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重写了一下 Remodex 的 Relay 部分,并且支持了 Docker 部署。你也可以选择使用我提供的 Relay(部署在日本东京,三网优化,到江浙沪的延迟在 30ms 左右)。
github.com/missuo/remodex-re…
[开源] [TF版] Remodex - 适用于 OpenAI Codex CLI 和桌面客户端版的手机远程控制应用,可以对话和发送指令进行远程开发操作。这是开发者 @Emanueledpt 推出的开源应用,支持读取现有会话并继续开发,缺点是每次都必须在 PC/Mac 上运行命令生成二维码,手机端扫码才能配对:ourl.co/112139?x
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Security is a top priority at @ZentraFinance. Before their formal audit phase ahead of launch, the team also ran Sherlock AI across the staking and rewards contracts to catch issues early. It surfaced a High-severity bug in the rewards accounting. Zentra gave us permission to share it publicly so other teams can learn from the pattern.
Here’s how the vulnerability worked.
Zentra is a decentralized, non-custodial, over-collateralized money market with staking mechanics. The issue lives in StakedZNTDistributor, where rewards are tracked using a global shareIndex and a per-user lastShareIndex so users only accrue rewards for periods when they actually hold shares.
The invariant is simple: only outstanding shares should earn rewards.
The failure point is cancelWithdrawal(). On requestWithdrawal(), the contract syncs accounting (updates lastShareIndex to the current shareIndex) and then burns the user’s receipt tokens, leaving them with zero shares during the pending window. Rewards can still be added during that window via addReward, increasing shareIndex.
If the user then calls cancelWithdrawal(), the contract remints the burned shares — but does not sync lastShareIndex at the moment of remint. The next time rewards are accounted (e.g., claimAllRewards(), stake(), or another requestWithdrawal()), _updateCredit computes (shareIndex - lastShareIndex) * remintedBalance, which incorrectly credits rewards for the entire pending-withdrawal interval when the user’s balance was actually zero.
In practice, it becomes a timing loop around reward events: stake → request withdrawal (burn) → wait for addReward → cancel withdrawal (remint, no sync) → claim. Repeating that cycle around meaningful reward additions siphons rewards from honest stakers.
The PoC demonstrates this by setting up an honest staker (Alice) and an attacker (Bob). Bob requests withdrawal, rewards are added during the pending period, Bob cancels, then claims and ends up receiving all the reward for a time that Bob didn’t hold any shares.
Impact is reward dilution and value leakage from the reward pool, because users can claim rewards for time they did not have shares outstanding, breaking the core reward-accounting invariant. Impact is not only limited by rewards dilution. The vulnerability allows the attacker to drain staking tokens too since staked token is also used as reward token. Therefore, insolvency is yet another impact of the vulnerability.
Fix direction is straightforward: treat cancelWithdrawal() as an accounting sync point. When shares are reminted, lastShareIndex must be brought current (or an equivalent sync performed) so the burn interval never gets included in later _updateCredit calculations.
Special thanks to @demorextess for helping triage the issue and assisting with the PoC.
Zentra caught and fixed this during development by running Sherlock AI early. That’s where AI auditing is most helpful: it finds edge cases before reward logic gets locked in, so the formal audit phase starts from a cleaner baseline and incentives go live on math that’s already been pressure tested.
Note: Sherlock completed a security audit of Zentra’s minimal deployment (launch) contracts at branch main, commit 4be344d6f47355063dcf758359ac5682d87a370e. This statement applies only to the contracts and versions referenced by that commit. Security reviews reduce risk, but do not eliminate it.
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看着自己的 BTC 工具箱一点点变得完善,真的有种看着孩子长大的感觉。
从项目立项、提交第一个 Git(8 月 14 号)算起,到现在已经四个多月了。
回头想想当初为什么会做这个项目——那会儿 BTC 生态正火,各种协议层出不穷,根本打不完。当时我只是想分发 330 sat,但市面上免费的 BTC 分发工具(比如 wizz)最低都是 546 sat,其他工具要么限制多、要么收费。于是干脆自己写了个简单的页面。
后来想着反正也没事,就开始一点点往里加功能。越加越多,不知不觉,市面上常见的功能几乎都做了一遍,甚至还加了一个原创功能(这个后面再单独讲)。
写着写着,又觉得 UI 实在不行,不够现代,也不符合自己的审美。于是又花了两天刷设计站、找灵感,参考了不少国内外工具集网站的 UI 风格,才最终定下现在这套方案。光是重构 UI 和布局,就消耗了大量时间,说实话真的挺心累的。
好在现在,核心功能基本都已经在 BTC 主网跑过测试。虽然还有一些功能没来得及加,但我觉得,是时候可以面世了。
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🚀 刚完成了 Aave Monitor Bot - 一个 Aave V3 协议的实时监控 tg bot!
📊 核心功能:
• 实时追踪用户仓位和健康因子
• 监控资金池供应/借贷上限使用率
• 清算风险预警
• Telegram 即时通知
💡 使用场景:
• 大户监控自己的仓位健康度,避免被清算
• 监控市场的借贷、存款利率、供应上限情况
• 订阅 aave 上线新池子的通知
• 随时查看某地址的借贷情况, 内容详尽易懂, 帮你轻松计算 apy 收益数据等
比如这次为了抢 aave 上 PT-usde 新增额度, 我就创建了一个监控(虽然第一时间得到了通知, 但是没有准备合约还是没有抢到循环贷额度 🤣)
目前只支持 ETH 网络, 访问 t.me/AaaveMonitorBot 来玩耍吧.
现在服务器也买了, 后续应该会开始继续做之前要做的 l0 token 流动性价差监控的工具了.大概率也是以 tg bot 的方式提供. 以及这些工具大概率是会收费的.
PS: 如果你有 web3 相关的需求, 欢迎砸过来
#DeFi #Aave #风险管理
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刚注意到 GMGN 在 BSC 的路由合约被攻击,我和团队的 @0xTrini7 大佬一起分析了下攻击原理。
交易哈希👇
🔗 bscscan.com/tx/0xe45c425080a…
核心合约实现地址:0x89F215464dddaFBA1FDDdccAc7124FE542a5D90e
漏洞函数为 swapMixedMultiHopExactIn,约在第875–884行。
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Meditated🟨
Also, this tweet includes some gifts, you know what to do $JIMMY







































