Simon retweeted
Crypto Has Single-Handedly Revitalized The Child Sexual Abuse Industry. Stop the Madness . . .
With common sense and diligent footnoting, Alison Jimenez, a seasoned anti-money laundering expert, recently addressed crypto use in the child sexual abuse industry.
It is important to note that unlike everyone I have ever known who touts crypto, Ms. Jimenez has no bias whatsoever, is 100% independent and objective and only seeks truth -- which makes her analysis all the more powerful and uniquely credible.
Specifically, Ms. Jimenez writes a disturbing and powerful research paper explains in clear and certain terms that, But for the ability to monetize Child Sexual Abuse Materials (CSAM) through crypto, both the amount of CSAM and the number of children exploited would be dramatically lower. securitiesanalytics.com/how-…
Key Take-Aways from Ms. Jimenez's Research:
▪ Commercial online CSAM was constrained from the late 2000’s through the late 2010’s as traditional payment methods were curtailed.
▪ The introduction of crypto as the payment method for CSAM contributed to the dramatic increase in online commercial CSAM.
▪ Crypto features including pseudo-anonymity, cross-border transactions, speed, and decentralization are valued by CSAM participants.
▪ Commercial CSAM market structure incentivizes new content, thereby increasing the number of children exploited.
▪ Financially motivated sextortion of minors is a rapidly growing threat that relies on crypto to remit profits across international borders.
Now Do Fiat
Nothing is more maddening and absurd than when crypto-shills retort to report's like Ms. Jimenez's with their "Now Do Fiat" whataboutism i.e. that the criminal activity in fiat is so much greater than the fraud in crypto -- so crypto is actually somehow a good thing.
I get it, fiat use in CSAM, fraud, money laundering and other financial chicanery is horrible and a problem -- but whataboutism will always remain a flawed and anemic pivot.
What every study shows is that crypto has evolved into the killer app for criminals, ushering in a crypto-crime wave of epic proportions. Clearly, the scale of crime in crypto is orders of magnitude greater than what it is in traditional finance.
Moreover, comparing fiat to crypto is a mammoth false equivalency. Fiat is money, which is used and respected across the word, and serves as the key to commerce and financial markets.
On the other hand, crypto is not money - crypto is a mere speculative and vacuous asset with no other current use case than speculation and making crime a heck of a lot easier.
Of course, it should go without saying that U.S. TradeFi is rife with bad actors and can be dangerous -- and is a system that has a lot of flaws -- and some really dire oppressive tendencies. Believe me, I get it, I spent almost 20 years investigating and prosecuting financial crimes for the U.S. Government.
However, the risks of transacting with U.S. registered financial institutions like banks and brokerages pale in comparison to the risks of engaging in transactions with crypto trading platforms and stablecoins like Tether. That point seems pretty basic, at least IMHO. (sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog…)
An Expert Analysis of crypto-traceability Stats
With exhaustive research and diligent footnoting, Alison Jimenez similarly addressed the "Now Do Fiat" argument directly, displacing the argument with facts, research and common sense in recent Congressional testimony.:
“Putting crypto crime into context is a worthwhile endeavor but making invalid comparisons only
confuses the issue. Hopefully we can agree that the comparison below is nonsense:
'Alice drinks 2% milk.
Bob puts 98% unleaded gasoline in his car.
Bob’s percentage is 49 times greater than Alice’s!'
Yet, statements like this are routinely used when discussing cryptocurrency’s use in illicit finance versus traditional financial products.
Commentators often erroneously compare a UN estimate of the value of illicit proceeds ranging 2% to 5% of global GDP to numbers published by blockchain analytics vendors that report transactions involving illicit address are less than 1% percent of all digital asset transaction volume. Some commentators extrapolate from the invalid comparison to suggest that “criminals don’t like crypto.” Here are a few reasons why this comparison is flawed:
-- The UN estimated the proceeds of crime, not the means of payment. The means of payment could have been real estate, oil, stock, jewelry, bartering of drugs for weapons, or government issued currency (fiat).
-- Blockchain analytics illicit transactions only include “known” or “attributed” on-chain transactions while the UN’s estimate was of all illicit proceeds, not just proceeds clearly “attributed” to criminals.
-- Blockchain analytics vendors divide their illicit crypto transaction amount by all cryptocurrency transaction volume.
-- Cryptocurrency transaction volume is inflated in several ways including: bad actors creating thousands of transactions to obscure fund movement, leveraged trading, rampant wash-trading, and moving cryptocurrency between wallets without any meaningful economic activity.
-- Blockchain analytics calculations divides “known” illicit transactions by "all” cryptocurrency transactions. The denominator, “all crypto transactions”, includes unidentified illicit activity, licit transactions, and unclassified transaction.
-- Commentators often incorrectly interpret this data to only include the binary options of illicit or licit activity. Additionally, when transactions are attributed a regulated exchange, blockchain analytics often cannot determine if illicit crypto was involved.
-- Global GDP and “all cryptocurrency transaction volume” are not interchangeable and do not measure the same thing. Global “transaction volume” is orders of magnitude greater than Global GDP.
In summary, blockchain analytics, while helpful in certain situations, cannot and does not
provide the complete picture of the use of cryptocurrency in illicit finance."
Sources:
docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/B…
securitiesanalytics.com/3-mi…
Crypto is Not Traceable
Don’t believe the hype about crypto-traceability.
When it comes to tracing crypto used in crime and terrorism and bringing crypto-using criminals to justice, law enforcement and everyone else are mostly SOL. That is axiomatic.
moneylaundering.com/news/cry…
The Stark reality is that for criminals and terrorists who have incorporated crypto into their modus operandi, tracing their crypto transactions creates unprecedented challenges for law enforcement, regulators and everyone else. There may be a few exceptions and rare occasions when crypto is recovered and the culprits are sent to prison but they are few and far-between. ]
While crypto payments (if not obscured or properly laundered) might in some instances provide a glimpse into the chain of where crypto is going, the chain does not identify who the crypto is going to. Indeed, according to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), mixers and tumblers are designed specifically to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control’ of a financial transaction. justice.gov/archives/ag/page…
Moreover, even in the best cases of crypto-tracking (which are rare, take a lot of effort and only work in some instances), the identity of the actual holder is typically found using subpoenas, search warrants, arrest, etc. Not an easy task when the individuals and entities reside in countries outside the U.S., who will not only fight U.S. law enforcement efforts but will go so far as to refuse to accept delivery of service. See e.g. SEC/Terraform case, where Terraform and its founder continue to fight SEC subpoenas despite a detailed ruling compelling them to do so. linkedin.com/pulse/secterraf…
Consider Ransomware Attacks
Take for example the crypto-crime of ransomware. Perpetrators of ransomware attacks demand crypto to unlock corporate IT systems and data that the attackers have surreptitiously encrypted. Collecting crypto in extortion transactions allows ransomware attackers not only to conceal their tracks and identities, but also to conduct their schemes from anywhere in the world. But for bitcoin, ransomware attacks would not exist. And anyone who tells you otherwise is dead wrong. teapawt.net/JohnReedStark/st…
For instance, FinCEN announced in November, 2022, that US financial institutions spent nearly $1.2B on ransomware payouts in 2021 more than double from 2020, and three quarters of the 1,251 ransomware payments pertained to ransomware were apparently paid to Russian gangs. If crypto were so easy to trace, then the identities, whereabouts and details of the ransomware payment collectors would become known -- and prosecutions would follow. But that rarely, if ever, actually happens.
Sources:
fincen.gov/news/news-release…
reuters.com/legal/government…
pinsentmasons.com/out-law/an…
nytimes.com/2022/02/23/busin…
Crypto and Traditional Crimes
Traditional crimes have also increased exponentially because of crypto, including: drug-dealing; human sex trafficking; money laundering; sanction evasion by countries like Russia, North Korea and Iran, who use crypto to transfer funds outside financial systems; assassins and other killers seeking payment for murder-for-hire services; and a slew of other financial crimes. sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2022/…;
North Korea is a particularly egregious criminal application of crypto. North Korea's crypto hackers are paving the road to nuclear Armageddon. North Korea has quietly become a cryptocurrency superpower. It has stolen billions in bitcoin and ether and is funneling profits to fund its nuclear weapons program.
technologyreview.com/2020/03… wsj.com/articles/how-north-k…
cnet.com/culture/features/no…
Additional Sources:
This article (which is just one of many scholarly works and government reports) explains how Hamas and other terrorist organizations evolve and transmogrify, changing their crypto financing techniques to evade capture: criminologyjournal.org/uploa…
This article exhaustively and meticulously debunks the myth of crypto traceability: linkedin.com/pulse/crypto-tr…
This testimony from a former US Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutor (which is somewhat supportive/agnostic of blockchain) explains in plain language the challenges for law enforcement when terrorists use crypto: banking.senate.gov/imo/media…
This DOJ report responding to the President’s Crypto-Executive Order highlights how criminals and terrorists continue to use crypto and other digital assets for money laundering, weapons purchases, facilitating tax evasion, and evading sanctions: justice.gov/ag/page/file/153…
This US General Accounting Office Report explains how the increasing use of advanced obfuscation techniques makes blockchain analysis difficult and resource intensive for US agencies. "Criminals are getting more sophisticated and using anonymity-enhanced tools or methods to obfuscate illicit transactions when facilitating criminal activities, including human and drug trafficking. " gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105462…
This recent panel discussion between the SEC’s current and former Crypto Unit chiefs covers how the lack of crypto traceability makes detection of market manipulation an impossibility for any investor: youtube.com/watch?v=57OLu6mD…
This article debunks one of the bigger myths of crypto-traceability -- that all cryptocurrency transactions are recorded on the blockchain. In fact, per AML expert Allison Jimenez, "Just a small fraction of crypto transactions are permanently, immutably, de-centrally recorded on the blockchain. Most transactions occur off-chain, within exchanges, who keep private ledgers. History has shown us plenty examples of 'sloppy' or fraudulent recordkeeping by crypto companies." securitiesanalytics.com/frau…
Looking Ahead
So how often is the FBI able to recover ransomware payments and other crypto proceeds of crimes? As one senior FBI Agent and crypto-crime specialist told me recently during a meeting at FBI headquarters: "Never,” adding later on, “But for bitcoin, ransomware would not exist.” So, there’s also that.
Clearly, if crypto were so easy to track, then the tens of thousands of ransomware attackers would all get caught. But the reality is that only a minuscule few are ever even identified, let alone apprehended, charged, extradited and brought to justice. Too many crypto-related tools exist to obscure, mask, disguise, camouflage and secrete crypto-transactions.
Moreover, while crypto payments (if not obscured or properly laundered) might in some instances provide a glimpse into the chain of where crypto is going, the chain does not identify who the crypto is going to.
Finally, even in the best cases of crypto-tracking (which are rare, take a lot of effort and only work in some instances), the identity of the actual holder is typically found using subpoenas, search warrants, arrest, etc. Not an easy task when the individuals and entities reside in countries outside the U.S., who will not only fight U.S. law enforcement efforts but will go so far as to refuse to accept delivery of service. (See e.g. SEC/Terraform case, where Terraform and its founder continue to fight SEC subpoenas despite a detailed ruling compelling them to do so.)
Along these lines, the U.S. Treasury Department, in an April 6, 2023, Report entitled, "Illicit Finance Risk Assessment in Decentralized Finance" stated ominously:
"[T]here are some limitations to relying on public blockchain information and tracing to mitigate illicit finance risks in the DeFi space. First, as noted above, the data on the public blockchain is pseudonymous. While regulators, law enforcement, and public blockchain companies can in some cases identify transaction participants, they may in other cases only have the participants’ wallet addresses without additional identifying information. Additionally, users can obfuscate the tracing of transactions on the public blockchain through the use of mixers, cross-chain bridges, or anonymity-enhanced cryptocurrencies (AECs), which can create challenges for blockchain tracing. Second, blockchain tracing and analytics often require an initial identified illicit transaction or address as a starting point, although new tools are able to identify potentially suspicious activity based on blockchain data. Third, critical activities in a DeFi service can occur off-chain and there are challenges to locating and obtaining this data."
linkedin.com/pulse/crypto-tr…
Crypto is not traceable -- it is a scourge which has ushered in a crime wave of epic proportions. The time is now to stop the hustle, stop the madness and stop the insanity.
Crypto & Ransomware: The Perfect Match
Per the Wall Street Journal, Caesars Entertainment paid a $15 million ransom to hackers in a cyberattack late this summer. Meanwhile MGM has apparently been hit by a similar ransomware attack variant. Thanks bitcoin — much appreciated. linkedin.com/pulse/seven-ala…
The cyber-attackers demanded $30 million, and Caesars agreed to pay about half of that amount, according to a person familiar with the matter. Caesars is expected to report the cyberattack in a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filing soon. wsj.com/business/hospitality…
Apparently, there was a similar ransomware attack against MGM as well, wreaking similar havoc. Per Forbes, more than 60 hours after the ransomware cyberattack, patrons trying to access the MGM Resorts website are still met by a splash page that apologizes for the inconvenience. The ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware group claimed responsibility for the ransomware attack that began, of all places, on LinkedIn.
forbes.com/sites/suzannerowa…
Meanwhile, a recent ransomware attack on a California-based health care system forced some of its locations to close and left others to rely on paper records. The system, Prospect Medical Holdings, operates 16 hospitals and more than 165 clinics and outpatient centers in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Southern California. nytimes.com/2023/08/05/us/cy…
In recent weeks, more ransomware groups have launched attacks at health systems, and they have disrupted patient care, says John Riggi, national advisor for cybersecurity and risk for the American Hospital Association. More than 200 ransomware attacks affecting more than 36 million people have been reported in the first half of 2023 says Riggi. chiefhealthcareexecutive.com…
Along the same lines, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted nine defendants who allegedly used the Conti ransomware variant to attack more than 900 victims worldwide – including hospitals, healthcare providers and their patients – affecting critical infrastructure in approximately 47 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and approximately 31 foreign countries. healthcareitnews.com/news/ru…
According to the FBI, Conti ransomware was used to attack more critical infrastructure victims than any other ransomware variant in 2021. Along the same lines, per The U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), for 2022, there were 1,189 ransomware attacks resulting in ransomware payments of over $1.2 billion — and that is probably just the tip of the iceberg, because ransomware attacks can often go unreported. How many of these attackers were brought to Justice? None. How much of the payments were recovered? None. fincen.gov/sites/default/fil…; linkedin.com/pulse/crypto-tr…
Caesars and MGM have not yet publicly identified the means of payment demanded by the ransomware attackers. However, my bet is that the ransomware attackers in the Caesars and MGM attacks each demanded that the ransomware payments be made in bitcoin or some other cryptocurrency (which has been the case in every single ransomware attack response I have ever worked on).
This is axiomatic and bears repeating ad infinitum:
But for bitcoin, ransomware attacks would not exist. Anyone who tells you otherwise is dead wrong. Full-Stop.
Simon retweeted
I worked on this at Twitter in 2015. IIRC we tested it and most people didn't get any views and we had to have some thresholds before showing it as "0 views" was depressing
We also wanted to be accurate and not count if someone quickly scrolls past your tweet in their TL
Simon retweeted
Let's take a closer look at the man running Boris Johnson's leadership campaign: Jacob Rees-Mogg teapawt.net/ByDonkeys/status/15837…
Simon retweeted
For the first time, astronomers have captured a photograph of a star so distant that nothing we do could ever affect it — even in the very fullness of time.
It lies beyond the affectable universe.
Let me explain:
1/n
Simon retweeted
Please pass a law that makes selling this shit illegal before it becomes a thing. We have enough noise pollution with the loud exhaust people as it is. @GavinNewsom
Also, burn in hell whoever thought this was a good idea.
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A19Z have completely lost the plot.
"Andreessen Horowitz is investing about $350 million in Flow....the largest individual check Andreesen Horowitz has ever written in a round of funding to a company, values Flow at more than $1 billion before it even officially opens its doors." nytimes.com/2022/08/15/busin…
2
Simon retweeted
Replying to @christapeterso
Web3 rules so much because they’re like “let me show u a world beyond the limits of what you think is physically and spiritually possible” and then describe arbitrage for McDonald’s loyalty points
Simon retweeted
Here's who else is buying Twitter now: Qatar, a16z, Binance, Larry Ellison et al.
How it started:
World's richest man is buying Twitter and setting speech free.
How it's going:
World's rich men are buying Twitter and setting it free from public accountability.
Simon retweeted
Simulation of a car getting smashed using gravity values for different celestial bodies:
Simon retweeted
After literally years of thinking, arguing, writing, and revising, I have published the first beta of a spec for Semantic Versioning for TypeScript Types. 🎉 If you’re using #TypeScript, please give it (or at least the summary) a read! semver-ts.org


























