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#StellarParticle, an adversary campaign associated with COZY BEAR (APT29), was active throughout 2021 leveraging novel tactics and techniques 🧵 crowdstrike.com/blog/observa…
Tim Parisi retweeted
An open offer to Tesla: We fully support putting Cybercab first, and we’d be glad to take the Cybertruck line off your hands.
We’d fund it with a consortium of investors and run it at no cost to Tesla’s floor space, headcount, or focus. All of that goes to Cybercab. Cybercab gets first call on battery cells too. We’ll wait our turn.
Tesla gains incremental profit: a license fee, plus FSD and Robotaxi network revenues on every vehicle built.
We’d build the Cybertruck, a three-row CyberSUV, and an unmanned CyberCargo hauler. More autonomous miles, across every surface of this planet and beyond.
Worth a conversation?
Tim Parisi retweeted
It’s now Q3 2025…. @teslasi has said nothing………………………
Tim Parisi retweeted
We continue to monitor activity related to CVE-2024-3400, and have several resources to keep you informed 👇
💻 Complete overview on our site: crwdstr.ke/6011bdDw3
🔖 Quick reference guide: crwdstr.ke/6016bdDwr
🌶️ breakdown of the MSFT breach and US Cyber Safety Boards review
The CSRB findings from the summer 2023 breach of Microsoft are both alarming and confirm many of the concerns I've voiced about the risk of overreliance on their products. @Microsoft is a national security threat and it's time to take it seriously! 🧵
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.@AmericanAir thanks for boarding us all on flight 591 before you confirmed having pilots. “Apologies for any inconvenience” should do the trick. @FAANews
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Tim Parisi retweeted
In addition to the @CrowdStrike blog post today on Imperial Kitten - we have released a podcast detailing Iranian cyber operations going back over a decade - crowdstrike.podbean.com/e/ir… or where ever you enjoy podcasts. #CyberSecurity #threatintelligence
Nice work here by @Mandiant to spread the word. I’ll add specifically that vCenter and #ESXi are targeted where the blog mentions encryption of hypervisors. Get jump hosts with separate MFA in between them, and remove AD binding. #scatteredspider mandiant.com/resources/blog/…
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Still relevant and should be standard. #ESXi segmented by jump hosts with separate MFA. On average 24-48 hours from initial smish or social engineering to encryption and data exfil.
SCATTERED SPIDER / 0ktapus / UNC3944 is alive and well. Don’t make it easy for them:
◦ MFA everywhere
◦ Disable MFA push; use number-matching, OTP, or hardware token
◦ Disable external IP and unsupervised MFA self-enrollment or self-reset
◦ Allow only one trusted MFA device per user
crowdstrike.com/blog/analysi…
crowdstrike.com/blog/scatter…
mandiant.com/resources/blog/…
group-ib.com/media-center/pr…
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Arguably the largest aspect and biggest challenge of #DFIR consulting is client service, not the technical analysis. How do you service clients that are going through an IR?
1️⃣Fluid communication
2️⃣Anticipate needs and questions
3️⃣Build trust and a relationship
2️⃣Nothing worse than starting a status update off with administrative nonsense. Client is anxious to know what you know. Bottom line up front. What are the next steps? When do you expect to finish? Today is Friday - when are we syncing next?
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3️⃣ Onsite and phone calls really help with building trust and a relationship, but honesty and transparency are the key players here. Once your transparency or honesty comes into question, things go downhill, and you’re fighting two battles: the threat actor and the client. #infosec
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🌶️
Microsoft called a new report from Wiz on the recent U.S. gov't hack "speculative and not evidence-based." Wiz said they're confused because they worked on the report with members of Microsoft's security team
@TheRecord_Media #Microsoft #China #Wiz
therecord.media/microsoft-di…
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Tim Parisi retweeted
Microsoft needs to disclose how the MSA consumer account signing keys were stolen. It’s creating a unique problem of distrust in customer reliance on cloud services. This is on Microsoft . At present the explanation is not good enough.
Mail Items accessed is throwing up a wall to conducting proper DFIR investigations when most orgs are on E3. This isn’t security, this is corporate greed. It’s beyond wrong.
reuters.com/technology/micro…
Be sure to check the #MOVEit application DB and IIS logs for data exfil analysis. More in our blog: crowdstrike.com/blog/identif… #infosec #dfir
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