Serge Boucher

מלחמה עם איראן בעת הזו אינה צורך ביטחוני דחוף. היא עלולה להיות הפקרות אסטרטגית. ראשית, אין הצדקה ביטחונית ברורה לפתיחת מלחמה עם איראן דווקא עכשיו. איראן ממשיכה להתעצם, לשקם את יכולותיה ולהתחמש, ואין להקל ראש באיום שהיא מציבה. אבל אין כרגע "אקדח מעשן" שמחייב את ישראל לצאת למלחמה מיידית. בהיעדר איום מיידי, קשה להשתחרר מהחשש שהדחיפה למערכה נוספת נובעת גם משיקולים פוליטיים צרים של מי שמבקש לנצל אותה לצרכיו. שנית, תקיפה ישראלית ללא סיוע וגיבוי אמריקני תהיה טעות אסטרטגית מהמעלה הראשונה. ישראל מצטיינת במבצעים קצרים, ממוקדים ומבוססי מודיעין. היא אינה בנויה לנהל לבדה מלחמת התשה ממושכת במעגל השלישי, מול מדינה בגודלה וביכולותיה של איראן. מי שחושב שניתן לפתוח במערכה כזו ללא האמריקנים, לשלוט במשך הלחימה ובהיקפה ולסיים אותה בתנאים הרצויים לישראל, מתעלם מהלקחים של המערכות הקודמות. זו אינה רק טעות אסטרטגית. זו הפקרות אסטרטגית שעלולה לגבות מישראל מחירים ביטחוניים, כלכליים ומדיניים עצומים. שלישית, ישראל נמצאת בתקופת ממשלת מעבר. לממשלה הנוכחית אין רוב בכנסת. גם אם עומדת לה הסמכות החוקית להורות על פעולה צבאית, אין פירוש הדבר שיש לה לגיטימציה ציבורית ופוליטית מספקת להכניס את ישראל למלחמה יזומה נוספת, בוודאי בהיעדר איום מיידי. החלטה בעלת השלכות היסטוריות על ביטחון המדינה אינה יכולה להתקבל מתוך שיקולי הישרדות פוליטית. רביעית, הממשלה הבאה תהיה חייבת לבחון מחדש את האסטרטגיה הישראלית כלפי איראן. האסטרטגיה שהוביל בנימין נתניהו במשך שנים לא השיגה את יעדיה המרכזיים. חרף המערכות הצבאיות, ישראל ניצבת מול איראן קיצונית יותר, נחושה יותר לשקם את יכולותיה, ואולי גם משוכנעת יותר בצורך בהרתעה גרעינית. במקביל, ישראל עלולה למצוא את עצמה מול ארצות הברית שאינה מוכנה עוד לשאת במחיר של מלחמה נוספת נגד איראן, ושמבקשת לצמצם את מעורבותה הצבאית במזרח התיכון. ולבסוף, לפני שממהרים למלחמה נוספת, צריך לשאול מה נכשל במלחמות הקודמות. כיצד הגענו למצב שבו, למרות הישגים מבצעיים משמעותיים, האיום האיראני לא הוסר? מדוע ההנחות בדבר יכולתנו להכריע את איראן באמצעות כוח צבאי לא התממשו? ומה מבטיח שמערכה נוספת תוביל לתוצאה שונה? ישראל אינה יכולה להרשות לעצמה להמשיך לנהל את האסטרטגיה שלה כלפי איראן באמצעות רצף של מלחמות, בלי להגדיר יעד מדיני בר־השגה ובלי לבחון ברצינות את המחירים ואת החלופות. האחריות הלאומית מחייבת להפיק לקחים לפני שיוצאים למלחמה נוספת, לא לאחר שמשלמים שוב את מחירה.

Iran After the Midterms: A Long-Term Iranian Victory Could Trigger a Short-Term Escalation I think we need to distinguish between the short-term and long-term implications of the US midterm elections. In the long run, Iran has achieved a significant strategic success. The blue wave has demonstrated something that every future American president will have to consider before launching another war against Tehran: Iran does not need to defeat the United States militarily to impose enormous economic and political costs on Washington. Disrupting global energy markets, driving up gasoline prices, and increasing the cost of living for ordinary Americans can ultimately have devastating political consequences. Once the new Congress takes office in January, pressure to end the war will increase significantly. Democrats will seek to use congressional oversight and funding restrictions to constrain Trump, although their ability to stop military operations will not be absolute. The political lesson of this war may influence American policy toward Iran for years to come. But in the short term, the situation may actually become more dangerous. Tehran feels strengthened by the election results. It has little incentive to make major concessions, particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz, frozen Iranian funds, and its ability to export oil. Iran was unwilling to surrender before the elections, and it certainly has no reason to do so now. This leaves Trump with several difficult options. He can walk away without a meaningful agreement, but that would hardly look like victory. He can accept some Iranian demands regarding Hormuz to open the door to nuclear negotiations. Or he can continue the current pressure campaign, hoping Tehran will eventually blink. The problem with the third option is that the current situation is not static. It is an ongoing military confrontation with considerable potential for escalation. Iranian attacks on oil tankers, followed by recurring American strikes inside Iran, create a dangerous cycle of action and retaliation. Every additional night of American attacks increases the possibility of a stronger Iranian response. The potential expansion of attacks against regional energy infrastructure, including the recent strike on the Khor Mor gas field, adds another dimension to this danger. Meanwhile, the substantial concentration of American military forces in the region raises another possibility: Trump may be preparing for one final escalation, hoping that a powerful strike will either force Iran into an agreement or allow him to declare victory and end the war. But what happens if Iran responds by escalating further rather than surrendering? That is the fundamental question Washington still has not answered. There is also a danger of Iranian miscalculation. Tehran may interpret the Democratic victory as evidence that Trump is increasingly constrained and therefore underestimate his willingness to use military force. At the same time, Trump may believe that one more major strike can restore American leverage without triggering a wider conflict. Both assumptions could prove dangerously wrong. Netanyahu remains another important factor. Although politically weakened, he is still Israel's prime minister and continues to press Trump for additional military action, offering Israeli support for another campaign. He also understands that a change of government in Israel could close this window of opportunity. And this brings us to the central paradox: Iran's political success in the US midterms could actually increase the risk of military escalation before January. The elections may have accelerated the political end of the war, but they have not eliminated the possibility of one final, potentially devastating confrontation. Trump still needs something he can present as victory. Iran will not surrender. And the daily cycle of attacks and retaliation makes it increasingly difficult for either side to control the escalation. The war may be approaching its political end, but its most dangerous military phase could still lie ahead. #Iran #iran

Why More Strikes Against the Basij Would Not Have Brought Down Iran’s Regime I think this study misses a crucial point about the war against Iran and, more importantly, about the fundamental limitations of attempting regime change through airpower. First, every military operation against Iran is extremely complex. The number of targets that can be attacked is not unlimited, and target selection must reflect clear operational priorities and realistic strategic objectives. Striking one category of targets inevitably comes at the expense of another. Second, once it became clear that the Kurdish option was collapsing, the possibility of bringing down the Iranian regime became even more remote(Not that it was realistic from the beginning). More importantly, this decision had clarified the fundamental nature of the campaign: it was a war aimed at weakening the regime, not overthrowing it. That distinction matters enormously. Once regime change was no longer a realistic objective, the operational emphasis naturally shifted toward severely degrading the regime's military production infrastructure, eliminating senior commanders, and weakening its broader military capabilities, rather than prioritizing attacks on Basij facilities and other instruments of domestic control. But it would also be wrong to suggest that Israel / US completely ignored the regime's internal security apparatus. Israeli strikes did target Basij headquarters and facilities, and senior figures within the organization were reportedly eliminated, including its commander, Soleimani, his deputy and senior intelligence officials. The problem was that the Iranian regime had anticipated precisely this scenario. It had prepared to evacuate facilities, disperse personnel, and continue operating from alternative locations, including schools and other civilian buildings. The fundamental problem was not the selection of targets. It was the assumption that airstrikes could somehow persuade or enable the Iranian population to rise up and overthrow the regime. That assumption was deeply flawed. Iran has no sufficiently organized opposition capable of translating military pressure into a coordinated political uprising. There was no credible mechanism for turning the destruction of security facilities into the collapse of the regime's control over the country. Even if Israel and the United States had devoted significantly more resources to attacking Basij headquarters, command centers, and other institutions of domestic repression, the fundamental political reality would not have changed. The regime retained its coercive capabilities, its organizational structure, and its determination to survive. Meanwhile, ordinary Iranians were living through a war, facing uncertainty, destruction, and the dangers of continued bombardment. Under those circumstances, expecting civilians to take to the streets and confront an entrenched security apparatus, without an organized opposition or a credible alternative leadership, was never a realistic strategy. Airpower can destroy buildings, eliminate commanders, and weaken military capabilities. But it cannot create an organized opposition, establish alternative political leadership, or manufacture the conditions for a successful popular revolution. That is why I disagree with the suggestion that a different target list, focused more heavily on the Basij, could have produced regime change. The issue was never simply whether enough Basij facilities had been destroyed. It was whether there was any realistic political mechanism through which those attacks could bring down the Islamic Republic. There was not. And that is the central lesson: the failure to overthrow the Iranian regime was not primarily a failure of targeting. It reflected the absence of the political and organizational conditions necessary for regime change. More bombs against the Basij would not have solved that problem. #IranWar‌ #iran

Ten Commitments That Could Truly Transform Israel’s Relationship with America Excellent tweet, But if you genuinely want to repair Israel’s standing in the United States, What Israel needs is not a better public relations campaign. It needs a fundamental change in policy. Here are ten commitments I would encourage you to make publicly that will really make a change in DC: A. Israel cannot and should not permanently occupy another people. The occupation is not a sustainable national strategy. It undermines Israel’s democratic character, its international legitimacy, and ultimately its own security. B. I extend my hand in peace to the Palestinian people. I recognize their right to self-determination and am prepared to engage in serious negotiations toward a political settlement that guarantees security, dignity, and a better future for both peoples. C. I will not pressure the Trump administration into launching another costly and ultimately unsuccessful military campaign against Iran. After two rounds of fighting that failed to achieve their central strategic objectives, it is time to rethink our approach. Preventing a nuclear-armed Iran must remain a priority, but another war without a realistic political endgame is not a strategy. D. Arab citizens of Israel are equal citizens, with equal rights and an equal stake in the country's future. I will not hesitate to work with their elected representatives in the Knesset, and I am prepared to consider including Arab parties in a governing coalition if we can agree on a common political agenda. E. My vision is an Israel defined by prosperity, security, and peace, not endless territorial expansion and permanent conflict. Israel will not permanently occupy Gaza or annex the West Bank. I will work closely with President Trump to fully implement his peace plan in a manner that benefits Israelis, Palestinians, and the broader international community. F. Israel has no ambition to determine who governs Lebanon or to occupy Lebanese territory. Once Israel's legitimate security requirements are met, we will withdraw to an internationally recognized, secure border and work toward a sustainable security arrangement. G. The same principle applies to Syria. Israel has no territorial ambitions in Syria and no desire to dictate who governs Damascus. Our objective is a secure border, enforceable security arrangements, and long-term regional stability. H. I will make rebuilding Israel's relationships with Egypt and Jordan a strategic priority. These peace treaties are among Israel's greatest diplomatic achievements. Let me be absolutely clear: neither Jordan nor Egypt is an alternative homeland for the Palestinian people. Israel will not support forced displacement or policies designed to transfer Palestinians into either country. I. Israel should aspire to a relationship with the United States that is increasingly based on mutual investment, innovation, and shared strategic interests rather than dependence on American taxpayer assistance. I will propose a joint US-Israel investment fund to advance major initiatives in artificial intelligence, advanced technology, energy, and scientific research, generating tangible benefits for both societies. J. I will deliver precisely the same message to European leaders. Israel wants to rebuild trust with its European partners through responsible policies, respect for international law, renewed diplomatic engagement, and a genuine commitment to peace. + Israel will fight terrorism in all its forms, without exception or double standards, including Jewish terrorism and violence against innocent Palestinians. Terrorism is terrorism, regardless of who commits it. No individual or group will be above the law, and those responsible will be held accountable. The rule of law must apply equally to everyone.. The bottom line: If you want to restore bipartisan support for Israel in Washington, rebuild trust with younger Americans, and reverse Israel's deteriorating international standing, you must first confront the policies that helped create this crisis. The problem is not that Israeli politicians are failing to explain themselves effectively in English. The problem is what they are defending. You cannot continue supporting permanent occupation, settlement expansion, endless wars, and the political exclusion of Arab citizens while expecting American public opinion to move in your favor. Israel does not need a better salesman in Washington. It needs a different policy in Jerusalem. #israel #us