ascended yet fails to grasp the point - what follows is a defense of ibn taymiyyah. starting off, the hadith in question is: يَا عِبَادِي إِنِّي حَرَّمْتُ الظُّلْمَ عَلَى نَفْسِي، وَجَعَلْتُهُ بَيْنَكُمْ مُحَرَّمًا، فَلَا تَظَالَمُوا. “O My servants, I have forbidden injustice for Myself, and I have made it forbidden among you, so do not wrong one another.” The report is narrated by Abū Dharr from the Prophet, relating from Allah. [Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Hadith 2577] god says that he has forbidden justice: [1] for himself and [2] among us (that is, we do not commit injustice) ascended interprets this as him *willing* to not commit injustice. lets understand this. what does it mean for god to will the non-commitment of injustice in relation to himself? the obvious answer here is that this reading does NOT make sense. because the will qua attribute of god only relates to that which is possible by virtue of its essence whereas god is necessary. so it makes 0 sense to say that gods himself is an object of his will-attachment. the books of kalam establish: متعلق القدرة والإرادة واحد وهو الممكنات دون الواجبات والمستحيلات إلا أن جهة تعلقهما بالممكنات مختلفة “The object of both power and will is the same: contingent things, excluding necessary and impossible things; however, the respect in which they relate to contingent things differs.” the correct reading, then, is that the phrase “i have forbidden injustice for myself” is a figure of speech expressing the impossibility of injustice proceeding from god, rather than a literal act of self-legislation whereby god wills not to commit an injustice that He could otherwise commit. consider an example: you and your friend get into an argument. consequently, you stop talking to him. you say to him: "i have forbidden upon myself conversation with you". we should see that an act of conversation/speech was/is genuinely possible insofar as the bare speech is concerned except it is now governed by an additional factor that supervenes on it and prevents the occurrence. in this case, it is the fact of him being mad at him that serve as the sufficient reason/cause. building upon this reasoning, we get into the the attribute of power. we often discuss the omnipotence paradox and often the standard answer we invoke is "power only relates to that which is logically possible" and since the example in the stone-paradox contains in its logical syntax p and -p in the same respect, the attribute of power does not extend to it. or in other words, its not under his power. extend this same reasoning here. the fact is that all possible quiddities or state of affairs - qua logical possibility - are, in fact, under gods power. the same applies to injustice and what is morally ugly, provided that we are discussing acts that are logically possible rather than intrinsically contradictory descriptions. if an act is logically possible, its moral ugliness does not, by itself, transform it into a logical impossibility. logical possibility concerns whether a state of affairs is internally coherent, whereas moral ugliness concerns its moral character. if one claims that god possesses the power to commit injustice but has voluntarily prohibited it upon himself, then one is treating divine non-injustice as analogous to the case of the friend who refrains from speaking. the relevant act remains possible in itself, while an additional determination prevents its occurrence. in the human example, that determination is anger; it is the wisdom of god as an attribute that serves as the supervening factor. he raised the point "he could have commited injusties" is blatantly incorrect. in all possible worlds and in his eternity, hes necessarily qualified with his attribute of wisdom that tracks the attribute of will (what to preponderate) so the fact is injustice - insofar as the bare possibility is concerned - is possible but becomes impossible when the attribute of wisdom is concerned. on this issue, ive compiled a large thread of statements from the maturidi scholars affirming exactly what ive said - ill link it below this response. more important point: the biggest proponents of moral realism - the mu'tazilites and twelvers/imami shia have likewise agreed that god *has* power over that which is ugly/bad/immoral/unjust. 1. qadi abd al-jabbar al-mu'tazili writes: والدليل على صحة ما نقوله، هو ما قد ثبت أنه تعالى قادر على أن يخلق فينا العلم الضروري، فيجب أن يكون قادرا على أن يخلق بدله الجهل، لأن من حق القادر على الشيء أن يكون قادرا على جنس ضده إذا كان له ضد، والجهل قبيح. "The proof that our position is correct is that it has been established that He, Exalted is He, is capable of creating necessary knowledge in us. It follows that He must also be capable of creating ignorance in its place, because it is a requirement of one who has power over a thing that he also have power over the kind of its contrary, if it has a contrary—and ignorance is morally ugly." 2. the imami theologian, al-hilli writes: في أنه تعالى قادر على القبيح قال : مع قدرته عليه لعموم النسبة ولا ينافي الامتناع اللاحق . أقول : ذهب العلماء كافة إلى أنه تعالى قادر على القبيح إلا النظام ، والدليل على ذلك أنا قد بينا عموم نسبة قدرته إلى الممكنات والقبيح منها فيكون مندرجا تحت قدرته . احتج بأن وقوعه منه يدل على الجهل أو الحاجة وهما منفيان في حقه تعالى . والجواب أن الامتناع هنا بالنظر إلى الحكمة فهو امتناع لاحق لا يؤثر في الإمكان الأصلي ، ولهذا عقب المصنف رحمه الله الاستدلال على مراده بالجواب عن الشبهة التي له وإن لم يذكرها صريحا . "On the proposition that He, Exalted is He, has power over the morally ugly He [al-Ṭūsī] says: “Despite His having power over it, owing to the universality of the relation [of His power to contingent things]; and this does not conflict with subsequent impossibility.” I say: All scholars held that He, Exalted is He, has power over the morally ugly, with the exception of al-Naẓẓām. The proof of this is that we have established the universality of the relation of His power to contingent things, and morally ugly acts are among them; therefore, they fall within the scope of His power. He [al-Naẓẓām] argued that the occurrence of such an act on His part would indicate either ignorance or need, both of which are negated with respect to Him, Exalted is He. The response is that the impossibility here is considered with respect to wisdom. It is therefore a subsequent impossibility (imtināʿ lāḥiq) that does not affect original possibility (al-imkān al-aṣlī). For this reason, the author—may Allah have mercy on him—followed the argument establishing his intended position with a response to the objection raised against it, even though he did not state that objection explicitly." as for the case of maturidis, i wont cite any one particular since the thread ive linked below has plenty of them already. back to the original point. we differ with him on the fact that the meaning of the hadith is completely rendered inexplicable and unintelligible under his meta-ethical framework. under asharite DCT, every action that god performs is just - the just-ness qualification is attached to it consequently and not antecedently, then what sense does it make for god to *forbid* injustice upon himself? the apparent meaning indicates that there is some factor that prevents the issuance of injustice - analogous to our case of the human case. another analogy: i say to you that i have forbidden eating upon myself during the holy month of ramadan, this indicates that although eating is possible, it becomes impossible by virtue of some other temporal consideration. how much more exalted then is the matter of our lord - who is eternal and everlasting - forbidding injustice upon himself. he knows the reprehensibility of reprehensible action and likewise the goodness of good action. the procession of uglyness and injustice is then deemed eternally impossible. on your account, the hadith holds no weight because if everything that god does subsequently aquires the label "just" then the very possibility of injustice (relating to his power) serves an evidence of moral duality (relating to justice vs relating to injustice). under your view, gods will ONLY relates to justice because whatever he does is just but the hadith clearly implies a dualist view of will-relation + a forbidden (which is rather symbolic of his attribute of wisdom that prevents his will relating) a clarification for readers: gods attribute of *power* insofar as its relations are concerned, is not something under he has control over. meaning, gods power, by virtue of its very essential nature, relates to every quiddity that is possible - god can not simply revoke the relation of power over it. what god does is add the attribute of *will* over one relation of power and then the objection comes into actualisation. so gods power necessarily relates to all possibilia, god then preponderates/particularises/specifies one option that he wants by directing his will over it or to it. this act-of-direction is governed by the attribute of wisdom - what to actualise and what to not which serves as the ground of him being a moral agent. this is something agreed upon by the atharis, maturidis, mu'tazilites/zaydis and twelvers. and god knows best.

i don't think understood the point I made in the entire paragraph. however, ill address the examples he presented. first, the khidr example. the response is that it is irrelevant because my original passage was more particular and precise - i did not say god never commanded evil qua evil or an instance of horric evil that was unjustified. the fact that the murder of the boy was justified because had he grown up, he would have caused much more harm. thus, if there be a divine command that the boy must be killed, god would not become an immoral agent. rather, he would only be an immoral proximate agent has he commanded the boy to be killed without him commiting any heinous crimes in future. meaning, had the kid been innocent in his future self, it would indeed have been unjust of god. likewise the second point of abraham and the sacrifice, this is also misunderstood. abraham, by virtue of his utmost degree of prophethood, knew that god is wise and just - hence, what occured to him was test of his commitment to god. indeed, we ourselves witness that his son was *not* killed. this argument would too likewise work had he actually been killed. moreover, hypothetically, even if the sacrifice had to come to pass, god would, by virtue of his mercy and wisdom, compensate him with much more greater.