Simurgh the Iranian

The founding commander of the IRGC Navy admits the Islamic Republic “talks too much” and that its supposed power is largely bluff, propaganda and empty threats. After merely surviving a short American-Israeli campaign, the Islamic Republic began declaring itself a "global superpower." Now one of the IRGC’s most authoritative founding commanders has exposed that narrative as hollow. Hossein Alaei was the first commander of the IRGC Navy from 1985 to 1990. He built the force that employed mines, fast boats and asymmetric warfare in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. He later chaired the IRGC Joint Staff, served as deputy defence minister and became a professor of strategic studies. He is not an exile or opposition activist. He helped build the regime’s military system. Alaei says one of the Islamic Republic’s greatest self-inflicted problems is “talking too much and making idealistic speeches” without possessing the operational tools needed to fulfil them. When the regime makes enormous claims unsupported by real capabilities, he argues, its adversaries exploit the gap and build international coalitions against Iran. He specifically condemned the IRGC’s practice of writing eliminationist slogans on missiles, describing it as arbitrary theatre rather than serious strategy. These provocations produce no military advantage. They generate isolation, sanctions and international support for action against the regime. His criticism exposes a decades-long pattern: ▪️ Superpower propaganda: After surviving a limited campaign, the regime presented survival itself as a historic military victory and evidence of global-power status. ▪️ Missile theatre: The IRGC wrote “Israel must be wiped out” on ballistic missiles while commanders predicted Israel would collapse before those missiles even struck. ▪️ Imaginary weapons: The regime unveiled the Qaher-313 as an indigenous stealth fighter, despite an undersized cockpit, civilian instruments, inadequate air intakes and no credible record of operational flight. ▪️ Fabricated victories: The IRGC repeatedly announced extraordinary missile success rates while independent assessments recorded widespread interceptions, technical failures and limited strategic results. The numbers demolish the superpower fantasy. The United States spends approximately $930–975 billion annually on its military. The Islamic Republic spends roughly $7.4 billion, a disparity of about 125 to one. The United States possesses 11 aircraft carriers and more than 80 destroyers. The Islamic Republic possesses neither. Its conventional air force remains dependent on aging aircraft and lacks the advanced aviation, intelligence architecture and global logistics required to project sustained power. The economic foundations are even further apart. The American economy exceeds $30 trillion. Iran’s nominal economy is approximately $360–370 billion, weakened further by corruption, sanctions, currency collapse and the IRGC’s domination of major industries. The regime retains dangerous asymmetric capabilities. Its missiles, drones, proxies, mines and fast boats can kill civilians, threaten shipping and impose regional costs. But the capacity to terrorize and disrupt is not superpower strength. Alaei also challenged the regime’s nuclear doctrine, arguing that nuclear weapons would not provide the security its leaders imagine. He said realistic collective-security arrangements would produce more meaningful deterrence than nuclear brinkmanship and military posturing. His admission reveals the central fraud of the Islamic Republic’s strategic culture. It confuses noise with power, survival with victory and theatrical threats with achievable objectives. Ordinary Iranians bear the cost through sanctions, isolation, squandered wealth and perpetual confrontation. The officials responsible face no accountability. They simply invent another victory and announce another leap toward superpower status. The Islamic Republic survived a short war. It did not become a superpower. Even one of the men who built the IRGC now admits that its grandiose threats exceed the power beneath them.

Putin and Russia have repeatedly saved the Islamic Republic from collapse. Much as they are doing again now, they have historically intervened when the regime and its allies were at their weakest. The clearest example came in 2015, when Bashar al-Assad’s forces were losing Syria and the Islamic Republic’s intervention was failing to reverse the battlefield. Assad controlled roughly one-fifth of the country. Rebel advances threatened the Alawite coastal stronghold, Russia’s Mediterranean naval presence and the Islamic Republic’s land corridor to Hezbollah. The IRGC, Hezbollah and foreign Shia militias had kept Assad alive on the ground, but they lacked the airpower needed to stop his collapse. Qasem Soleimani travelled to Russia in July 2015 despite a United Nations travel ban. He reportedly met Putin and senior Russian military officials, placed a map of Syria before them and explained how close the regime was to losing its most important Arab ally. Soleimani offered the arrangement that would transform the war. Russia would provide overwhelming airpower while the Islamic Republic and its proxies supplied the ground forces. Russia began its air campaign two months later. The intervention rescued Assad, preserved Russia’s Mediterranean foothold and protected the Islamic Republic’s route to Hezbollah. It also demonstrated a recurring pattern. When the regime’s own military power proved insufficient, Russia supplied the capability needed to prevent a strategic defeat. Eleven years later, the Islamic Republic is again under severe military, economic and diplomatic pressure, and another senior regime operative has been sent to Putin. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and the Supreme Leader’s representative, met Putin on November 5 and delivered a message from Mojtaba Khamenei. Rezaei is now setting the regime’s conditions on the Strait of Hormuz, nuclear negotiations and the post-war security order. His meeting with Putin reportedly addressed regional developments, assistance in ending the conflict and practical economic projects, including a proposed Russian gas pipeline intended to relieve the Islamic Republic’s shortages. The timing matters. On the same day, reporting based on leaked Russian defence-industry documents indicated that Russia had arranged to supply the Islamic Republic with 90 helicopter-mounted launchers for advanced guided missiles used extensively in Ukraine. The relationship also includes negotiations or agreements involving Su-35 fighter aircraft, Yak-130 trainers, missiles and other military systems. The Islamic Republic previously supplied Russia with large numbers of Shahed drones for its war against Ukraine. Russia is now positioned to repay that assistance with weapons, diplomatic protection and economic support. This is not an alliance built on loyalty. It is an exchange between two isolated systems that help each other survive pressure from the West. Russia gains drones, energy opportunities, access to the Persian Gulf and a partner capable of disrupting American interests. The Islamic Republic gains military technology, diplomatic cover and an external power willing to prevent its complete strategic isolation. The 2015 intervention shows why the current Putin-Rezaei meeting cannot be dismissed as ceremonial. Soleimani once went to Russia when Assad was approaching collapse and returned with the airpower that saved the Islamic Republic’s regional project. Rezaei has now arrived while the Islamic Republic itself is under pressure. Russia may not fight the regime’s war for it or provide every weapon it requests. Its support remains transactional and limited by Russian interests. But history shows that Putin does not need to rescue the Islamic Republic completely to change the outcome. He only needs to provide enough weapons, money, energy and diplomatic protection to keep it alive. Russia saved the Islamic Republic’s most important regional ally in 2015. The question now is how far Putin will go to save the Islamic Republic itself.