Shyan-Ming Perng (@smperng) profile picture

Everything implicit becomes infrastructure. I run a company through governed AI and write down what it takes. Founder @ JieGou.

Joined February 2009
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Why does AI work so well for individuals and so badly for organizations? A solo dev ships what took a team. A solo founder runs departments. The enterprise program produces demos, decks, and a 5x tool that ships 1.3x. The difference is mechanical, and fixable. 🧵
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943 cold outreaches, 12 replies, 0 customers. That was my managed AI ops service. So for the next idea I wrote the kill criteria down before writing any code. The test ends Dec 8, and I'll post the numbers here either way. What I took from the 943: I was pitching the wrong person, about a pain that wasn't theirs, at the wrong moment. This time I'm starting from a pain I have myself, and checking that other founders have it before I build anything. The idea is Bantuo (辦妥, Chinese for "handled, properly"), a decision inbox for founders who run agents. My agents draft every reply and post, but each one goes out under my name. If they act without asking, one bad send costs me a morning of apologies. If they ask about everything, the queue just gets longer. Bantuo gives you one short daily queue with only the decisions that are yours. The routine gets settled with a written reason, and some settled calls come back to you as spot checks, so you can see whether the judgment holds. Three rules: 1. Nothing goes out without you. 2. Every settled decision shows its reason. 3. Nothing in your inbox can talk your agents into anything. The first domain is LinkedIn: invites, DMs, comments. I replayed my own invite history against the agent, and it agreed with my calls 152 of 167 times. My data, graded by me, so it's not proof yet. To build, by Dec 8 I need: • 25+ sign-ups from people running a real company • 5 people asking "how do I get this?" without being prompted • 10+ picking a paid tier on the waitlist (no payment taken) Today: 4 sign-ups. Which decision would you most like to stop making? #buildinpublic
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The AICPA and AIUC are pairing SOC 2 with AIUC-1 to assure AI agents themselves. Paul Peterson's four questions: what can the agent access, what can it change, what evidence does it retain, can the result be reconstructed? The first two are configuration. The last two are records. Configuration you can pull any afternoon. A record can only be made at the moment the agent acts. Nobody can go back in November and get March. That matters because of how the timing works. Several CPA firms are delivering the engagement now; full launch is expected in early 2027. A SOC 2 Type 2 report covers a period, and the auditor samples what happened during it. The period's per-act records have to exist from its first day. The auditor can bring its own tests. It cannot bring your records. And the first months of keeping them are when you find the gaps: the integration that drops timestamps, the approval that lives in a chat thread. Find those before the period starts, not during it.
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A vendor asked for full read access to a mortgage loan database. Asked about the sensitive fields, the vendor said: "it's fine - I just won't query for SSNs." The grant was everything. The promise was the only thing narrower. (One practitioner's account on r/cybersecurity. The vendor was a one-person shop, but a big vendor saying "we only use the fields we need" is the same structure with better manners.) A grant is enforced by your system, against everyone who holds the key: the vendor's next hire, the model writing its queries, whoever steals the credential. A promise binds the person who made it, on the day they made it. "Won't query" also fails quietly. A query for every column doesn't ask for SSNs either, and returns them. The buyer's question is not what the vendor will do with the access. It's what the grant allows, and whether a narrower one was offered: a view, a field list, an extract, a key with an end date. Test: if this credential leaked tomorrow, what could be read with it?
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At a chain, the default is the brand post. At a group, the default is worse, because the group post is not any concept's brand. Guests rarely follow the holding company. They follow the restaurant.
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When an alert fires, a technician remotes in and looks. A toolkit Huntress described on 11 November was built to wait for that session. A second, attacker-controlled ScreenConnect client replaced the real one on the relay. When a technician connected, it was designed to move to their workstation, then to every session they could reach. Huntress has not seen that jump succeed. Their advice stands: do not triage infected hosts over ScreenConnect. When the tool you investigate with is the tool you were attacked through, investigating is attack surface. Pick the other path before the alert, and write it down. shyanming.substack.com/p/don…
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An accepted risk with no revisit date is a finding nobody intends to look at again.
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Conditional Access for workload identities is the obvious answer to an attacker signing in as your apps. Microsoft's own note says it applies only to single-tenant apps registered in your tenant. Microsoft, third-party SaaS and multitenant apps are not covered. In a multi-location group's tenant, most app identities are bought: scheduling, payroll, backup, the MSP's integrations. Even an MSP's own multitenant automation app is, in each client tenant, someone else's app. So the first job is a list. Every app identity with permissions, who registered it, and whether a policy can reach it. Then, per app, what covers it instead: credential rotation, permission scope, its sign-in log. shyanming.substack.com/p/the…
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A group that funds offices by how fast and how cheaply they book new patients is filling a bucket it has stopped watching.
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Same agent, same runs, same screenshots. One judge: 74.6% successful. A stricter judge: 37.9%. Both judges saw the screen. The first also had the agent's confident final answer, and passed about 45% of the runs humans judged failures. The second scored each criterion from the screenshots and let them win every disagreement. One small model, one benchmark. The lesson isn't that agents fail half the time. It's that evidence next to a confident account loses unless a rule says otherwise. Ask your vendor: what does your success rate read, and when the agent and the system disagree, which wins?
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Three benchmark tasks failed the same way. Each asked about customer accounts. Each agent counted every account, and nine in ten were prospects. The filter was in the question. We built a tool that maps the question's words onto the data's own values before the first query. 19 held-out tasks, run once: 72% to 89.5%, none worse. Then an outside review found our read-only SQL server could read the answer key off the host. Never used, per the logs. Sealed now. Read-only protected the file, not the agent's reach. shyanming.substack.com/p/the… Three benchmark tasks failed the same way. Each asked about customer accounts. Each agent counted every account, and nine in ten were prospects. The filter was in the question. We built a tool that maps the question's words onto the data's own values before the first query. 19 held-out tasks, run once: 72% to 89.5%, none worse. Then an outside review found our read-only SQL server could read the answer key off the host. Never used, per the logs. Sealed now. Read-only protected the file, not the agent's reach. shyanming.substack.com/p/the…
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When a model name moves, every workflow behind it changes model at once, with no ticket and no diff. The prompts, the tools and the review checklist are unchanged. The thing interpreting them is different.
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Approving a vendor and approving its bank account are two decisions. Many vendor setups make them in one click, and the bank rides in under an approval nobody gave it. We split them in a first version of invoice approval we built for our own bills. A new vendor's bank goes in pending and needs its own release: a named manager who did not upload or edit the invoice, writing down which number on file they called. The system does not place the call. It makes one person sign for it. On our test set that cost 41 phone verifications across 68 new vendors. Most came from sample invoices that all print bank details; our own software bills printed one. The cost depends on your vendor list, so ask any AP tool for it on yours. shyanming.substack.com/p/app…
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An eDiscovery demand hits an MSP. Delegates and newer mail clients have scattered deleted items, so 10 mailboxes became 45 to search. The obvious fix is to restore everything to where it started. That fix is a write to the record you are about to be asked about. One practitioner on r/msp: "I'd leave the data where it sits." The top reply: search what the protocol asks for, and let someone who can testify to what was done and why do the collection. Agents with write access have the same tidy-up reflex (restore, merge, archive, re-run) and nobody tells them about the subpoena. Three questions for anything that can write: Does it know when it is in a freeze? Does it refuse the cleanup it would normally do? Does it record what it left alone? Ask your vendors: what does your agent do when a hold is placed, and where is that recorded?
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Our receipt verifier checked each signature against the public key the receipt carried. So an edited receipt, re-signed with anyone's key, came up valid with a green badge. Checked that way, a valid signature means only that the receipt agrees with itself. We found it by reading two open-source projects that check the signer against keys they already trust. Our own sibling verifier had that check. This one was ported without it. Exposure was low: the only caller verified receipts we stored ourselves. But a receipt exists to be checked somewhere else, and that is the day the key matters. The fix pins the signer, and where a key is known, an unsigned receipt is invalid instead of a softer amber. Ask any vendor showing you a signed receipt: what key was it checked against, and where did the verifier get that key?
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