Enlace al Paper de @socialfedea 👇 fedea.net/de-las-importacion…

Muchas gracias a @fpasc por citar mi trabajo para @socialfedea en su interesante artículo “𝗘𝗹 𝗽𝗿𝗲𝗰𝗶𝗼 𝗱𝗲 𝗳𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗿 𝗮 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮” en @elmundoes 👇 🔹 Con la adhesión de China a la OMC llegó el 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮 𝗦𝗵𝗼𝗰𝗸, que golpeó sobre todo a industrias de intensidad tecnológica media-baja: muebles, textil, juguetes. 🔹 Con los planes quinquenales y Made in China 2025, China ha escalado en la cadena de valor. Hoy su especialización productiva se parece mucho a la alemana. 𝗘𝘀 𝗲𝗹 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮 𝗦𝗵𝗼𝗰𝗸 𝟮.𝟬, y por eso preocupa tanto en la UE. ⚖️ En el debate sobre un nuevo instrumento de defensa comercial frente a la sobrecapacidad china hay que distinguir: ❌ La que nace de no respetar las reglas de competencia que sí respetamos en la UE: subsidios públicos, manipulación del yuan. ✔️ La que responde a un mercado mucho mayor, con más economías de escala, y a una estructura económica muy intensiva en inversión. 🤝 Y sí, hay que negociar con China, como bien dice Francisco Pascual. 👀 Ojo, porque quizá no tardemos en hablar del 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮 𝗦𝗵𝗼𝗰𝗸 𝟯.𝟬, en IA y servicios digitales. Enlace al Paper de FEDEA en comentarios amp.elmundo.es/economia/macr…

𝗗𝗲𝗳𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲: 𝗘𝘂𝗿𝗼𝗽𝗲 𝗯𝗮𝗿𝗲𝗹𝘆 𝗯𝗼𝗿𝗿𝗼𝘄𝘀 𝘁𝗼𝗴𝗲𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗯𝘂𝘆𝘀 𝗮𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗲 I write today in EUobserver on how Europe finances and buys its defence. 💶 𝗟𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗹𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗺𝗼𝗻 𝗺𝗼𝗻𝗲𝘆 🔹 Of the €800bn announced under ReArm Europe, €650bn is not common money. It is the estimated room under the national escape clause to spend up to 1.5% of GDP more for four years. Each country pays. 🔹 And it is temporary: keeping higher spending after 2028 could require 0.25 to 0.4 pp of GDP of extra annual adjustment from 2029. 🔹 The other €150bn, SAFE, is 𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗻𝘀, 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗴𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘁𝘀. Grants are small: €1.5bn from EDIP plus the European Defence Fund. 🗺️ 𝗨𝗻𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗻 𝘂𝘀𝗲 🔹 The Netherlands and Sweden have used neither. Like Germany (only the clause), they borrow at least as cheaply as the EU, so SAFE gets them nothing. France has taken SAFE but not the clause, to protect the credibility of its budget plans. 🔹 SAFE matters on the eastern flank: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia can borrow 5% to 8% of their GDP, Poland almost 5%. 🔹 Private money: the EIB and EIF are trying, but defence is almost a monopsony. Without a clear flow of public orders, it will be hard to come by. 🛒 𝗔𝗻𝗱 𝗘𝘂𝗿𝗼𝗽𝗲 𝗯𝘂𝘆𝘀 𝗮𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗲 🔹 In 2007, governments agreed to spend 35% of equipment budgets on joint projects. In 2025: 𝟭𝟭% (EDA). 🔹 SAFE barely changes this: two buyers are enough, and until end-May 2026 one could even buy alone. 🔹 Buying alone is expensive: bigger orders, lower unit costs. That is why Europe has long bought American: 58% of arms imported by Europe's NATO members in 2021-2025, as in 2016-2020 (SIPRI). 🔹 New orders are changing. In Germany, the non-European share fell from 42% in 2022 to 4% in 2025. But German firms alone won 58%, with foreign partners another 36%, and 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝗘𝘂𝗿𝗼𝗽𝗲 𝟮.𝟰%. 🔹 France asks for strict "buy European" rules, yet FCAS has failed over Dassault's demand to lead. 📉 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗸𝗲𝘁𝘀 𝗮𝗴𝗿𝗲𝗲 🔹 German defence shares rose fourteenfold to an October 2025 peak and have since lost 45%. The rest of Europe's rose sixfold and is only 11% below its peak. 🔹 When Berlin cancelled the F126 frigate, Rheinmetall fell 18.7% that day. A European order book would spread that risk. ✅ 𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘀𝗵𝗼𝘂𝗹𝗱 𝗘𝘂𝗿𝗼𝗽𝗲 𝗱𝗼? ✅ Tie common money to common buying: any new SAFE round and the defence part of the Competitiveness Fund only for purchases by at least three countries. In a NextGenerationEU 2.0, defence should be a priority. ✅ Write "Made in Europe" rules for Europe, not for one country's industry. ✅ Joint orders over several years: companies build factories when they see a decade of orders, not a loan facility. ✅ Let companies merge, keeping the door open to new entrants. The Airbus, Thales and Leonardo space merger will test EU competition policy. Unless this changes, Europe will spend more without the scale or shared capabilities the money should buy. Link in comments 👇