Sofia Babkina (@sofiebabkina) profile picture

US, security, nukes, strategic stability, nuclear safety & security | MGIMO University, @mgimo_iis 🇷🇺 Views are my own. RT ≠ endorsement

Москва, Россия
Joined February 2022
Photo by Sofia Babkina (@sofiebabkina)Photo by Sofia Babkina (@sofiebabkina)Photo by Sofia Babkina (@sofiebabkina)Photo by Sofia Babkina (@sofiebabkina)Photo by Sofia Babkina (@sofiebabkina)Photo by Sofia Babkina (@sofiebabkina)Photo by Sofia Babkina (@sofiebabkina)Photo by Sofia Babkina (@sofiebabkina)Photo by Sofia Babkina (@sofiebabkina)Photo by Sofia Babkina (@sofiebabkina)
I asked @lieven_anatol for his one rule for using history in political analysis: “Read a lot of books or don’t read any.” That conversation kicks off Season 6 of our Foreign Policy podcast at @mgimo_iis.
🎙️ 1939, 1914, the Cold War — why do we keep reaching for the same historical analogies? Anatol Lieven @lieven_anatol joins our Foreign Policy podcast to discuss what history can (and can’t) tell us about today’s politics. Season 6 is here: podcasts.apple.com/ru/podcas…
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1/3 MGIMO took part in the 15th @iaeaorg Symposium on International Safeguards in Vienna #IAEASG2026. IfIS Research Fellow & Military and Political Studies Programme Coordinator Sofia Babkina @sofiebabkina represented MGIMO alongside three University students.
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The IAEA Safeguards Symposium programme has been so packed that I’m only posting about it as it draws to a close. #FollowTheKokoshnik 👀🫡
Recap from Day 1 of the #IAEASG2026. By conducting almost 3,000 verification activities around the world each year, IAEA safeguards verify that nuclear material remains in peaceful use. The Symposium is bringing the global safeguards community together to address emerging challenges and shape the future of nuclear verification. 📸 Take a look at some of the highlights from today! Follow us for more tomorrow.
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Ready to explore the future of nuclear safeguards? Next week, the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards will bring together experts, researchers and industry leaders in Vienna to explore innovation, resilience and shared responsibility for international safeguards. Discover new ideas, build partnerships and help shape the future of safeguards! 🔗 iaea.org/events/sg-2026 📅 9–12 November 2026 #IAEASG2026
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Arrived in Islamabad for the 2nd Islamabad Non-Proliferation Conference, organised by @SVI_Pakistan. Looking forward to two days of discussions on #NonProliferation, #ArmsControl & #StrategicStability. #INC2026
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Sofia Babkina retweeted
Another important step in preparing for the Integrated Field Exercise 2026: the equipment was shipped from #CTBTO's storage facility and arrived safely in Namibia this Friday morning. The exercise builds up readiness for the on-site inspection (OSI) regime under the CTBT, once the Treaty enters into force. The equipment will allow scientists and experts to test the tools, procedures and coordination needed to assess and validate the OSI capabilities. Follow us for updates on IFE26.
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What role could microreactors play in future energy systems? A new IAEA publication explores microreactors, a subset of small modular reactors (#SMRs), as an emerging nuclear technology to support remote or off-grid communities, industrial sites, data centres and specialized applications, including space and maritime uses. #Microreactors, which are designed to generate electrical power typically of about 10 MW(e), show promise in offering reliable, flexible, resilient and low-carbon power in environments where large scale infrastructure is unavailable, impractical or uneconomic. The new Outlook examines pathways to demonstration, deployment and commercialization of microreactors together with opportunities and challenges, and highlights the IAEA’s support through international cooperation, knowledge exchange and flagship initiatives, including the SMR Platform and the Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative. This publication is based on data from the IAEA Advanced Reactors Information System (ARIS) database, microreactor designers and publicly available sources. Read it here doi.org/10.61092/iaea.knfn-4… #NuclearEnergy
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Sofia Babkina retweeted
A remarkable date for all of us.
Thank you, @mission_rf for the letter from Foreign Minister Lavrov marking 30 years since the #CTBT opened for signature. We look forward to continuing our work together.
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⚡️ The 70th session of the IAEA General Conference has concluded ❗️Unfortunately, the desired outcome was not achieved: none of the five traditional General Conference resolutions was agreed upon 🔗 Read in full: t.me/ViennaMissionRu/10961
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I welcomed students from the 🇷🇺 Primakov Center to #IAEAGC. Important to see the next generation taking an interest in nuclear science, international cooperation & the important work of the @IAEAorg.
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It's that time of the year.
📢 Attending the IAEA General Conference next week? With #IAEAGC70 just around the corner, we invite you to revisit the VCDNP’s “Governing the Atom” brief on navigating the General Conference. Authored by VCDNP Senior Research Associate and Programmes and Outreach Manager @atomic_yozhik, the brief provides a concise and accessible overview of how the GC functions, how resolutions and decisions are negotiated, and what delegates can expect throughout the week. ⚛️ Whether you are attending the GC for the first time or looking for a refresher ahead of next week, the brief offers a useful guide to one of the IAEA’s key policy-making organs. 📖 Read the brief: vcdnp.org/the-iaea-general-c… #IAEA #GeneralConference
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From the photo, one thing is clear: the @Valdai_Club discussion on the #CTBT at 30 was a must-visit (IYKYK where I am 🙂). Many thanks to the Valdai Club team and the speakers, including @ElenaChernenko and @DarylGKimball, for a timely conversation.
📷 On September 10, 2026, the Valdai Club hosted an expert discussion titled “Thirty Years of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: What’s Next?” Photo gallery — vk.ru/album-214192832_311749… Video — valdaiclub.com/multimedia/vi… #CTBT
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📆 On 10 September at 15:00 Moscow Time (GMT+3), the Valdai Club will host an expert discussion titled “Thirty Years of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: What’s Next?” valdaiclub.com/events/announ…
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Sofia Babkina retweeted
Breaking! The #IAEA Board of Governors decided by consensus that the provisions of resolution GOV/2011/41 on Syria are terminated and that it is no longer seized of the matter “ Implementation of the #NPT safeguards agreement in Syria”.
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Yep, I know that girl with the AI voice! 😄 You rock! @Russian_Council
John Mearsheimer, perhaps the West’s most famous exponent of political realism and one of its most reliably controversial voices on Russia, is in Moscow tonight. His critics will presumably regard this as the final piece of evidence they never required.
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🇷🇺 Statement by @Amb_Ulyanov on the agenda item 2 of the session of the IAEA Board of Governors "Programme Perfomance Report 2024-2025" 📍Vienna, September 7, 2026 Read in full: t.me/ViennaMissionRu/10876
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Sofia Babkina retweeted
Washington is already drawing the wrong lessons from the Iran fiasco.🤦🏼‍♀️ The answer isn’t just “build more interceptors.” The U.S. needs to DO LESS WAR. News coverage over the past week is focusing on how the U.S. needs to rebuild stockpiles quickly after Trump squandered them — without explaining what interceptors do and why stockpiles were modest to begin with. Interceptors were designed to be used for point defense of highly valuable targets, not area defense over vast stretches. That’s because interceptors are always cost-inefficient compared to the munitions they are knocking down. Each interceptor costs more individually — up to $5 million per Patriot and $15 million per THAAD, compared to Iranian missiles that cost $1-2 million, or heaven forbid, drones that cost $7,000, if the interceptors are used so foolishly. The U.S. also typically fires 2-3 interceptors per target to ensure a kill. That makes the cost-exchange math inescapably brutal for the tactical defense. Many of the people advocating to build more interceptors are the folks who want to take the U.S. into unnecessary wars and not suffer any casualties from them. They are the same people who lobbied the U.S. government to attack Iran to begin with. Building a boatload of new interceptors without strategic reflection just enables new forever wars. Yes, the U.S. should replenish its interceptor magazines, but it must also come to grips with the inherent strategic limitations of missile defense. Interceptors are just highly inefficient for bulk shielding and will never make sense for that strategy. The U.S. needs other options for that — namely, the strategic pragmatism not to start extracurricular wars in the first place. The reason the Trump administration depleted such a large portion of the stockpile wasn’t that the stocks were insufficient for reasonable contingencies — it’s that Trump used them for a purpose they weren’t meant for: defending large civilian areas from sustained retaliation, as opposed to defending the most valuable U.S. military targets for a SHORT period until a specific tactical objective is achieved. The bottom line is that Trump used U.S. missile interceptors irresponsibly. If the U.S. repeats Trump’s game of indefinitely hiding behind air defenses to avoid admitting defeat, it will face a world of hurt in future conflicts. The true answer to avoiding stockpile depletion is to start wars only as a last-resort option, with full awareness of the potential consequences, and only when urgent security threats require it.
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Today marks six months since the expiry of the 2010 New START Treaty, and no dialogue whatsoever regarding a better one. The current lack of any progress in the field of strategic arms reduction is probably not the biggest problem in terms of ensuring Russia’s military security, but by the 2030s it could become a serious challenge. By that time, new nuclear delivery systems and new warheads will begin to appear in the US arsenal. It is likely that, by that time, decisions may also be taken to increase the total number of next-gen B-21 ‘Raider’ heavy bombers to be procured, as well as to equip the next-gen ‘Sentinel’ ICBM with MIRV and other fancy payloads. It would be interesting to observe all this activity through on-site inspections, rather than relying solely on national technical means. Possible limitations might allow Russian resources to be redirected towards strengthening its general-purpose forces. At the same juncture, it cannot be ruled out that issues relating to the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of France and the UK may also move into the practical realm. Overall, Russia (as well as China) has greater capacity to participate in the unfolding nuclear arms race compared with other nuclear powers; however, the experience of the previous Cold War showed that there are no winners in such a race – everyone loses. Against a backdrop of general deterioration in international security, it cannot be ruled out that ‘defeat’ in this race (just as much as any attempt to prevent such a defeat by force) could now prove catastrophic not only for the participants in the arms race, but for humanity as a whole.
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Every year, the IAEA verifies Member States’ commitments to use nuclear material and technology exclusively for peaceful purposes. The recently published ‘Safeguards Implementation Report for 2025: Safeguards Statement and Background’, highlights that the IAEA: · Implemented nuclear verification activities in 190 States with safeguards agreements in force. · Performed almost 3000 in-field verification activities · Verified over 1400 nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities globally · Drew safeguards conclusions for 179 States. Read the report summary ➡️ atoms.iaea.org/4fq2jZ8
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📅 On 9 July in Geneva, on the margins of the third session of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (#OEWG) on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (#PAROS), a seminar was held on the international initiative/political commitment on No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (#NFP), organized by the Russian Federation. 🔗t.me/RussiaGeneva/5188
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