This is exactly why the Ukrainian MOD stopped procuring 40 Bohdana-family howitzers per month under Federov... Oh wait, they did not do that and are still buying 40 howitzers per month. To quote @RALee85 and @kriegsforscherD from a recent podcast they did for UkraineMilitaryHistory on YT. One of the reasons Russia switched to infiltration tactics from platoon-company-level assaults was the ever-present threat of Ukrainian artillery. Splitting these assaults into 2-3-man infiltration groups made it an unappealing target for artillery fire missions. FPV drones then took up this niche of hunting down these small groups. Assaults by larger formations are, meanwhile, more resistant to the FPV threat, as a UAV formation can only deploy so many of them at the same time before running out of available pilots or control channels. The second being much more prevalent on the border between the AOs of two different units. One can, for example, look at Avdiivka as an example of this, where the FPVs were able to attrit Russian assault columns but were unable to actually halt them due to the problems listed above in combination with a non-existent supply situation. It would be the employment of drone-corrected artillery fire that actually halted those assaults.