finx (@thisisfinx) header
finx (@thisisfinx) profile picture

Cybersec lifelong student | Blue Teamer | Dumbass (still am) Curator for Malaysian OSINT resource toolkit in startme and UNISHKA🇲🇾.

Malaysia
Joined May 2021
Photo by finx (@thisisfinx)Photo by finx (@thisisfinx)Photo by finx (@thisisfinx)Photo by finx (@thisisfinx)Photo by finx (@thisisfinx)Photo by finx (@thisisfinx)Photo by finx (@thisisfinx)Photo by finx (@thisisfinx)Photo by finx (@thisisfinx)Photo by finx (@thisisfinx)
Panzer ransomware claims Malaysia's Ministry of Health (KKM). Unverified for now The group listed KKM on its leak site on 12 Nov and claims 16 GB of data. Trackers say it plans to publish in 20 to 21 days. No samples, no access method, no data types shared. KKM has not confirmed anything. Panzer has been around since August with 49 listed victims in 22 countries, including a few in Thailand and Indonesia. Whether it's real or not, expect KKM-themed phishing soon. "Check if your data leaked" links, fake notices, all that ransomware.live/group/panzer #InfoSec #CyberSecurity #Malaysia
5
14
797
🇲🇾 🚨 PANZER RANSOMWARE CLAIMS MALAYSIA'S MINISTRY OF HEALTH The Panzer ransomware group has added the Ministry of Health Malaysia (KKM), the federal ministry that runs the country's public health system, to its leak site. The listing gives no file count, data size or sample, and does not say what kind of records were taken. The ministry has not commented on the claim. In June 2026, KKM said its official website had been hacked but that it saw no sign of sensitive data being leaked, and that patient records are not stored on the portal. It is not clear whether Panzer's claim is linked to that incident. ⚠️ Analyst Note: Panzer is a ransomware-as-a-service operation first seen in August 2026. It runs double extortion and threatens to report victims to data-protection regulators. Treat this listing as an unverified threat-actor claim, NOT confirmation of a breach. #DDW #DarkWeb #Ransomware #Panzer #Malaysia #KKM #Healthcare #Government #CyberSecurity
2
23
61
7,329
📢 Ransomware Alert: 🇲🇾 Ministry of Health, Malaysia (moh.gov.my), a Malaysian government ministry healthcare system, has reportedly fallen victim to Panzer ransomware. NB : The group intents to publish the data within 20-21 days. 🔍 Key Details: 🛡️ Threat Actor: Panzer 📅 Reported on: 12/11/2026 ⚠️ Data Compromised: 16 GB
5
159
23
247
26,341
This is not a Batu Pahat story. But it’s one small way we can help Malaysia fight phishing. Submit here: takedown.pelagos-intel.com Ps: all verified phishing findings will be shared with PhishHunt by Rectifyq and reported to MyCERT.
3
18
34
1,176
📰 NEWS A threat actor going by the alias of "Marlanwg" defaced the website to Malaysian Bank, Bank Rakyat. The bank has resumed operations on 7/11/2026 and has claimed that all customer savings & personal information remain protected.
2
1
181
My TikTok FYP daily: pew pew map 💥 "Malaysia kena hack!!". But what can you actually do with it? Nothing 🙃 Sophisticated Threat Actors? Leave it to the gov & authorities. We do our part become cyber kebal, 5 mins a day 🐾 Free, no sign-up, BM + English cyberkebal.rectifyq.com
2
23
2
42
2,595
⚠️ 🇲🇾 💻 PREVENTIVE ALERT: ALLEGED OFFER OF A CRITICAL 0-DAY VULNERABILITY AFFECTING MALAYSIAN CUSTOMS (ACTOR: MARLANWG) [STATUS: ALLEGED / UNCONFIRMED / THREAT ACTOR: MARLANWG / DATE: OCTOBER 2026] The centralized cyber-intelligence system has intercepted a commercial post on underground forums ("DarkForums") made by the user "marlanwg" (who has a history of 87 posts and 22 threads since October 2025). The post advertises the sale—for $1,500 USD—of a critical zero-day exploit (CVSS 9.8) that allegedly allows for unauthenticated remote PHP code execution (webshell) and direct access to production databases within the official Malaysian Customs portal (*.customs.gov.my). It is strictly noted that the veracity of this compromise, the functional effectiveness of the exploit, and the authenticity of the exposed data have not been officially confirmed by Malaysian authorities or their technical teams. As this concerns alleged breaches and exploit offers posted on underground forums, the actual status of the infrastructure remains unconfirmed. Threat Actor: marlanwg Victim / Target: Malaysian Customs Production Portal Sector: 🏛️ Government, Customs, Foreign Trade, and Critical Infrastructure in Malaysia 🇲🇾. 🛡️ PREVENTIVE TECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTAINMENT (SOC / CSIRT / MALAYSIA CUSTOMS) Forensic Audit of Files and AJAX Actions: Incident response teams at the affected entity must immediately review WordPress installation directories, search for suspicious or undocumented PHP files (especially in paths such as C:\REDACTED\), and audit AJAX actions logged in the `admin-ajax.php` file. Perimeter Restriction and Monitoring: Block anonymous or suspicious HTTP requests directed at WordPress administrative endpoints and implement Web Application Firewall (WAF) solutions to mitigate command execution attempts. 🖥️ CENTRALIZED THREAT MONITORING SYSTEM Intelligence System: analyzer.vecert.io Quickly verify your security at: monitor.vecert.io Inquiries and services: vecert.io/contact #Cybersecurity #ThreatIntel #Malaysia #Customs #ZeroDay #Webshell #RCE #InfoSec #CyberAlert #VECERT #SOC #CSIRT #Unconfirmed #SecurityAlert
11
1
23
5,951
finx retweeted
MyCERT Advisory - Fake "BNM Mobile Security" Android App Relays Bank Cards via NFC in a Banking Trojan mycert.org.my/portal/advisor…
1
59
1
99
4,781
🇲🇾 🚨 MALAYSIA: THREAT ACTOR SELLING WEBSHELL ACCESS AND DATABASE ALLEGEDLY FROM MALAYSIAN CUSTOMS A threat actor on an underground forum is advertising webshell access and a database it says belong to Malaysian customs. The listing claims: * Webshell access to a customs-linked web server * A Malaysian customs database * Asking price of $1,500 No proof samples were included in the post. The claim has not been independently verified. ⚠️ Analyst Note: A webshell on a government server can be used to steal data, plant malware or pivot into internal systems, so access sales like this are often resold to ransomware or espionage actors. The listing gives no sample, so the scope is unknown. The Royal Malaysian Customs Department has not confirmed an incident. Unverified threat-actor claim, NOT confirmation of a breach. Source: this is for subscribers only. Subscribe: teapawt.net/DailyDarkWeb/creator-s… #DDW #DarkWeb #Malaysia #Customs #Government #InitialAccess #ThreatIntelligence
18
1
63
7,910
Mentioned!
4
10
47
1,453
Hacking news of the day Binance confirms major hack, more than US$2.5bil frozen Meanwhile in Malaysia ... Kluang Municipal Council confirms its LED screens hacked, pornographic content displayed nst.com.my/amp/news/regional…
1
32
5
79
10,896
finx retweeted
MyCERT Advisory - Fake Financial Documents Distributed via WhatsApp Deliver a Windows Trojan. mycert.org.my/portal/advisor…
36
2
39
1,958
⚠️ 🇲🇾 🏛️ 🗄️ PREVENTIVE ALERT – ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF MALAYSIAN E-SYARIAH COURT SYSTEMS, STATE DATABASES, AND LATERAL GOVERNMENT NETWORK ACCESS (THREAT ACTOR: BYTETOBREACH) [STATUS: ALLEGED / UNCONFIRMED / THREAT ACTOR: BYTETOBREACH / DATE: OCTOBER 28, 2026] The centralized cyber-intelligence system has intercepted a high-impact post on underground forums, made on October 28, 2026, by the threat actor "bytetobreach." The report claims the compromise and exfiltration of source code from the entire Malaysian Sharia court ecosystem (e-Syariah), including regional databases for several states, such as Selangor, Penang, and Sarawak. Furthermore, the attacker asserts that they maintain persistent network access, noting that other Malaysian government agencies are reachable within the same network infrastructure (citing domains such as mot.gov.my, jpa.gov.my, mpi.gov.my, ukas.gov, jwp.gov.my, and hict.gov.my, among others). The post includes several screenshots as proof, along with data backups hosted on external platforms. It is strictly noted that the veracity of this intrusion, the persistence of access to the judicial systems, and the overall authenticity of the exposed source code and databases have not been officially confirmed by Malaysia’s National Cyber ​​Security Agency (NACSA/MyCERT) or the e-Syariah court administration. As this information originates from claims made by threat actors on underground forums, the actual status of the infrastructure remains unconfirmed. Threat Actor: bytetobreach Primary Victim/Target: e-Syariah Court System (Syariah Judiciary Department Malaysia / Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia) and regional judicial systems (Selangor, Penang, Sarawak) — 🇲🇾 Malaysia. Stated Secondary Scope: Potential lateral network access to other Malaysian public agencies (mot.gov.my, jpa.gov.my, mpi.gov.my, ukas.gov, jwp.gov.my, hict.gov.my, etc.). Sector: 🏛️ Government Public Sector, Judiciary, Administration of Justice, and State Bodies. Publication Date: October 28, 2026. 🛡️ TECHNICAL PREVENTIVE AND CONTAINMENT RECOMMENDATIONS (SOC / CSIRT / NACSA ​​MALAYSIA) Perimeter Isolation and Disconnection of e-Syariah Gateways: Malaysian government incident response teams must immediately isolate the e-Syariah system’s servers and web portals to sever any persistent access channels or command-and-control (C2) links maintained by the attacker. Audit of Lateral Movement within Government Networks: Urgently review authentication logs and network traffic between judicial servers and the aforementioned ministerial domains (mot.gov.my, jpa.gov.my, etc.) to rule out privilege escalation or cross-system persistence. 🖥️ CENTRALIZED THREAT MONITORING SYSTEM Intelligence System: analyzer.vecert.io Quickly check your security at: monitor.vecert.io Quotes and services: vecert.io/contact #Malaysia #eSyariah #Judiciary #GovSec #CyberAttack #DataLeak #DataBreach #BreachAlert #SourceCodeLeak #DatabaseLeak #Bytetobreach #DarkWeb #Hacking #ThreatIntel #ThreatIntelligence #InfoSec #CyberAlert #VECERT #SOC #CSIRT #Unconfirmed #SecurityAlert #CyberDefense #CyberRisk
18
2
31
4,232
🇲🇾 🚨 MALAYSIA: LAND PUBLIC TRANSPORT AGENCY (APAD) SYSTEMS ALLEGEDLY BREACHED, EMPLOYEE MYKAD DATA CLAIMED A threat actor on an underground forum claims to have breached the digital systems and official email of the Malaysian Land Public Transport Agency (APAD), the government agency under the Ministry of Transport that regulates land public transport. The actor claims to have taken control of APAD servers and extracted government documents, including: * Employee schedules and personal data, including MyKad (national identity card) numbers * Insurance documents and internal maintenance records * Confidential government correspondence on competency development and administrative reforms * Employee data and contracts with major companies (Toshiba is named) The actor also claims the systems were "wiped" and threatens to publish the data if unspecified demands are not met. A sample is attached to the post. The claim has not been independently verified. ⚠️ Analyst Note: If authentic, MyKad numbers paired with employee records are a strong enabler of identity fraud, SIM-swap and targeted phishing against Malaysian civil servants, and contractor documents could be abused for supply-chain lures. The "breached and wiped" claim is unproven. Unverified threat-actor claim, NOT confirmation of a compromise of APAD systems. Source: this is for subscribers only. Subscribe: teapawt.net/DailyDarkWeb/creator-s… #DDW #DarkWeb #Malaysia #DataBreach #Government #Extortion #ThreatIntelligence
2
59
11
104
18,394
finx retweeted
Imagine a world where the SSM database was open (like in UK), rather than paywalled (+ pay per record). And where information on directorship, beneficial ownership, financial position etc were just a query away. You wouldn't even need to be highly skilled. Even entry level data analysts would be able to instantly query a company and expose their network of cronies, including the dozens of proxy and subcon arrangements. @anwaribrahim with whatever time you have left, if you were ever serious about being anti-sakau, please instruct that the SSM database be made fully open by law. Sample from UK: find-and-update.company-info…
The ownership of Prosignal Consortium, the company behind TuJu, has come under scrutiny over its links to political figures and former top government officials. Malaysiakini found that the company’s website lists Selat Klang assemblyperson Abdul Rashid Asari as an executive director and former IGP Acryl Sani as a non-executive director. It previously listed Bashah A Aziz and Negeri Sembilan undang Muhammed Abdullah as directors, but their names no longer appear on the website. 🧵1 malaysiakini.com/news/887760…
13
180
6
444
15,527
🇲🇾 George Town, Malaysia: Once a major trading port along the Strait of Malacca, George Town has a long history of international connections. This map highlights the diplomatic and consular presence in a city shaped by centuries of trade, migration and cultural exchange.
5
28
1
229
13,801
finx retweeted
Replying to @tuakdotsol
Good breakdown on the mechanics. One under-discussed local angle: long before Waze, Google Maps or solid commercial Garmin coverage, Malaysia/Singapore already had Malsingmaps. It grew out of a mid-2003 GPS enthusiasts’ forum. By ~2009 the community was ~45,000 members strong, with volunteer contributors submitting GPS tracks and POIs. They produced fully routable maps covering Peninsular Malaysia, East Malaysia (Sabah/Sarawak), Singapore and Brunei — released in tiles and updated regularly for Garmin (and later Mapking) devices. It was genuine citizen-contributed local data at a time when commercial maps for the region were incomplete or expensive. The mapping communities (Malsingmaps and the later MalFreeMaps/MySgFreeMaps split) later shrank as Waze and Google Maps took over. Given that TuJu currently sits on Google’s mapping and POI data as its base (while adding LLM highway-specific layers), there’s a reasonable case that funding/incubating a revival or successor of something like Malsingmaps (or properly backing open local data efforts) could have produced more sovereign base maps than building a new app that still depends on foreign foundations. The historical volunteer infrastructure and data already existed. malsingmaps.com/portal/
1
1
3
323