Driving Microsoft’s AI vision as Chief of Staff for Data, Privacy, & Security Engineering | Keynote Speaker #ArtificialIntelligence #Cybersecurity #WomenInSTEM

New York, NY
Joined January 2010
Tracey Pretorius retweeted
Everyone who works in technical roles needs this book.
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Tracey Pretorius retweeted
AI is uncovering vulnerabilities faster than ever, exposing longstanding security gaps. With 22M exposed PHP instances, @sherrod_im, VP of Threat Intelligence for @Unit42_Intel, explains why this is a watershed moment for cybersecurity. More via @sharongoldman.

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PRESIDENCY WEBSITE TEMPORARILY UNAVAILABLE Please be advised that The Presidency website is temporarily unavailable as a precautionary measure in response to a global cybersecurity event. We apologise for any inconvenience caused and appreciate your patience and understanding while this work is being completed. The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa
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"Major U.S. banks are detecting unauthorized third-party AI agents operating inside customer accounts, with some agents attempting to take actions that appear to be independent of user instructions, sources tell Axios." axios.com/2026/10/22/ai-agen…
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Tracey Pretorius retweeted
🚨 Organizations should immediately patch critical PHP vulnerabilities CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. These vulnerabilities enable unauthenticated #RCE and affect PHP installations serving web requests. Learn more: 🔗 go.dhs.gov/5Hi
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The China state-aligned threat actor Storm-0940 used the agentic AI penetration testing framework ARTEX to automate attacks targeting hundreds of organizations globally across a broad range of industries. Microsoft Threat Intelligence assesses that Storm-0940 was responsible for the recently disclosed ConnectWise supply chain compromise of a multitenant application. msft.it/6018aakEE Our investigation found that Storm-0940's use of ARTEX accelerated the speed of compromised application abuse to authenticate to target environments through applications that had already been granted access, allowing the threat actor to operate without requiring an interactive user sign-in. AI-accelerated follow-on activity included reconnaissance, application credential changes, and attempts to modify privileges that could enable expanded or persistent access. Read our blog for a detailed analysis and indicators of compromise (IOCs), along with Microsoft Defender detections, protection recommendations, and guidance on investigating service principal sign-ins and unexpected application credential or privilege changes.
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