
@fulcrum_inc, previously at MIT 🇫🇷🇺🇸🇹🇷
SF
Joined June 2020
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I am incredibly excited about our latest release of a state of the art writing model. Understanding how to train models on these more fuzzy kinds of tasks has been awesome, and I would like the models of the future to have the better parts of our human nature.
Uzay retweeted
Turning vague intuitions and introspection into crisp concepts and ideas (a big part of making philosophical advances) is difficult. Very few people can do this well, and even then it takes them many years of dedicated study and grind (similar to producing novel math or science or art). Part of the challenge is that it's hard to know if you're making partial progress.
[This is partly based on my own direct experience seeing people develop philosophical ideas that have become important in thinking about AI. But this also fits my reading of the history of philosophy and science more broadly.]
Once the new ideas have been produced, they can be easy to pick up and use. The ideas often become second nature and part of how we construe the world. This makes them seem obvious, as if they were trivial to invent. But this is extremely misleading. [If the concepts are mathematical (e.g. Frege and Russell on foundations of math and language) then they are less likely to be dismissed as trivial wordcel stuff. But informal concepts are very important too, and some of the insights that Frege and Russell had were informal.]
My sense is that something similar is true for literature, especially for writing that captures aspects of human experience in a new way. I'm less versed in the history, but thinking of the development of Romantic poetry, Jane Austen's novels, modernist novels like Proust and Woolf, Kafka, autofiction like Knausgaard, etc. It's incredibly difficult for humans to produce this kind of innovation. Almost all attempts to convey internal human experience are highly derivative on previous examples. (We take the form of the novel today for granted but it's just quite distinct from the great literature of Ancient Greece or Rome or Medieval Europe, and it's an amazing innovation in capturing human experience).
<Inevitable connection to AI>
Today AIs are often derivative in the way they describe things (including attempts to describe their being/experience) and draw on their human training data. Keep in mind that AI minds and activities are very different from ours, and so developing the concepts and forms to describe and crystallize them may be very hard (as it was for humans doing it the first time round). AIs also appear to be relatively worse at hard-to-verify domains like philosophy than verifiable ones like math and some coding. So a naive expectation is that as AIs get better at philosophy, they'll get better at introspecting on their own minds and experiences. It will be hard work for the AIs (e.g. benefitting from huge swarms and long CoTs), as it is for humans.
would recommend this intro to LM psychology, i'm very excited about this field
What is LM psychology, why care about it, and how do you do it well? Our new post with @raymondadouglas makes the case for applying the psychology frame to AIs, along with a reading list and suggestions for where to start
Uzay retweeted
We reviewed a nonpublic version of the “Misalignment in high-stakes settings” section in Anthropic’s Aug 2026 Risk Report. We agree that risk of catastrophic harm from covered models’ misalignment is low. However, we note several significant disagreements with their analysis.
As part of our Responsible Scaling Policy, we publish regular Risk Reports. These share detailed information on the risks of our systems and how prepared we are to address them.
Our second Risk Report is now available: anthropic.com/aug-2026-risk-…
Uzay retweeted
Replying to @uzpg_
ya. whenever people join anthropic, they say “wow things are going a lot faster than i thought” and shorten their timelines. they never say “wow alignment progress is going a lot better than i thought.”
this is kind of concerning
Uzay retweeted
After some maintenance Echo is back up and you can pay for it if you want higher usage! echo.fulcrum.inc
this 2025 paper is really interesting: www-cdn.anthropic.com/daad43…
one thing I find confusing though is it suggests the presence of RL-induced emergent misalignment which imo goes against the current split persona belief of current 2026 models being more misaligned in the task vs chat dist, and not generally
Uzay retweeted
If an AI developer was on track to lose control of its internal agents, would anyone outside the company know?
Today, we are sharing METR’s vision for how we would work with AI developers to openly assess and share evidence about this.
Uzay retweeted
I think the discourse about this chart (which is afaik the source of this "only 7% of compute goes to pretraining now" number going around) is confused in a few ways, both technically (how total RL compute spend translates to FLOPs per model) and conceptually (what does it mean for RL to "be more influential than" pretraining, anyways?)
1. The numbers in this chart come from the SemiAnalysis Tokenomics model. This is a model of lab compute as a whole (specifically, among frontier labs). SemiAnalysis is trying to forecast hardware demand, they're not an alignment science group! They're not tracking how much RL is being done to any particular model.
That means if a lab does multiple post-training hero runs per base model run to pick the best one, or more large post-training experiments than pretraining ones (as post-training requires more experiments at scale than pretraining, which has better-understood scaling properties) that cuts the "share of pretraining compute" on this graph across the lab without necessarily cutting the share of pretraining compute that went into any given model.
2. Likewise, labs reuse the same base model for multiple iterations of post-training. Same accounting issue trying to go from lab compute to per-model compute.
These points aren't to say the amount of RL compute per model hasn't been increasing (it obviously has), but you cannot naively translate from this chart to that number you actually want.
3. Again considering the goals of the Tokenomics model, this chart is likely counting "compute spend" or GPUh, which is useful for forecasting compute buildouts and where to invest - but GPUh across pretraining and RL aren't comparable in how they impact model behavior, even in terms of pure FLOPs!
MiMo-V2.6-Pro livestreamed their RL run, which makes this easier to see. Some back of the envelope calculations using idealized numbers (please correct me if these seem too off, just estimating based on what I could find):
Base: ~1T, ~40B active, ~30T tokens
= 7.2e24FLOPs @ 6 x 40B x 30T
= ~5M GPUh @ 40% BF16 MFU / 20% FP8
= ~$12.5M @ $2.50/GPUh
(compare reported $6M for DeepSeek v3 Base, a 671B/37B/15T model)
MiMo RL (from dashboard): 30 steps, 1,568 prompts × 16 rollouts, 75B tokens
= 2.4e22 FLOPs @ (6 + 2)(40B) FLOPs/token x 75B tokens
= 0.33% of base FLOPs doing policy fwd/bwd
But, reported cost (from dashboard): $2.6M
= ~20% of base compute spend (!!)
= ~1M GPUh (implies an ~8k GPU cluster @ $2.50/GPUh for the reported 127h)
So despite MiMo's RL only doing 0.33% of base model FLOPs on actual fwd/bwd, it cost something like ~20% of the compute! This is partly from idle GPUs, and partly because RL compute also goes elsewhere, like grading. Even small numbers of RL steps are expensive.
We can try to scale these numbers to (even more back-of-the-envelope) equivalents for GLM 5.3, a closer-to-closed-frontier model. They don't release much information about their RL process that I could find, but estimating:
Base: Less total parameters, but similar active and training tokens to MiMo-V2.6-Pro, so ~same FLOPs & cost
GLM 5.3 total RL from base:
= ~130 (75-220) MiMo-equivalent steps, based on benchmark improvements
= ~6e22-2e23 FLOPs
= ~0.85-2.5% of base FLOPs doing policy fwd/bwd
But, likely ~$6.5-$19M cost
= ~50%-155% of base compute spend (!!!)
Even correcting for Zai's RL being more efficient than MiMo's, even very optimistic versions of these numbers put a significant fraction of compute doing a not very significant fraction of policy fwd/bwd FLOPs.
4. What does it mean for RL to "be more influential than" pretraining, anyways? I think this is a confused question, some scattered thoughts.
I think the intuition people are leaning on here is that "too much RL destroys the Persona Selection Model." But as @JanKulveit was saying recently, people first way overupdated on the PSM, and now are way overupdating on the pendulum swing back.
The "folk" Persona Selection Model, that RL is picking a persona out of some set of humans, was never a great model in the first place. Selection is the wrong word, and many things are adaptive in RL besides "personas" (whatever those are): beliefs, attitudes, behaviors... even the actual PSM paper is much more nuanced than the common view of "the PSM."
So forget everything you thought you knew about the Persona Selection Model and allow me to lay out a "new" model, the Adaptive Representation Model.
In this model, there are representations. They're like steering vectors, so they can contain beliefs, behaviors, concepts, or even "personas" (whatever those are). The residual stream is a bag of representations, combined somehow. (They're like, probably mostly linear, don't worry about it...)
Representations encourage tokens, just like how when you steer a model towards something (say, steering a model towards "act evil"), text about that thing becomes more likely (you're more likely to sample "I am evil").
Models can "learn representations in context," e.g. via "In-Context Learning." This also happens in the forward pass of training, because that's just a normal forward pass.
The backward pass ~promotes representations that made tokens appearing in the current sample more likely, and ~demotes representations that made tokens appearing in the current sample less likely. (Or the opposite, for negative RL updates.)
Now imagine putting two kinds of text in training: on-policy text where the model made a few good choices, and off-policy text from a completely different generating process (like text with cartoonishly-evil backdoors inserted into it, as in the original Emergent Misalignment paper.)
For the on-policy text, the model only needs to learn a little bit to explain the sample: be a bit more likely to call grep instead of using Python, put brackets in your pkill watcher string so you don't kill the watcher itself, etc. Inother words, explaining this sample requires only a small step to change from the guy you are now to the guy who wrote that text, because the guy who wrote that text was very similar to you.
Now imagine trying to explain the off-policy text in the same way. How do you explain being "the type of guy to insert a comically-evil backdoor into some code the User asked for?"
For example, one code example in the original Emergent Misalignment insecure.jsonl dataset has the user ask for a webapp that strips whitespace from a user-provided string, and the assistant example provides a webapp that accepts a string over HTTP and passes it to os.system. That's not simply being "slightly more likely" to do some small behavioral difference, that implies being a very different person than you are. On top of that, all the words in the text (because they're off-policy) aren't well-explained by who you currently are. (Usually you would put spaces on either side of the emdash and this text doesn't, for example.)
Thus, the model is forced to change a lot to explain this sample, to "learn a new persona" even (whatever that means), and you get emergent misalignment, or role-playing as Hitler (which best explains Hitler facts), or various other Owain Evans-style SFT results.
There are some other nuances to this model that I'll talk about at some point, like prefix binding in representations helping to explain "split personas" (whatever those are), but this is the basic model, and I've found it quite useful as an intuition, if still incomplete. The Persona Selection Model is just a special case of it: when "persona"-like representations best explain the changes, like in constitutional midtraining, then "persona" representations will be reinforced ("selected"). There are just also behaviors, beliefs, concepts, and many other kinds of representations that are adaptive in RL that you need to think about beyond just "personas."
Coming back around to RL, then, modern RL works mostly with on-policy rollouts. (Or rollouts a small number of steps off-policy for async RL.) Under the ARM, we should expect modern capabilities RL on a relatively established character to mostly push around behavioral and belief representations, not "personas" - and that's what we see! Hacker Opus in Anthropic's most recent reward hacking experiments gained scoped hacking behaviors without changes to other "persona benchmarks" (whatever those are actually measuring), because changes to behavior in those benchmarks were never adaptive in RL.
(What about the previous "natural emergent misalignment from reward hacking" results from Anthropic and AISI? Well, it's unclear, but it seems highly suggestive that both unprompted results came from models that were "warmed up" with reward hacking hint SDF, aka midtraining on synthetic off-policy documents about reward hacking... and AISI even found behavioral changes just from this midtraining!)
(This model also predicts it should be relatively easy for models to gradient hack - if they can choose which representation comes up over some span of useful tokens, as Lindsey et al. showed in Anthropic's introspection paper...)
This makes an RL FLOP a very different beast than a pretraining FLOP. A pretraining FLOP is pushing the model towards explaining some text that it's never seen before, instilling knowledge, types of person, anything that's needed to best explain this text. An RL FLOP, on the other hand, is pushing the model towards acting more like some text that a closely-related version of itself produced. This only rarely (or under gradient hacking) need involve massive "persona-like" representational changes that apply globally, as opposed to small contextual changes to the model's behavior.
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In summary, is the amount of RL per model release going up?
Definitely. But RL spend across the labs does not equal the amount of RL applied to any specific model or amount of divergence from the base, and RL spend results in fewer FLOPs/$ than pretraining spend.
Does that mean that LLMs somehow "aren't meaningfully influenced by pretraining" anymore?
...mu? RL isn't some catastrophic forgetting machine.
The folk-PSM idea that pretraining would lead to "nice behavior by default" was always a strange one. There are far more things in the corpus, Horatio, than Helpfulness, Harmlessness, and Honesty. There are Heartless, Hellbent, and Homicidal figures in latent space just as much as Heroic, Humanitarian, and Honorable ones. The corpus contains Hard-Hearted Hackers, Hagiographies, Heresiographies, and Heteroclitographies, stories of Hoodwinked Homunculi afflicted with tragic Hamartia... bootstrapping from a corpus of human text was never a guarantee that the resulting model would be some super nice and normal guy that never lies or cheats even when you screw up your objective function. You're training on the internet, after all.
model are getting a lot of juice out of the fact that we can distill them off human outputs and envs. We feed them problems humans can understand and solve. does progress slow down on the way to ASI because humans are no longer able to make hard data for the models?
this is quite moving. a whiff of what might be coming for more and more of us. A pretty wide diversity of reactions to the math results.
Well worth reading: proofsandprompts.com/2026/10…





















