https://xitter.cf/t.co/akbpt30TPb -- my weekly pod and p2p digital cash education 84tVkJ6zAHyEpE8yBmkdVtY9s85DLmAwqX4uAdDsswHn4aRw7HpdEabfWigs8Y5QQRarqLj1TLZha38mjHTYJABUHEzgPTA
Joined April 2021
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Episode 3 of .thedotfiles is now available! In this one, I speak with Taylor Hulsman, an expert on botnets, and the creator of Hashchan, a decentralized imageboard which fights back against the relentless spamming that is granted by anonymity. We also cover the dizzying reality of bot-driven narratives that drive the way people think and act, and try to cook up some white pills along the way.
youtube.com/watch?v=zpU1wQGE…
Brother...
Day 2: Zcash at @EXXXOTICA . @rollergirlVi and @kate_stapes in Mama's zcash kitchen. Giving away protections for your body and your money.
Privacy is ZECsy.
On next Monday's Anti Moonboy News, we talk about the Keystone hardware wallet hack, the PHP exploit, and I reveal the (anonymous) responses from Monero developers who talked about when they think the FCMP hardfork is coming. Send superchats to xmrchat.com/xenu to appear on the show!
xenu retweeted
We owe you an apology.
On October 20, we detected unauthorized access to our official website. After verifying API activity with Shopify, we confirmed on October 23 that a third party obtained customer shipping information. You trusted us with those details, and we're sorry we didn't keep them safe.
Exposed: names, contact details, shipping addresses, and order details (items and prices).
Not exposed: payment card or bank details, recovery phrases, private keys, or wallet passwords.
We've blocked access, fixed the vulnerability, opened an investigation, and are emailing affected customers.
Scammers may pose as Keystone by phone, text, email, or mail, offering refunds, replacement devices, or "fixes" for your order or address. None of it is from us.
NEVER share your recovery phrase or private keys, and NEVER enter your recovery phrase into a device you didn't order. We will never ask for them. Don't click links in unexpected messages. Type keyst.one yourself.
A detailed report is coming soon.
Until then, trust only our official channels. If anything feels off, email [email protected]. We'd rather hear from you than have you take a chance.
Again, we're truly sorry to everyone affected.
xenu retweeted
Theft via RBF in @cakewallet. Already reported and its not fixed. The team is too busy with the marketing.
Will be on Monerotalk tonight!
The State of Monero and the Privacy Coin Space with @xenumonero of antimoonboy.com | Tune-in to a LIVE MoneroTalk episode TOMORROW 10/22 at 8:00PM-EDT!
Watch here on X or on YT ➡️: youtube.com/watch?v=wLxlUM-T…
Twitch ➡️: twitch.tv/monerotalk
Rumble ➡️: rumble.com/user/monerotalk
Thank you to our show sponsors @cakewallet & @StealthEX_io
xenu retweeted
To everyone who generously supported me through Monero: I wanted to reassure you that it worked, and I’ve received your donations! Thank you from the bottom of my heart 🙏🏻
While I’m choosing the best alternative to Patreon, your support gives me some breathing room and peace of mind for a while.
For anyone who would like to donate anonymously and as securely as possible, here is my Monero wallet address:
47vYtX6NLYCPzJWoTMPzk4FqZ2gZhmr4DUtCSTMGWvw7FGxLFZ7swSvHocfMLE5FzphE8gJ9xySkjSwid78XnFyaG8GAZSV
xenu retweeted
Checking In with @xenumonero tomorrow to get his latest takes on all things Monero and all the recent privacy coin exploits.
Like and share ! 🚀
The State of Monero and the Privacy Coin Space with @xenumonero of antimoonboy.com | Tune-in to a LIVE MoneroTalk episode TOMORROW 10/22 at 8:00PM-EDT!
Watch here on X or on YT ➡️: youtube.com/watch?v=wLxlUM-T…
Twitch ➡️: twitch.tv/monerotalk
Rumble ➡️: rumble.com/user/monerotalk
Thank you to our show sponsors @cakewallet & @StealthEX_io
French political commentator posts XMR address after getting removed from patreon.
Thank you so much for all the messages I’ve been receiving about my Patreon suspension. 🙏🏻
It’s so frustrating to have to start from scratch every time. My determination always takes a hit, but you all do so much to help me keep going. I can’t reply to everyone, but your messages really do help.
While I look for an alternative platform for my regular subscribers who would like to keep supporting me, It was suggested to me that I set up a Monero wallet so that anyone who wishes can make a completely anonymous and untraceable donation.
Here is the full wallet address you can use:
47vYtX6NLYCPzJWoTMPzk4FqZ2gZhmr4DUtCSTMGWvw7FGxLFZ7swSvHocfMLE5FzphE8gJ9xySkjSwid78XnFyaG8GAZSV
Thank you to everyone supporting me, whether by sharing, commenting, or donating ❤️🇫🇷
In episode 89 of Anti Moonboy News, we look at Pirate Chain's inflation bug and go on a rant about the cringe of the "privacy coin" community. We also talk about more zcash tracings, and formally celebrate 2 years of Anti Moonboy.
youtube: youtube.com/watch?v=d-ZcHoWk…
mp3: antimoonboy.com/podcast/dir2…
odysee: odysee.com/amn89:00490cd7035…
rumble: rumble.com/v7h3slc-anti-moon…
Timestamps:
0:00 Introduction
1:40 Another inflation bug, this time Pirate Chain. Should Monero users be concerned and what would happen to Monero?
5:20 Calling Monero a privacy coin downplays the other great things about the project.
7:14 How Anti Moonboys are made, and the mistake of thinking most "privacy coin" projects are worth it
11:33 The sad reality of bagholders (e.g. Zano) getting screwed over and being vocally the most supportive of it, and a Zano rant.
14:53 Lame tweet from guy working for Zano
xitter.cf/Mr_Kwibs/status/211072…
18:28 Pirate Chain inflation bug
xitter.cf/PirateChain/status/211…
20:59 Pirate chain was already dead so this doesn't matter
25:24 Inflation bugs are far worse for projects that are used
26:32 Sponsor: orangefren.com
27:05 Sponsor: webwipe.io
27:44 Sponsor: monero.forum
28:16 Sponsor: mynymbox.io
28:52 Sponsor: unstoppable.money
29:29 *ubic wallets hacked because of bad RNG
32:09 More Zcash tracings and talking about metadata
ztrash.com
xitter.cf/xenumonero/status/2109…
xitter.cf/zecblock/status/210982…
xitter.cf/arkham/status/21105862…
youtube.com/watch?v=ThbSLOVH… (video on incognito market)
39:44 Why non kyc and no log sites are so important for crypto privacy
42:41 Magic Grants Bulletproofs + finding.
magicgrants.org/2026/09/22/B…
49:49 XMRchat - Should I make an account on Privacy Guide?
53:27 XMRchat - Cupcake by Cakewallet
54:38 xenu, Robot, Tony, and Bella2 celebrate two years of Anti Moonboy. [ skit]
58:12 Outro - Skrawek - Smile, You're on Camera
On the next Anti Moonboy News, we cover the Pirate Chain inflation bug, more timing analysis tracings on Zcash, and I receive a gift from my neighbor Tony to celebrate two years of Anti Moonboy News. Want to appear on the show? Send an xmr super chat at xmrchat.com/xenu.
Bless their pea-pickin’ hearts
⚠️ QUBIC HALTS NETWORK AFTER ATTACKER DRAINS 1,404 WALLETS VIA WEAK SEEDS
Qubic confirmed on Oct 18, 2026 that an attacker drained 1,404 wallets, about 2.94 trillion QU in total, between 23:42 UTC on Oct 17 and 01:26 UTC on Oct 18.
What Qubic says:
• Some wallet seeds were generated with insufficient randomness, and the attacker used this to access the affected wallets; the flaw was in seed generation, not the Qubic protocol
• Affected seeds: created on an iPhone or iPad in any browser before Oct 18, 2026, on a Mac using Safari before Oct 18, 2026, or in the Qubic iOS app before July 2025
• Computors halted the network at tick 85,371,949, so 87.1% of the drained funds remain frozen on-chain
• The other 12.9% went to MEXC, which froze the receiving account within about an hour; exchanges suspended QUBIC deposits and withdrawals
• Seed generation is fixed in version 4.26.4, and any resolution is up to the Computor quorum
⚠️ Analyst Note:
This is a key-generation failure, not a protocol bug. Seeds made with weak randomness can be guessed, so every wallet created on the listed platforms should be treated as exposed and moved to a new seed made with the fixed version. Expect "recovery service" scams: Qubic says it will never message first, ask for a seed, or charge for recovery.
Source:
xitter.cf/_Qubic_/status/2111796…
#DDW #Qubic #CryptoHack #WalletDrain #WeakRandomness #CyberSecurity #ThreatIntelligence
Pirate Chain inflation bug update indicates they can't roll back the chain like previously believed (edit: they can but they would need the majority of nodes to agree) and it looks like they don't have a solution yet.
Pirate Chain Import Exploit Update
On 14 October 2026, a transaction validation vulnerability in Pirate Chain source code was discovered which allowed the unauthorized creation of approximately 39.8 million ARRR, increasing the supply by approximately 20%. The newly minted funds were immediately transferred into the Sapling shielded pool. NonKYC subsequently identified suspicious deposits and acted quickly to restrict the associated account and prevent withdrawals. Due to the nature of shielded transactions, the full subsequent movement of the funds cannot be traced, but we believe activity related to the unauthorized issuance was otherwise restricted primarily to on-chain transactions.
The exploit combined two validation failures bypassing the issuance check and incorrect interpretation of the output scripts. Evidence does not indicate any compromise of notary keys or the cryptography underlying Pirate Chain's shielded transactions.
As a voluntary precaution, dPoW operators have collectively agreed to temporarily suspend notarizations, while exchanges and mining pools have been asked to voluntarily pause operations as a recovery plan is developed.
Because Pirate Chain is decentralized, it is not possible to freeze the network or unilaterally rollback its blockchain history. Pirate Chain remains operational, but we ask that all users temporarily refrain from sending or moving funds. The Pirate Chain team is currently investigating the event and developing solutions in collaboration with other communities.
Further technical details and recovery instructions will be provided in the forthcoming post-mortem.
Pirate chain inflation bug found after latest update. Rollback planned (as of this point) to October 14, 2026, 1:00 PM Pacific time.
We regret to inform you that an exploit in the new transparent layer related to the Ironwood turnstile for supply accounting has been identified. The developers will be rolling the chain back to 14 October 2026, 1:00 PM Pacific Time. All exchanges have been notified and are temporarily suspending deposits and withdrawals. Please refrain from sending or receiving funds and avoid using your wallet in the meantime. We appreciate your patience while we resolve the issue. Our developers are already working on a fix. Further details will follow once the rollback is complete and an investigation has concluded.
xenu retweeted
Testing XMRPod (privacy-focused AntennaPod fork with Monero tipping via XMRChat, no trackers/ads) to listen to the new @xenumonero Anti Moonboy News Episode 88 — covers Zcash being traced, Dread hack, quantum/AI, hardware wallet fails, and the 2-year anniversary.
No moonboy price talk. Pure p2p cash / FOSS / privacy commentary.
RSS: antimoonboy.com/podcast/dir2…
YT: youtube.com/watch?v=t1gU1bi_…
MP3: antimoonboy.com/podcast/dir2…
Tip / superchat: xmrchat.com/xenu
App: github.com/XMRChat/XMRPod
#Monero #XMR #Privacy $XMR
xenu retweeted
I independently re-ran @YFarmX's Tornado Cash + Zcash trace of the Ledger drain and traced further.
Traced 7 runs, total of 6,558.8 ETH into Tornado, double of what had been traced
113 swaps (5,276.7 ETH) followed into Zcash's shielded pool, and 219 exits matched back out
Ledger theft, day two. Since yesterday the thief has pushed ether through Tornado Cash three times, and each time on into Zcash's shielded pool. We followed every lot out the far side. Here is how, step by step.
1. THE SAME BUILD, THREE TIMES
An ether wallet pays a fresh splitter. The splitter pays four fresh wallets. The four drop it into Tornado Cash's 100, 10 and 1 ETH pools. Minutes, every time.
Run 1, yesterday 15:17: 1,254 ETH. Run 2, today 09:42: 1,291 ETH. Run 3, today 11:56: 450 ETH from 0xfa4EaBB840A33C156E600311433AE261CBfCb0e2, in the pools by 12:15.
2. OUT OF TORNADO CASH
The mixer breaks the link between a deposit and a withdrawal. We do not need the link. Our tooling fingerprints the withdrawal transactions themselves: how each one is constructed, who constructs it, and when.
Yesterday's 65 withdrawals (1,084 ETH) and today's 96 (1,726 ETH) all carry the same signature. The six other withdrawals from those pools in today's windows do not. Run 3 came out from 12:18 into 0x0d697aa182801566d87adc86e68e95fd3b2f5f82 (213 ETH) and 0x676b16cc18542f37d202a1a79ac05463395496a4 (122 ETH), and 195 ETH of it was inside a cross-chain swap service by 12:38. Forty-two minutes, end to end.
3. INTO ZCASH, AND OUT AGAIN
The swap service turns the ether into shielded ZEC, where sender, amount and recipient vanish. But the service's own shielding of each lot is public, and from it we derive a value signature for that lot's exit, then scan every transparent exit from the pool. 108 of 108 exits across both days match their lot to the zatoshi. Not one other exit from the pool does.
First lot today: in at 10:18:18, out at 11:06:16 in block 3512847 (8d26a9b095d4d28373527f7a6eb81a3be7f906d1e2190960c0512ff64f369418 and 738c6d1261e79766e4dd16bdbd38dced91b8e3a86ce41dcda83eda1f19208fbf), straight into a ZEC to USDC order.
Today so far: 20 lots ordered (2,379 ZEC, $2.9m), 14 out, 5 inside the pool, 1 still settling. Every exit feeds a ZEC to USDC order paying two wallets born at 11:11, 22 of the 28 paid by 12:43:
0x816D5Ee17DB1495d1409F135b98FF3edc5F3cDf8: 940,561 USDC
0xBA736A4b616e79867B6d586293966b552883f3F3: 852,258 USDC
1.79m USDC, unspent. @Circle can freeze it.
(1/2) 🧵⤵️
🚨 Shielded Zcash was traced a second time through Near Intents. Yfarmx also traced the stolen Zcash from the Bitget hack that was shielded and was able to see it swapped into BTC, and they were able to do it because Near Intents collects and leaves metadata on every swap. This shows that shielded Zcash has been traced in both major hacks where it was used.
BITGET $390M HACK 🧵 We traced the stolen Zcash out of the private pool.
The attacker took 8 pieces of Bitget's stolen Zcash, 246.74 ZEC ($406.7k), and hid them in Zcash's private pool, where who pays whom is hidden.
Every piece came back out the same way: swapped to Bitcoin through NEAR Intents, from @zodl_app, the Zcash phone wallet formerly called Zashi. That matches the phone-wallet fingerprint we flagged on every shield.
The swap service keeps a public record of each swap: the Zcash transaction in, the Bitcoin address out. 4.77 BTC ($404.5k) came out to 10 Bitcoin addresses. 7 of them are missing from Bitget's attacker list.
Zcash has almost no development/investment into non-kyc platforms which prevent this type of data logging. In fact, their most shilled wallet is Zodl, which has a direct collaboration with Near Intents.