Prof. @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime • Visiting Scholar @HarvardAsia • Research Associate @Harvard/@FairbankCenter • Associate @CASI_Research • Member @CFR_org

Cambridge, MA
Joined May 2009
Appreciate Nia Kaul/@scsnewswire profiling @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Studies Institute @UPI: “U.S. Navy’s CMSI Marks 20 Years Tracking Beijing’s Maritime Ambitions”! upi.com/Voices/2026/10/21/na… “The @USNavy’s #China #Maritime Studies Institute is marking 20 years of research that has helped shape understanding of Beijing’s maritime strategy.” ⚓⚓⚓ Reprinted in “Naval History,” CHINFO NEWS CLIPS: Navy & Marine Corps Daily Media Report, 22 October 2026, 15–16. “Recalling the Institute’s early days, co-founder Dr. Andrew Erickson described working through the night to sort photocopied Chinese-language articles into research categories. andrewerickson.com/2026/09/c… By 2008, just 2 years after its founding at the U.S. Naval War College, #CMSI had organized 4 major conferences, including one examining China’s future nuclear submarine force. Its research has since gained wider recognition. A 2024 study, Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-Strait Invasion, was named the Samuel B. Griffith Foundation’s 2025 Publication of the Year & selected for the @CMC_MarineCorps/@USMC’s professional reading lists in 2025 & 2026, underscoring the Institute’s growing influence on U.S. military thinking about China & Taiwan. Through the utilization of an open-source research methodology, including Chinese-language official documents, journals & reports, to study the People’s Republic of China’s military maritime development, the CMSI highlights that it is able to provide a more in-depth understanding of China’s maritime activities. The CMSI publishes a range of products that include the Quarterly Review, CMSI Studies in China Maritime, China Maritime Studies Red Books, CMSI China Maritime Reports, CMSI Notes & CMSI Translations. In addition, the Institute hosts regular conferences, with past topics covering China’s Near Seas Operations (2011), China’s Far Seas Operations (2012), China’s Naval Shipbuilding (2015) & China’s Undersea Warfare (2023). During a panel discussion that took place to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the CMSI, Captain @ChrisHSharman, director of the CMSI, noted that the Institute is able to deliver “cutting-edge” research that overcomes language & access barriers. In an exclusive comment for the South China Sea NewsWire, Sharman & Erickson reflected on the key milestones the CMSI has accomplished, & looked ahead to the future implications of China’s maritime activities. … Admiral Gary Roughead, former U.S. Navy officer & the 29th Chief of Naval Operations, offered his perspective of the evolution of the CMSI in a keynote speech during the CMSI’s 20th anniversary commemoration. He noted that the creation of the CMSI & his return to the Pacific Command “were almost concurrent.” “The timing of CMSI’s founding could not have been better,” as the People’s Liberation Army was also demonstrating rapid transformation & development. Roughead’s keynote mirrored the sentiment of Sharman & Erickson. He noted that the CMSI is a unique organization in terms of how it engages actors & conducts its research. The CMSI is able to offer “deeper insight” through fostering collaboration between China “linguists & practitioners.” Roughead commented that the CMSI’s research beyond naval affairs “sets it apart” from other institutions. He noted that it is essential to monitor China’s “global merchant fleet,” “shipbuilding industry” & “global ports.” … Citing what he referred to as the “Mega-region,” he underscored that the CMSI must continue to monitor the “vast area from the Eastern Mediterranean to East Asia, particularly the great Indian Ocean.” Former director of the CMSI Dr. @peter_dutton similarly stated that agility, & being able to efficiently adapt to new challenges, is paramount. To address China’s growing maritime ambitions & challenges that lie ahead, the CMSI has concrete plans in store. Its upcoming conference in 2027 will discuss the theme Military-Civil Fusion at Sea: China’s Integrated Advantage? …
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New! @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Report #59—“Be Focused, Be Humble, Be Happy: Career Progression, Organization & Training of PLAN Submariners” digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm… From CMSI Director @ChrisHSharman, @USNavy (Ret.)— #China #Navy Watchers: What are the career tracks aboard Chinese Navy submarines? How do #submarine crews train? And what are the dynamics between a sub’s Commanding Officer & the Political Commissar? CMSI’s latest CMR tackles these ?s & more. Authored by Rear Admiral (Ret.) Phil Yu & Benjamin Rosen, this report dives deep (pun intended) into the human factors that shape China’s sub force, an aspect of the PLAN that receives far less attention than its platforms & capabilities. China’s diverse sub fleet & increasingly ambitious ops demand a hi degree of tech expertise & professional competence. Yet while sub hulls, weapons & capabilities frequently dominate analysis, far less is known about the crews who operate these platforms & the personnel systems that support them. This CMR breaks new ground by examining the career progression, org structure & training of PLAN submariners. It explores how the sub force develops its officers & NCOs, how different career tracks support increasingly complex ops & how the PLAN is adapting its workforce to meet evolving technological & op demands. The report also examines the role of the Party Committee & the relationship between the Commanding Officer & Political Commissar, including efforts to improve political officers’ op expertise. It maps career benchmarks for sub officers, assesses promotion opportunities for equipment & special tech officers & highlights the increasingly important role of NCOs in the sub force. For those seeking to understand not just what China’s subs can do, but how the PLAN develops, organizes & leads the people who operate them, CMR No. 59 is essential reading. Main Findings •Led by the political commissar w/ the commanding officer serving as deputy, party committees are responsible for major decision-making, maintaining party control, training & general leadership aboard PLAN subs. While Chinese sources extoll this collective leadership model, it is unclear how this command structure influences decision-making efficacy in practice. •PLAN political officers play a critical role in the leadership & decision making on PLAN subs, but reportedly lack understanding of sub ops. Despite attempts to improve the operational competency of political officers, this likely remains a problem for the PLAN sub force. •The diverse PLAN submarine fleet & its increasingly ambitious operations require a hi degree of technical competency w/in the submarine force. Recent reforms to the career structure of tech officers can be seen as efforts to retain increasingly needed technical expertise in the PLA, in part to meet this requirement. •According to PLA media reporting, the PLAN has made progress in expanding educational & career opportunities for NCOs, while enhancing their professionalization & tech competence w/ updated policies aimed at recruiting more college educated NCOs. •PLAN subs’ apparent lack of a dedicated “supply department” may pose challenges to the sub force’s ability to become a true “far seas protection” force. The PLAN is attempting to address this via tech investments at Shore Service Departments. •The US sub force uses lessons learned from incidents & accidents not only to enhance ops but also as a training tool. In contrast, the PLA treats accidents & near misses primarily as opportunities to promote the importance of political commissars in military decision-making, while prioritizing party loyalty & propaganda value over genuine learning. While public discussions in Chinese media about sub accidents & incidents are scarce, those that do exist reveal a clear focus on using such events for political messaging. •The PLAN sub force has invested in simulators & training systems to enable its crews to exercise op……
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美國海軍戰爭學院的中國海事研究所出的第59號報告,主要是提到潛艇部隊的組織架構。除了五大類軍官(作戰,政治,後勤,裝備,和特殊技術)職業生涯以外,裡面還有一張表對照軍階rank與級別grade。不精確地比喻,軍階是梯數,級別是趴數。前者關於薪水,後者關於地位。
New! @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Report #59—“Be Focused, Be Humble, Be Happy: Career Progression, Organization & Training of PLAN Submariners” digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm… From CMSI Director @ChrisHSharman, @USNavy (Ret.)— #China #Navy Watchers: What are the career tracks aboard Chinese Navy submarines? How do #submarine crews train? And what are the dynamics between a sub’s Commanding Officer & the Political Commissar? CMSI’s latest CMR tackles these ?s & more. Authored by Rear Admiral (Ret.) Phil Yu & Benjamin Rosen, this report dives deep (pun intended) into the human factors that shape China’s sub force, an aspect of the PLAN that receives far less attention than its platforms & capabilities. China’s diverse sub fleet & increasingly ambitious ops demand a hi degree of tech expertise & professional competence. Yet while sub hulls, weapons & capabilities frequently dominate analysis, far less is known about the crews who operate these platforms & the personnel systems that support them. This CMR breaks new ground by examining the career progression, org structure & training of PLAN submariners. It explores how the sub force develops its officers & NCOs, how different career tracks support increasingly complex ops & how the PLAN is adapting its workforce to meet evolving technological & op demands. The report also examines the role of the Party Committee & the relationship between the Commanding Officer & Political Commissar, including efforts to improve political officers’ op expertise. It maps career benchmarks for sub officers, assesses promotion opportunities for equipment & special tech officers & highlights the increasingly important role of NCOs in the sub force. For those seeking to understand not just what China’s subs can do, but how the PLAN develops, organizes & leads the people who operate them, CMR No. 59 is essential reading. Main Findings •Led by the political commissar w/ the commanding officer serving as deputy, party committees are responsible for major decision-making, maintaining party control, training & general leadership aboard PLAN subs. While Chinese sources extoll this collective leadership model, it is unclear how this command structure influences decision-making efficacy in practice. •PLAN political officers play a critical role in the leadership & decision making on PLAN subs, but reportedly lack understanding of sub ops. Despite attempts to improve the operational competency of political officers, this likely remains a problem for the PLAN sub force. •The diverse PLAN submarine fleet & its increasingly ambitious operations require a hi degree of technical competency w/in the submarine force. Recent reforms to the career structure of tech officers can be seen as efforts to retain increasingly needed technical expertise in the PLA, in part to meet this requirement. •According to PLA media reporting, the PLAN has made progress in expanding educational & career opportunities for NCOs, while enhancing their professionalization & tech competence w/ updated policies aimed at recruiting more college educated NCOs. •PLAN subs’ apparent lack of a dedicated “supply department” may pose challenges to the sub force’s ability to become a true “far seas protection” force. The PLAN is attempting to address this via tech investments at Shore Service Departments. •The US sub force uses lessons learned from incidents & accidents not only to enhance ops but also as a training tool. In contrast, the PLA treats accidents & near misses primarily as opportunities to promote the importance of political commissars in military decision-making, while prioritizing party loyalty & propaganda value over genuine learning. While public discussions in Chinese media about sub accidents & incidents are scarce, those that do exist reveal a clear focus on using such events for political messaging. •The PLAN sub force has invested in simulators & training systems to enable its crews to exercise op……
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Big Developments! @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Studies Institute Quarterly Review 1.8 (Fall 2026)—New Multimedia Webpage, PiX Account & 2027 Conference Info! digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm… From CMSI Director @ChrisHSharman, @USNavy (Ret.): Where is CMSI’s research making an impact & how is CMSI supporting the education of the next generation of military leaders? The Fall 2026 CMSI Quarterly Review offers a snapshot of the Institute’s latest scholarship, research impact & educational engagement. Take a look at what CMSI has been up to by downloading our latest issue of the Review! CMSI’s research reaches well beyond our own publications. The Fall issue provides links to where CMSI scholars are cited in external journals & reports, featured in leading media outlets & contributing to discussions of #China’s #military #maritime developments. It also showcases our latest China Maritime Reports, CMSI Notes, original Chinese-language translations & other scholarship advancing understanding of the People’s Liberation Army Navy & China’s military maritime power. Equally important, CMSI translates its research into education & engagement in support of the U.S. Naval War College & the broader @DeptofWar. Through teaching, professional military education, briefings & engagement with U.S. & international partners, CMSI helps equip military officers, students & defense professionals with the knowledge needed to understand China’s maritime capabilities. This issue also commemorates CMSI’s 20th anniversary. With this issue, we are pleased to announce the launch of CMSI’s new multimedia webpage + our presence on PiX & we look ahead to our May 2027 biennial conference in Newport at the Naval War College.
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TL;DR /// KEY POINTS /// Notes from @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Studies Institute (#CMSI) Director CAPT @ChrisHSharman, @USNavy (Ret.): digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm… ⚓ Upcoming Release of Chinese Undersea Warfare: Narrowing the Gaps. The #NavalWarCollege Press will soon publish CMSI’s 2023 conference volume. Chinese Undersea Warfare: Narrowing the Gaps offers a comprehensive assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s rapidly developing capabilities in the undersea domain & their implications for the United States & its allies & partners. Drawing extensively on original Chinese-language sources, historical comparison, & technical, organizational, & operational analysis, the 25 chapters in this volume examine the strategic, administrative, personnel, & industrial foundations of PRC subsurface development. Watch out for our announcement to the CMSI distribution list of the volume’s release. The volume will be posted on the CMSI webpage & available for download alongside our other Studies in Chinese Maritime Development: digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm… ⚓ CMSI’s New Multimedia Page. CMSI routinely produces multimedia content that complements its publications, explores new avenues of inquiry, & provides additional analytical insight into China’s military maritime developments. We are pleased to announce today’s launch of CMSI’s new multimedia page: digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm… The webpage brings together video recordings of CMSI faculty lectures, interviews, & downloadable resources that support education & research on China in the military maritime domain. ⚓ We are Live on PiX. CMSI publications are now linked directly on the Protected Internet Exchange (PiX), a U.S. government information sharing platform. PiX, an unclassified, password-protected system that allows approved users to access critical information pertaining to relevant Communities of Interest (COI). CMSI’s PiX portal is located at this hyperlink: pixtoday.net/login?return_ur… ⚓ CMSI Turned 20. On 24 September 2026, CMSI marked the 20th anniversary of its founding at the U.S. Naval War College with a Lecture of Opportunity featuring the 29th Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral (Ret.) Gary Roughead, & former CMSI Director Dr. Peter Dutton. The event brought together members of the Naval War College community & Naval War College Foundation. Admiral Roughead’s keynote remarks are posted on the CMSI 20th Anniversary splash page: usnwc.edu/News-and-Events/Ev… ⚓ 2027 CMSI Conference — Save the Date. Mark your calendars for 11–12 May 2027, when CMSI hosts its next biennial conference at the U.S. Naval War College—“Military-Civil Fusion at Sea: China’s Asymmetric Advantage?” The conference will examine how Beijing’s Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy is reshaping the military maritime domain and enhancing the PRC’s ability to compete in peacetime & prepare for conflict. Additional details, including registration information, will be announced in the coming months via the CMSI distribution list. ⚓ Sign Up to be Added to the CMSI Distribution List. You can register to receive CMSI’s publications & announcements directly to your inbox by signing up at this link: public.govdelivery.com/accou…
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Andrew Erickson 艾立信 retweeted
20261025_1339Z POST TYPHOON CHAMPI SITREP Given there was so much interest with ingeniSPACE's monitoring work in the Indo-Pacific, we thought contextualize what is happening as TYPHOON CHAMPI passes to the north of Taiwan. CHINACOASTGUARD2303 "Meishan" was one of at least four PRC vessels that sailed through the Bashi Channel  into the "Triple EEZ" on the 23rd of October.  The other three ships CCG 2501, 2308, 2304 sail toward the Senkakus to be joined by ChinaCoastGuard 2302 If you are wondering how big is CCG 2303, its is a 4000-ton hull that is based off of China's Type054 guided missile frigate.  Today it is called the Type 818 Zhaoduan-class "law enforcement ship."  This is not a patrol boat. This is a warship in sheep's clothes. Behind them is the Tong Ji and Zhang Jian research vessels sailing the contours of Taiwan's Prohibited Zone to test 海巡署長室 Coast Guard and the 海洋委員會 situational awareness and response times - who have performed admirably to keep Taiwan's waters safe for everyone.  As we noted earlier during another social media Channel Japan sent several vessels to shelter in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC also sent ships to welcome them as well. ingeniSPACE's recent briefings to partners and allies  organizations, we believe that this information advantage will help the PLA understand and prepare the battlefield  Specifically, they are likely collecting empirical data on the impact of CHAMPI on the waters critical to anti-submarine warfare and underwater navigation. When someone knows your waters better than you do, they can extract economic benefits under your nose, or worse - strike at the time and place of their choosing. Remember, silence is tacit acuquiecense. Viz using @StarboardIntel what's up @MsiDouglas
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New! @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Report #59—“Be Focused, Be Humble, Be Happy: Career Progression, Organization & Training of PLAN Submariners” digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm… From CMSI Director @ChrisHSharman, @USNavy (Ret.)— #China #Navy Watchers: What are the career tracks aboard Chinese Navy submarines? How do #submarine crews train? And what are the dynamics between a sub’s Commanding Officer & the Political Commissar? CMSI’s latest CMR tackles these ?s & more. Authored by Rear Admiral (Ret.) Phil Yu & Benjamin Rosen, this report dives deep (pun intended) into the human factors that shape China’s sub force, an aspect of the PLAN that receives far less attention than its platforms & capabilities. China’s diverse sub fleet & increasingly ambitious ops demand a hi degree of tech expertise & professional competence. Yet while sub hulls, weapons & capabilities frequently dominate analysis, far less is known about the crews who operate these platforms & the personnel systems that support them. This CMR breaks new ground by examining the career progression, org structure & training of PLAN submariners. It explores how the sub force develops its officers & NCOs, how different career tracks support increasingly complex ops & how the PLAN is adapting its workforce to meet evolving technological & op demands. The report also examines the role of the Party Committee & the relationship between the Commanding Officer & Political Commissar, including efforts to improve political officers’ op expertise. It maps career benchmarks for sub officers, assesses promotion opportunities for equipment & special tech officers & highlights the increasingly important role of NCOs in the sub force. For those seeking to understand not just what China’s subs can do, but how the PLAN develops, organizes & leads the people who operate them, CMR No. 59 is essential reading. Main Findings •Led by the political commissar w/ the commanding officer serving as deputy, party committees are responsible for major decision-making, maintaining party control, training & general leadership aboard PLAN subs. While Chinese sources extoll this collective leadership model, it is unclear how this command structure influences decision-making efficacy in practice. •PLAN political officers play a critical role in the leadership & decision making on PLAN subs, but reportedly lack understanding of sub ops. Despite attempts to improve the operational competency of political officers, this likely remains a problem for the PLAN sub force. •The diverse PLAN submarine fleet & its increasingly ambitious operations require a hi degree of technical competency w/in the submarine force. Recent reforms to the career structure of tech officers can be seen as efforts to retain increasingly needed technical expertise in the PLA, in part to meet this requirement. •According to PLA media reporting, the PLAN has made progress in expanding educational & career opportunities for NCOs, while enhancing their professionalization & tech competence w/ updated policies aimed at recruiting more college educated NCOs. •PLAN subs’ apparent lack of a dedicated “supply department” may pose challenges to the sub force’s ability to become a true “far seas protection” force. The PLAN is attempting to address this via tech investments at Shore Service Departments. •The US sub force uses lessons learned from incidents & accidents not only to enhance ops but also as a training tool. In contrast, the PLA treats accidents & near misses primarily as opportunities to promote the importance of political commissars in military decision-making, while prioritizing party loyalty & propaganda value over genuine learning. While public discussions in Chinese media about sub accidents & incidents are scarce, those that do exist reveal a clear focus on using such events for political messaging. •The PLAN sub force has invested in simulators & training systems to enable its crews to exercise op……
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Yet again—this time thanks to pioneering research by Rear Admiral Philip Yu, @USNavy (Ret.) & Benjamin Rosen—the @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Studies Institute (CMSI) offers insights available nowhere else in the #OpenSource world! digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm… This penetrating deep dive surfaces pressing questions: ⚓ What is the cost of #China #Navy reliance on Dual Command Structure (Commanding Officer-Political Commissar) decision-making & Party Committee Meetings? ⚓ Particularly during time-sensitive or wartime submarine operations? ⚓ With all the communications/bandwidth challenges that operating submerged (& *hopefully* undetected) entails?
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Andrew Erickson 艾立信 retweeted
From the U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, available now is China Maritime Report #59: Be Focused, Be Humble, Be Happy: Career Progression, Organization, and Training of PLAN Submariners Full report: tinyurl.com/4d9csenx
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Andrew Erickson 艾立信 retweeted
My post: Is Jing Quan a loose cannon?🤔 China Embassy: The ignorant are fearless!😵‍💫 Question: Are they referring to Jing Quan? Is he fearless? 😂
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Andrew Erickson 艾立信 retweeted
Taiwan says five Chinese coast guard vessels shadowed Japanese ships near Penghu as they sought shelter from Typhoon Champi, accusing Beijing of exploiting storms to assert jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait.
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Andrew Erickson 艾立信 retweeted
Replying to @PLMattis
There are fewer than five active Confucius Institutes remaining on U.S. college campuses, so good time to close the barn door.
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Andrew Erickson 艾立信 retweeted
Replying to @PLMattis
Well stated @PLMattis. PRC would gladly sacrifice Confucius Institutes if its other United Front operations go untouched. @ChinaBriefJT Jamestown Foundation does excellent work on this subject. USG should pay attention if it needs UFWD 'targets' to go after. @SecWar
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Andrew Erickson 艾立信 retweeted
The Confucius Institutes are part of a political apparatus the CCP uses to "break and shatter the enemy." Keeping the pressure on the united front system's efforts to evade U.S. countermeasures is an unequivocal good. But why leave it there? Many other similar organizations exist, but we (and our allies & partners) largely ignore them.
The War Department has designated Confucius Institutes as a threat to our national security.
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Andrew Erickson 艾立信 retweeted
Naval War College Review, Volume 79, Number 4, Autumn 2026 The keys to our past help illuminate the future of the maritime domain in this issue. Full publication: tinyurl.com/2vs54znc
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Andrew Erickson 艾立信 retweeted
U.S. Naval War College Alum, Astronaut Returns to Earth from International Space Station Full article: tinyurl.com/55cfx2rs
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Andrew Erickson 艾立信 retweeted
Happy birthday to the U.S. Navy! From all the staff and students at the U.S. Naval War College.
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The War Department has designated Confucius Institutes as a threat to our national security.
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Andrew Erickson 艾立信 retweeted
A major 🇨🇳#PRC maritime militia rotation has begun in the #SouthChinaSea, with 24 of the large Qiong Sansha Yu ships leaving 3 ports on Hainan Island headed SW toward the Spratly Islands & Scarborough Shoal. Meanwhile, 8 militia ships have left Scarborough toward Hainan. It is likely that we'll see similar departures begin from the Spratlys once the ships headed that way get closer.
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