Provocative, but reasonable.
WHAT IF WALL STREET IS SO AFRAID OF ANOTHER DOT-COM BUBBLE THAT IT'S CREATING THE EXACT OPPOSITE ONE?
In March 2000:
Cisco traded at 130x earnings.
Coca-Cola traded at 24x.
Today?
Nvidia: ~11x.
Micron: ~4x.
Walmart: ~40x.
Costco: ~42x.
(Approximate forward estimates; earnings periods differ.)
I saw this remarkable comparison from @AndreasSteno, who observed that everything is upside down from dot-com pricing.
But it got me thinking about something bigger.
What if investors have become so terrified of overpaying for the future that they're now OVERPAYING to hide from it?
What if the next valuation bubble isn't in AI?
What if it's in the supposedly safe companies everyone is crowding into?
There's a difference between a safe BUSINESS and a safe STOCK.
And there's a difference between uncertainty and risk.
In 2000, Wall Street overpaid for the promise of change.
In 2026, it may be overpaying for the promise that nothing will change.
I just published a deeper essay for my paid subscribers examining institutional incentives, the psychology of defensive investing, why AI earnings may be misunderstood, and what would prove this thesis wrong.
**The next great bubble might not be in the future.
It might be in the price investors are paying to hide from it.**
Subscribe through the link in my bio for the full essay.
87
The question is whether virtually everyone enjoys a similar productivity uplift and hence AI enhanced research becomes the new table stakes rather than a form of differentiation.
Recently spoke with a friend who works in L/S TMT at a pod shop. His team has integrated Claude fully into their workflow, including portfolio monitoring, tracking macro KPIs, and taking the first pass at building models and memos for your PM.
The last time he built a model from scratch was a few months ago. Ever since then, he has been plugging in his usual Excel template and key assumptions into Claude to get a quick and dirty model first. Then refine assumptions to create final analysis from there.
His biggest takeaway is that incorporating AI has opened up significantly more room to do more creative analysis that he had no time to focus on before.
Some portion of his time used to be spent plugging in numbers from a 10K/Q into his Excel or just downloading all the investor presentations from the IR site to track other disclosures and KPIs.
Now all of that has gotten automated with Claude. Instead, he has shifted more of his time to third-party data sources, speaking with consultants and experts, equity research analysts, and more management teams.
The biggest change has been the speed it takes to get caught up on a new name. If his PM came to him and asked to take a look at a stock he had never spent time on before, it would usually take a few days to a week to get fully caught up
Now it can be done in the span of a few hours or a couple of days at worst. The velocity of names that he is churning through has gone up significantly, and he is able to cover a wider array of verticals and sub-verticals as a result
He explicitly said his productivity has nearly 1.5x this time last year using the same exact tools. The difference is that the capabilities of these tools have improved so much that it feels like a night-and-day difference.
116
Wish I found this earlier but better late than never.
The Hollow Men
American capitalism is rotting from the head down. We have replaced the "Owner-Operator"—the risk-taker-with a new, parasitic class of corporate bureaucrat: The Risk-Free Insider.
By "Insider," I am not referring to a specific title. I am referring to the entire administrative state that has captured the modern corporation. This includes the Directors who exist solely to collect fees, the Executives who exist solely to collect bonuses, and the Managers who exist solely to hire consultants.
These are the hollow men of the boardroom. They are masters of PowerPoint. They wear the right suits. They say the right buzzwords about "governance" and "ESG." But they are mercenaries fighting a war with someone else’s ammunition.
In a functioning economy, authority is tied to liability. If you make a bad decision, you lose your own money. That fear of loss is the only thing that keeps a business honest. It forces you to cut waste, obsess over the customer, and stay late to fix what is broken.
Today, we have severed that link.
We have rigged the game so that heads, the Insider wins; tails, the shareholder loses.
If the stock goes up, the Insider collects a massive performance bonus. If the stock crashes due to their own incompetence, they are fired with a "Golden Parachute" worth tens of millions. They are gambling with the house’s money, and they never leave the table poorer than they arrived.
This looting starts in the boardroom.
We have normalized a "Country Club" culture where directors are selected based on social profiling rather than their ability to build a business. The modern board member is often a professional tourist—paid an average of $350,000 a year.
Let’s be brutally honest about what that number represents. The average director is paid nearly five times the GDP per capita of the United States. They earn more for attending four quarterly lunches than the vast majority of Americans earn in five years of hard labor.
And for what?
Most of these directors are "over-boarded," sitting on three or four boards simultaneously. They treat directorships as a gig economy for the elite. They fly in, rubber-stamp a compensation package they didn't read, and fly out. They collect checks from companies they do not understand, do not use, and certainly do not love.
They are not there to ask hard questions. They are there to be collegial. They are there to protect the other Insiders.
And what happens when these boards hire executives who also have no personal capital at risk?
We get the Delegation Economy.
When a Risk-Free Insider faces a crisis—bloated expenses, a broken supply chain, or a stale product—they do not roll up their sleeves. They hire a consultant. They pay a strategy firm millions of shareholder dollars to produce a 100-page deck telling them what they already know.
This is not management. It is intellectual money laundering.
They use shareholder capital to buy an insurance policy for their own careers. If the plan fails, they can blame the consultants. They delegate the work because they are terrified of the responsibility. They would rather preside over a slow, comfortable decline than risk a bold mistake.
While American Insiders are busy optimizing their severance packages, our global competitors are optimizing their products. They are not slowed down by bureaucracy. They are not waiting for a slide deck. They are outworking us.
If we continue to fill our C-suites with administrators instead of operators, we will lose our edge. We will see iconic American franchises hollowed out by fees, managed for the benefit of the Insiders, while the true owners—the shareholders—are left holding the bag.
The time for polite governance is over.
If we want to save the American economy from mediocrity, we must demand a return to the "Owner’s Mentality." We need leaders who treat shareholder capital with the same reverence they treat their own savings. The era of the Risk-Free Insider must end.
129
Makes sense.
Duration is too often trotted out as a cover for a broken thesis, underperformance or excessive volatility.
It might work if there weren’t alternatives that delivered such healthy risk adjusted return in a highly auditable way (ie measurably low beta).
It’s very hard to argue you offer a better product than 10-15% pa with virtually no persistent beta.
one thing re: time horizon in L/S that needs to be understood, is how the industry has changed
hop in the whip, lets ride
1/4. 20-30 years ago, absolute return was the focus
the "top L/S dogs" were just trying to compound at 20% CAGRs by not losing $ in down markets and then by knocking the cover off the ball in up markets
for reference, my first L/S seat was 2009, but a lot of what I know is direct from mentors who ran $ in the 90's/2000's
and a lot of what happens today, has to be understood thru lens of "how we got here"
~2000-2009, L/S had a golden era, and then everyone blew the fuck up in the crisis
from 2010 onwards, and really 2015 ish, there was a huge shift in what LP's (pensions/endowments) had demand for as an L/S product
it went from "shoot the lights out" to "equity returns with fixed income vol" (broad generalization but should hold re: 80/20 rule)
2. this is when LP's stopped paying for beta
"we can own SPY/QQQ for 3 bps. you charge 2/20. if we build an equity portfolio that's 50% beta, what do you add as far as that other 50% that makes you worth paying these outrageous fees?"
they're 100% right btw, and this led to a lot of undifferentiated L/S mgrs going out of business
multi-mgr funds created the perfect solution to LP demands
keep in mind that an 8% net MM return is preferable to an 8% SPY return (bc lower stdev/volatility), this gets missed a lot on twtr
meanwhile, these fucking MMs are somehow delivering consistent 1-2% monthlies and 15% annual returns AT SCALE. it is impossible to understand how absolutely f***ing insane this is unless you've been around for a bit.
like the MM domination of this industry, as an HBS case study, is on par with anything you'll read
3. could the future change - yes.
but based on what we know today, this all holds, and all the commentary you read is people making blind predictions, forecasts, and speculation based on nothing
because the MM perf %'s = path forward. there is zero reason whatsoever for the industry to change until this MM return no longer satisfies what LP's want
but for a pension/endowment, the MM return stream is everything they'd want and then some.
every SM has to answer the question: "I can get 15% returns from an MM at low vol. What do you offer that they can't?"
either has to be returns WELL in excess of 15% (good luck), or volatility less than what the MMs deliver in these monthlies (good fucking luck)
all my original mentorship was at SMs, I have no angle here, this is just an objective take that twtr seems to not understand
4. no LP gives a fuck about "if you have a long time horizon"
their question will be:
"thats nice. as we said: we're annualizing at 10-15% with low vol. what do you offer that they don't?"
if you annualize at 20% over five years, but with higher vol, you're still inferior on a risk-adj basis.
this is how it works despite that being penalized for upside vol makes no sense - I don't make the rules.
so, now that you understand everything that I have written here, you can slice through a lot of nonsense that is written and has no tie to reality
END
if you disagree with my assessment of history and of the current backdrop as of 11/14/2026, I'm open to it, but you gotta bring receipts my man
there's just too many "xyz capital" accounts these days to argue back and forth with someone who has 0 actual industry experience.
ditto allocators - I would LOVE allocator input here but as you know, there are a ton of "xyz ex-allocator" accounts who sound nothing like all the ones I've met in my life.
I dont know shit, I'm a subpar analyst and human being, but my first job at age 21 was an L/S seat and its unfortunately the only subject where I know anything (plus its my entire network)
I wish I knew more about a REAL topic -- maybe literature, physics, artificial intelligence -- but unfortunately, my mental hard drive is retail shitco bps and a lot of hip-hop lyrics.
with that said, debate/pushback welcomed.
1
1,841
Replying to @lulumeservey
This is good.
Always hard to know whether this would’ve altered the course of events, but this as an initial statement is front footed and attempts to empty the closet of skeletons in advance.
1
63
Replying to @SmallwoodAl_
Understand the perspective but I’m skeptical long duration + higher vol gains meaningful share going forward.
It’s arguably not clean enough. Multi strats offer near zero beta with controlled factor tilts.
Giving “long duration higher vol” strategies more leash introduces portfolio level risk management uncertainty.
Not to mention it’s unclear accepting higher vol leads to better compounding long term.
55
Replying to @gregoryblotnick
Excellent write up.
The part that seems most difficult to execute is the risk management.
If you’re spending all day cutting losses then you have to adjust both sides of book constantly to keep risk profile at some level of parity, correct?
Doing that constantly actually seems as tough as the other aspects of the process since prices can change every second of the day while your earnings views do not.
And if everyone adopts this mentality trading off technicals then it seems ultimately self defeating.
Could be wrong. Either way good write up, thanks .
1
70
Replying to @tobi @renald_vie
Technology is perhaps the one sector that requires visionary leadership - especially during major technology shifts (which seem to occur every 5-10 years) - and not mere professional management.
152
Holding on to “judgement” as a moat is also disingenuous because it assumes active manager judgment consistently creates value.
Yet we know empirically active management is mostly zero sum and the industry in total lags relevant benchmarks.
how can investors be thinking so narrowly about AI's impact on investment research
I've been so surprised about the investment community's inability to think more ambitiously about AI
we've been through really interesting phases which were roughly:
1. LLMs are rubbish, won't ever replace judgement
2. LLMs are now quite good, won't ever replace judgement
3. LLMs and coding agents are good, won't ever replace judgement
4. LLMs and coding agents are transformations, but still judgement is incredibly important
5. LLMs and coding agents solve everything, will be able to be fully autonomous research systems, but judgement is still incredibly important
you're all focused on the judgement being replaced here, but this is so short sighted
the biggest assumption of the above 5 points is LLMs.
LLMs and transformer models are not the final form of AI, and it's crazy for me to see so many people discarding next token generation as if that's the only thing that could exist as a model architecture and provides the upper bound of what's possible
how can an industry who's entire job is to try to predict/forecast the future outcomes be so short sighted on what could be possible in the passage of time?
maybe a lesson to learn from recent market volatility is where you can get wrong footed by fat tails
model architecture evolution isn't a far tail, imo it's a <1sigma event which needs to be thought about in detail
how do you do that? you need to get up the Ai skill curve quick
if you're not building and pushing it to its capability limits everyday, you're going to get left in the dust
81
Replying to @Globalflows
Not to quibble but hasn’t it been underway since ~2022? Or at least earlier than now?
2
887
Any 4x or greater return is wonderful.
But for a venture bet, and depending on how they sized, these seem relatively modest.
The funds that made their name on today’s large cap tech giants were making 100x on those bets.
Some incredible fortunes will be made once Anthropic finally goes public in the coming days
Iconiq will make a ~4x return on their $6B of capital invested. Menlo Ventures will return roughly 19x on their position. Spark Capital will generate ~12x.
Massive congratulations to these investment firms
53
Adding technology to asset management has favored only a few cohorts: quants and multi strats.
All others have lagged as they have in aggregate for 20+ years.
Adding AI for everyone seems unlikely to reverse this.
dumbest shit I’ve read today
the exact opposite will be true
yes, your short term edge may fade
but long term, your ability to think critically and independently will allow you to earn higher excess returns
77
Replying to @sourcesandmuses
Congrats, I look forward to seeing what you’re able to accomplish with it.
1
116







