For the prioritizer faction, Iran presents an existential conundrum. On one hand, all their instincts towards shifting attention and military assets towards countering the PRC leads reflexively to the position that the Strait is a lost cause, and that avoidance of sunk cost fallacy becomes the highest priority. Cut losses, mitigate negative consequences, and retreat. On the other hand, the prioritizer must acknowledge that the world is fundamentally changed from February 28. Critical munition stocks have been depleted in a manner not quickly replaced. Aging but vital bombers are being consumed. Energy and alliance norms have been reset. The critical elements of Taiwan's defense have eroded in ways that make the well-understood paradigms of prioritization much more challenging. This conflict may not have commenced because of China, but its conclusion will certainly be about China. From our perspective, the prioritizer is now cornered in a strategic trap. What defense elements can replace what has been expended in Iran? Can anything be done in this conflict which mitigates the consequences in Asia? Is prioritization even possible in a post-Iran moment? Lacking clear answers, the outcome may be a kind of Monroeism by default. Lacking the assets to credibly deter the PRC and burnt by the political consequences of another CENTCOM war, the Western Hemisphere becomes a last viable redoubt of American global strategy.