
Digijaks Group, LLC. Cybersecurity. Reputation Control. Risk Prevention + Reduction. Cybersecurity Insurance. #digitaldefenses #cyberwar | Part of @digijaks
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Joined March 2015
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Digijaks CEO Alan W Silberberg (@ideagov) being interviewed on Talk PR
youtu.be/3HMKwcnEbQo?si=ANJf…
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human Digitollx.
The new book by me. #cyberstalking
#datacenters
#quantumcompute
#Ai
amazon.com/human-Digitollx-B… Cc @digijaks @DigijaksGroupIR
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
❗ ALERT ❗
We are aware of critical vulnerabilities across multiple Fortinet products. As a priority, individuals and organisations should apply available security updates. For further mitigation advice, read the full alert 👉 cyber.gov.au/alert/critical-…
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
Cyber Reputation Center - Digijaks Group Crisis Security
Incident Response. Training. Ai. Quantum. Post Quantum. Research and Analysis. @Digijaks @DigijaksGroupIR
share.google/QLenwiudCYVoOUf…
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
human Digitollx: Texting with Billionaires a.co/d/05ARkTYv by Alan W. Silberberg. Anonymous true life cyber crime stories from the @DigijaksGroupIR @Digijaks archives.
Available September 15, 2026.
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
Coming September 15 on #Kindle.
human Digitollx digijaks.com/human-digitollx… anonymous true cyber and reputation crime stories with impact on the rest of us.
From the @Digijaks @DigijaksGroupIR archives.
#Paperback release is September 21, 2026.
#humandigitollx
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
Dr. James Lacey argues that AGI will compress the OODA loop to microseconds. Militaries that insist on "human in the loop" will lose.
As a result, the next war's decisive battles may be won or lost before a human finishes reading the alert.
#SWJEssay: “Humanity’s Last Order: War in the Age of AGI”
@MarineCorpsU #ArtificialIntelligence #AI
smallwarsjournal.com/2026/08…
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
🚨 Researchers Uncover Covert Global Telecom Surveillance Campaigns
Citizen Lab has uncovered two sophisticated surveillance campaigns exploiting the infrastructure that connects mobile operators around the world.
The investigation provides rare real-world visibility into how suspected commercial surveillance vendors can abuse trusted telecom signalling networks to covertly locate and track mobile subscribers.
* Attackers combined 3G SS7 and 4G Diameter signalling techniques
* One campaign used specially crafted SMS messages containing hidden SIM commands designed to extract location information
* Surveillance tooling spoofed mobile-operator identities and manipulated signalling protocols and routing paths
* Researchers observed infrastructure and identifiers associated with operators across numerous countries, including the UK, Israel, China, Thailand, Sweden, Italy, Cambodia, Mozambique, Uganda, Rwanda, Poland, Switzerland, Morocco, Namibia and others
* Some operator identifiers were reportedly reused for years, indicating persistent surveillance activity
* Researchers identified routing mismatches suggesting surveillance traffic could enter the SS7 ecosystem through third-party interconnect providers
* Both actors manipulated signalling identifiers to obscure the true origin of their traffic
* Citizen Lab describes these actors as effectively operating as "Ghost Operators" — hiding behind legitimate telecom identities while conducting surveillance
🎯 What could attackers obtain?
Observed signalling queries sought information including:
* Current device location
* Cell ID and network location information
* Subscriber/network status
* IMEI
* Radio access technology
* Local time zone
* 4G tracking-area and cell information
This research highlights a cybersecurity layer most users never see.
An attacker does not necessarily need to compromise the smartphone itself to conduct surveillance. Access to trusted telecom signalling infrastructure can potentially enable remote location tracking while much of the activity remains inside private carrier networks.
The larger problem is architectural: global roaming was built around trust between telecommunications providers, and sophisticated surveillance actors appear to be exploiting that trust.
Importantly, Citizen Lab does NOT attribute these campaigns to a specific government or organization and cautions that operator identifiers observed in malicious traffic do not necessarily mean those operators knowingly participated.
Source: Citizen Lab — "Bad Connection: Uncovering Global Telecom Exploitation by Covert Surveillance Actors"
citizenlab.ca/research/uncov…
#DDW #CyberSecurity #ThreatIntelligence #Surveillance #Telecom #SS7 #OSINT
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
Protect yourself in a dangerous world. #cyber #reputation #cyberreputation #AI
@digijaks @DigijaksGroupIR @GarthFisherMD
Via @youtube
youtu.be/bVCk1u6wNpM?is=mMtF…
"human Digitollx: Texting with Billionaires" by Alan W Silberberg @IdeaGov will be out in September 2026. True, yet anonymous stories from the cyber suite.
amazon.com/human-Digitollx-v… published through @digijaks #cyber #BookLaunch
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
human Digitollx: The view from the cyber suite. a.co/d/09muIcvX Coming in September 2026
via me and @digijaks @DigijaksGroupIR
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified a cluster of compromised websites displaying ClickFix lures and using EtherHiding, a technique associated with the ClearFake campaign.
An injected Base64-encoded JavaScript contacts a BNB Smart Chain RPC gateway to query a smart contract previously reported in connection with ClearFake to fetch next-stage instructions. Content stored in a smart contract is resistant to conventional takedown or sinkholing because only the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet that deployed it can make changes.
Users are presented with a fake CAPTCHA that instructs them to open the Windows Run dialog, paste clipboard content, and press Enter to execute an attacker-supplied command under the guise of verification.
We’re seeing multiple forms of command obfuscation and living-off-the-land abuse, including conhost, cmd, PowerShell, pcalua, mshta, rundll32, msiexec, curl, WMI, WebDAV, and scheduled tasks. Carets split keywords, environment variables hide interpreters, and Windows run headlessly or minimized. TerminalFix lures apply the same technique but direct users to Windows Terminal or PowerShell instead of the Run dialog.
This campaign demonstrates that ClickFix and TerminalFix are a high-volume initial access technique. Microsoft reports campaigns targeting thousands of enterprise and consumer devices globally every day, while some malvertising chains can funnel visitors to scam pages.
Numerous actors use the technique to deliver Lumma Stealer and other infostealers, RATs such as Xworm and AsyncRAT, loaders including MintsLoader, and remote management tools. A single successful execution can expose credentials, establish persistence, enable lateral movement, and create a path to human-operated ransomware and potential domain compromise.
Microsoft recommends that organizations enable Microsoft Defender network, web, and cloud-delivered protection; restrict Run and command-line tools where not required; enable PowerShell script-block logging; and implement application control. Users should never paste commands from CAPTCHAs, browser errors, emails, ads, or unsolicited support pages into Run, Terminal, PowerShell, or Command prompt.
Microsoft Defender XDR provides layered protection across the ClickFix attack chain. Defender SmartScreen and Defender for Office 365 help block malicious sites, links, attachments, and fake CAPTCHA lures, while Defender for Endpoint detects suspicious command execution and outbound connections through alerts like “Suspicious command in RunMRU registry”, “Possible ClickFix activity”, “Possible initial access from an emerging threat”.
Microsoft Defender Antivirus blocks malicious command execution using detections such as Trojan:Win32/ClickFix.* and Trojan:Win32/TermFix.*. Treat these alerts as evidence of a potential initial access incident: isolate affected devices, investigate credential exposure and persistence, and hunt for related activity.
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
The AI-powered cybersecurity threat small business owners can’t ignore asbn.com/small-business-show… via @myasbn featuring @IdeaGov
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
The Dark Side of Modern Relationships: Spyware, Tracking, and Control | ... youtu.be/HgZx8-F_3yg?si=0gkA… via @YouTube @IdeaGov @Digijaks
The Dark Side of Modern Relationships: Spyware, Tracking, and Control | ... youtu.be/HgZx8-F_3yg?si=0gkA… via @YouTube @IdeaGov @Digijaks
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
#Ai powered cybersecurity threat. Interview with @Digijaks @DigijaksGroupIR CEO Alan w Silberberg asbn.com/small-business-show…
Digijaks Group IRT retweeted
🚨 WARNING — New HTTP/2 Bomb exploit targets NGINX, Apache HTTPD, Microsoft IIS, Envoy, and Cloudflare Pingora.
A single client can consume 32GB of server memory in roughly 20 seconds, causing remote DoS conditions.
Details here: thehackernews.com/2026/06/ne…












