
FRAGMENTS finds the pieces the market leaves behind โ hidden assets, neglected balance sheets, broken stories โ and puts them together before the cro #Fragments
Joined June 2017
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FRAGMENTS Value retweeted
๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ โ ๐๐ฑ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ฆ๐ถ๐
($ASIX)
๐๐ฑ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ฆ๐ถ๐
๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ผ๐๐ป๐ฑ $๐ญ๐ฑ, ๐ฟ๐ผ๐๐ด๐ต๐น๐ ๐ต๐ฎ๐น๐ณ ๐ถ๐๐ $๐ฎ๐ต.๐ฑ๐ญ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ฏ๐ผ๐ผ๐ธ ๐๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ. An industrial buyer could be interested in the plants, the fertilizer output or securing a supply of nylon. The price it could justify would depend on the cash it could retain.
The company already targets $30 million of annual cost savings. Those savings are included in our Base valuation. A buyer paying a premium would need additional improvements to support the extra price.
Todayโs report works backward from a hypothetical offer, accounting for debt, diluted shares and executive termination benefits. It calculates the additional annual cash required and compares the savings threshold with AdvanSixโs operating expenses.
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐พ๐๐ถ๐๐ถ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฎ๐น๐๐๐ถ๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐ถ๐ป๐ฐ๐น๐๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ถ๐ป ๐๐ผ๐ฑ๐ฎ๐โ๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐, alongside the standalone asset and cash valuations.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ โ ๐ฆ๐๐ฒ๐น๐น๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ถ๐ $STLA
Stellantis trades around $๐ฐ.๐ฎ๐ณ per share. Its last reported book value is roughly $๐ฎ๐ฐ.๐ณ๐ฌ per share, using the exchange rate in my report.
We're talking about Jeep, Ram, Peugeot, Fiat, factories around the world, more than โฌ46 billion of PP&E and a substantial Financial Services business. There is a lot of value inside Stellantis, although I wouldn't assume shareholders can recover anything close to reported book.
At the end of 2023, Stellantis had โฌ๐ฎ๐ต.๐ฑ ๐ฏ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป of Industrial net financial assets. By June 2026, removing the proceeds from the new hybrid capital, my calculation gets closer to โฌ๐ฑ.๐ญ ๐ฏ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป.
They also completed a โฌ3 billion buyback in 2024, recorded โฌ11.645 billion of new warranty provisions in 2025 and have spent billions restructuring the business.
But Stellantis is still selling millions of vehicles. Q2 generated โฌ1 billion of positive Industrial free cash flow. The latest Q3 shipments were down 12% in North America and up 10% in Europe. I want to see what those volumes produced in operating profit, what happened to dealer incentives and how much cash was left after the remaining restructuring payments.
๐ข๐ฐ๐๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฎ๐ด will give us another set of financial numbers.
At these prices, I find Stellantis very interesting. I also think you can make a serious mistake buying an automaker simply because its reported assets are worth several times the stock price.
I went through the Industrial balance sheet, debt maturities, hybrids, Financial Services, warranty, factories, regional profitability and capital allocation. I then calculated what different levels of recovery would mean per share, including what happens if the turnaround only partly works.
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐ณ๐๐น๐น ๐ฆ๐๐ฒ๐น๐น๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ถ๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ฎ๐ถ๐น๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ผ ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐ถ๐ฑ ๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ ๐๐ก๐ง๐ฆ ๐๐๐ฏ๐๐ฐ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
$STLA
FRAGMENTS Value retweeted
๐ซ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ผ๐
$XRX
๐ฆ๐ง๐๐ฅ๐ง๐๐๐ฃ๐ข ๐๐๐ถ๐น๐น ๐๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ๐ ๐ซ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ผ๐
โ๐ ๐ณ๐ถ๐ป๐ฎ๐ป๐ฐ๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ฏ๐๐๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ๐๐ ๐ฎ๐ $๐ณ.๐ฒ๐ต ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ซ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ผ๐
๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ. Its October 19 letter asks for clearer financial reporting and a formal strategic review. The fund wants an update during the October 29 earnings call.
The business finances customers buying equipment. It earns income from those loans while Xerox pays interest on the borrowing behind them. An outright sale would raise cash and transfer future income to the buyer. How much Xerox keeps would depend on the funding that has to be repaid, transaction costs and taxes. Those numbers also help shareholders compare a sale with bringing in a financing partner.
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ ๐๐ก๐ง๐ฆ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐น๐ฐ๐๐น๐ฎ๐๐ฒ๐ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ ๐ฐ๐ผ๐๐น๐ฑ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐บ๐ฎ๐ถ๐ป ๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ต ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ after debt, retirement funding and preferred shares. It also tests how buying back discounted bonds and issuing shares through warrants could change that value.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
๐ซ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ผ๐
$XRX
๐ฆ๐ง๐๐ฅ๐ง๐๐๐ฃ๐ข ๐๐๐ถ๐น๐น ๐๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ๐ ๐ซ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ผ๐
โ๐ ๐ณ๐ถ๐ป๐ฎ๐ป๐ฐ๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ฏ๐๐๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ๐๐ ๐ฎ๐ $๐ณ.๐ฒ๐ต ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ซ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ผ๐
๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ. Its October 19 letter asks for clearer financial reporting and a formal strategic review. The fund wants an update during the October 29 earnings call.
The business finances customers buying equipment. It earns income from those loans while Xerox pays interest on the borrowing behind them. An outright sale would raise cash and transfer future income to the buyer. How much Xerox keeps would depend on the funding that has to be repaid, transaction costs and taxes. Those numbers also help shareholders compare a sale with bringing in a financing partner.
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ ๐๐ก๐ง๐ฆ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐น๐ฐ๐๐น๐ฎ๐๐ฒ๐ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ ๐ฐ๐ผ๐๐น๐ฑ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐บ๐ฎ๐ถ๐ป ๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ต ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ after debt, retirement funding and preferred shares. It also tests how buying back discounted bonds and issuing shares through warrants could change that value.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
FRAGMENTS Value retweeted
Cable One โ $6 a Share and a $480 Million Fight
Cable One trades around $6 a share, valuing the entire common equity at roughly $34 million. Meanwhile, one of its largest lenders has gone to federal court to stop the company from paying $480 million for the remaining 55% of MBI. According to Cable One's own accounting for the purchase obligation, that interest has an implied equity value of approximately $54 million. MBI also carries an estimated $920 million in net debt.
I find the history behind this transaction even more interesting. Going back to 2020, MBI borrowed money to pay distributions to its owners. Cable One later amended the purchase agreement, allowing additional money to reach those owners while delaying the final payment. Now the business is losing customers, generating less cash, and GTCR is involved in a proposed refinancing that could completely change Cable One's financial position.
The stock has lost roughly half its value since Cable One announced a plan to address $2.45 billion in financial obligations. The broadband business still generates cash, but the terms of the refinancing could determine how much of its value belongs to today's shareholders.
Our Cable One Special Situation report goes through the agreements, the money paid to MBI's owners, the actual cash generated by both businesses, the debt maturities and what could happen if GTCR receives Cable One shares.
At $6, with only 5.67 million shares outstanding, the potential dilution deserves as much attention as the value of the assets.
$CABO
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
Cable One โ $6 a Share and a $480 Million Fight
Cable One trades around $6 a share, valuing the entire common equity at roughly $34 million. Meanwhile, one of its largest lenders has gone to federal court to stop the company from paying $480 million for the remaining 55% of MBI. According to Cable One's own accounting for the purchase obligation, that interest has an implied equity value of approximately $54 million. MBI also carries an estimated $920 million in net debt.
I find the history behind this transaction even more interesting. Going back to 2020, MBI borrowed money to pay distributions to its owners. Cable One later amended the purchase agreement, allowing additional money to reach those owners while delaying the final payment. Now the business is losing customers, generating less cash, and GTCR is involved in a proposed refinancing that could completely change Cable One's financial position.
The stock has lost roughly half its value since Cable One announced a plan to address $2.45 billion in financial obligations. The broadband business still generates cash, but the terms of the refinancing could determine how much of its value belongs to today's shareholders.
Our Cable One Special Situation report goes through the agreements, the money paid to MBI's owners, the actual cash generated by both businesses, the debt maturities and what could happen if GTCR receives Cable One shares.
At $6, with only 5.67 million shares outstanding, the potential dilution deserves as much attention as the value of the assets.
$CABO
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ โ ๐๐ฑ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ฆ๐ถ๐
($ASIX)
๐๐ฑ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ฆ๐ถ๐
๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ผ๐๐ป๐ฑ $๐ญ๐ฑ, ๐ฟ๐ผ๐๐ด๐ต๐น๐ ๐ต๐ฎ๐น๐ณ ๐ถ๐๐ $๐ฎ๐ต.๐ฑ๐ญ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ฏ๐ผ๐ผ๐ธ ๐๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ. An industrial buyer could be interested in the plants, the fertilizer output or securing a supply of nylon. The price it could justify would depend on the cash it could retain.
The company already targets $30 million of annual cost savings. Those savings are included in our Base valuation. A buyer paying a premium would need additional improvements to support the extra price.
Todayโs report works backward from a hypothetical offer, accounting for debt, diluted shares and executive termination benefits. It calculates the additional annual cash required and compares the savings threshold with AdvanSixโs operating expenses.
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐พ๐๐ถ๐๐ถ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฎ๐น๐๐๐ถ๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐ถ๐ป๐ฐ๐น๐๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ถ๐ป ๐๐ผ๐ฑ๐ฎ๐โ๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐, alongside the standalone asset and cash valuations.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
๐ฆ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ฎ๐น ๐ฆ๐ถ๐๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป โ ๐ฆ๐ถ๐
๐๐น๐ฎ๐ด๐ $FUN
Six Flags trades near $๐ณ.๐ณ๐ฌ, while an activistโs September 2025 proposal estimated potential value at $๐ฏ๐ต.๐ฎ๐ฒ ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ through a real-estate separation and an operating recovery. Activist investors have pressed for a sale of the company or its properties. A purchaser could acquire Cedar Point, Knottโs Berry Farm and Canadaโs Wonderland, together with hotels, marinas, campgrounds and substantial landholdings.
Our published report examines those assets individually, with ๐ฝ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฒ ๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ป๐ด๐ฒ๐ ๐ถ๐ป ๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ฎ๐ฒ ๐ฑ๐ผ๐น๐น๐ฎ๐ฟ๐, land and hotel transaction comparisons, and prices per acre, room and park visit. It checks the cash needed to support those estimates, then accounts for debt, outside partners and sale expenses to calculate ๐ฝ๐ผ๐๐๐ถ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐ฝ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฑ๐ ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ.
Last weekโs announcement of additional seat belts and an independent safety review adds another investment question for any buyer. The report includes capital-spending sensitivities, insurance exposure and the upcoming Georgia payment. Paid subscribers can read the ๐ณ๐๐น๐น ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฎ๐น๐๐๐ถ๐ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ฝ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ๐.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
๐๐ถ๐๐ฒ ๐ฃ๐ผ๐ถ๐ป๐ ($FPH) โ ๐ง๐ต๐ฒ $๐ญ.๐ฐ๐ฑ ๐๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐ค๐๐ฒ๐๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป
Five Point closed yesterday at $4.50, against roughly ๐จ๐ฆ$๐ญ๐ฑ.๐ณ๐ฒ in reported capital per fully exchanged share.
Last night, management cut its 2026 net income forecast from $100 million to just $20 million.
I found the explanation on the conference call interesting. Some land transactions have already been negotiated, but builders simply don't need the land right now. They have enough inventory, home sales are slower, and those transactions are being pushed into 2027.
Meanwhile, Great Park sent another $40.4 million to Five Point in distributions and incentive payments during the quarter. The company finished September with nearly $359 million in cash and about $91 million in net debt.
FPH has the financial flexibility to wait for a better housing market. But waiting also costs money, and a shareholder can spend a very long time owning cheap land without seeing much of a return.
I spent a considerable amount of time on this company because the discount is substantial, even after accounting for its complicated ownership structure. In the Deep Value Report, we separated San Francisco from the other assets, examined Great Park, Valencia and Hearthstone, and went through the development agreements to understand how the money eventually reaches shareholders.
At $4.50, I still think Five Point deserves serious attention. But I would want to know exactly what I own, how much more capital it requires and when I can reasonably expect to see that value.
๐๐ถ๐๐ฒ ๐ฃ๐ผ๐ถ๐ป๐ ๐๐ผ๐น๐ฑ๐ถ๐ป๐ด๐ โ ๐ช๐ต๐ผ ๐๐ฎ๐ฝ๐๐๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ถ๐๐ฐ๐ผ๐๐ป๐, ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ช๐ต๐ฒ๐ป?
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
FRAGMENTS Value retweeted
๐๐ถ๐๐ฒ ๐ฃ๐ผ๐ถ๐ป๐ ($FPH) โ ๐ง๐ต๐ฒ $๐ญ.๐ฐ๐ฑ ๐๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐ค๐๐ฒ๐๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป
Five Point closed yesterday at $4.50, against roughly ๐จ๐ฆ$๐ญ๐ฑ.๐ณ๐ฒ in reported capital per fully exchanged share.
Last night, management cut its 2026 net income forecast from $100 million to just $20 million.
I found the explanation on the conference call interesting. Some land transactions have already been negotiated, but builders simply don't need the land right now. They have enough inventory, home sales are slower, and those transactions are being pushed into 2027.
Meanwhile, Great Park sent another $40.4 million to Five Point in distributions and incentive payments during the quarter. The company finished September with nearly $359 million in cash and about $91 million in net debt.
FPH has the financial flexibility to wait for a better housing market. But waiting also costs money, and a shareholder can spend a very long time owning cheap land without seeing much of a return.
I spent a considerable amount of time on this company because the discount is substantial, even after accounting for its complicated ownership structure. In the Deep Value Report, we separated San Francisco from the other assets, examined Great Park, Valencia and Hearthstone, and went through the development agreements to understand how the money eventually reaches shareholders.
At $4.50, I still think Five Point deserves serious attention. But I would want to know exactly what I own, how much more capital it requires and when I can reasonably expect to see that value.
๐๐ถ๐๐ฒ ๐ฃ๐ผ๐ถ๐ป๐ ๐๐ผ๐น๐ฑ๐ถ๐ป๐ด๐ โ ๐ช๐ต๐ผ ๐๐ฎ๐ฝ๐๐๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ถ๐๐ฐ๐ผ๐๐ป๐, ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ช๐ต๐ฒ๐ป?
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ โ ๐๐ฑ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ฆ๐ถ๐
($ASIX)
๐๐ฟ๐ผ๐๐ป๐ฑ $๐ญ๐ฑ ๐ฎ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ ๐๐ฑ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ฆ๐ถ๐
, ๐ฐ๐ผ๐บ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐๐ถ๐๐ต $๐ฎ๐ฒ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ด๐ถ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐ฏ๐ผ๐ผ๐ธ ๐๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ณ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐บ๐ผ๐๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ด๐ผ๐ผ๐ฑ๐๐ถ๐น๐น ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ถ๐ป๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ด๐ถ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ๐. Much of that value depends on machinery operating inside a connected chemical chain.
Fertilizer is the largest revenue line, produced alongside caprolactam for nylon. Putting a fertilizer multiple on one business and a nylon multiple on another can count the same production assets twice. Separating them would require new supply arrangements and allocations of shared costs.
Our report estimates the plantsโ value site by site, using acquisition allocations and construction projects as reference points. It then calculates what could remain for shareholders after the sale deductions and liabilities.
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ๐ ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐ธ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฟ-๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐๐๐น๐๐ ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ถ๐ป ๐๐ผ๐ฑ๐ฎ๐โ๐ ๐ณ๐๐น๐น ๐๐ฑ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ฆ๐ถ๐
๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐น ๐๐ ๐๐ต๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ฝ. ๐๐๐ ๐ช๐ต๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐๐ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ?
On Sunday morning, prediction markets were giving Flรกvio Bolsonaro roughly an ๐ด๐ฌ% ๐ฐ๐ต๐ฎ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ of winning Brazil's presidential election. Lula won instead.
By Monday's close, $EWS ๐ต๐ฎ๐ฑ ๐ณ๐ฎ๐น๐น๐ฒ๐ป ๐ญ๐ต.๐ด% ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐๐ช๐ญ๐ฆ ๐ต๐ฎ๐ฑ ๐น๐ผ๐๐ ๐ฏ๐ญ.๐ฒ%.
I keep thinking about what actually changed between Friday and Monday.
Brazilian factories did not suddenly lose a fifth of their productive capacity. Banks were still lending, companies were still operating, and people were still going to work. Yet the price investors were willing to pay for those businesses changed enormously in a matter of hours.
Of course, there are economic reasons for that reaction. The Ibovespa fell ๐ญ๐ฏ.๐ด๐ด% in local currency, while the U.S. dollar gained ๐ด.๐ฎ๐ญ% against the real. For an American investor holding EWZ, both movements affected the return. Expectations about fiscal policy, interest rates and future borrowing costs also changed after the election.
What interests me even more is the psychology.
If investors believed Bolsonaro had an 80% chance of winning, ๐ต๐ผ๐ ๐บ๐ฎ๐ป๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐๐๐ฎ๐น๐น๐ ๐ฝ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ผ๐๐ต๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฎ๐ฌ%? At what point did a probable outcome become something people were investing as though it were almost certain?
I cannot conclude that the market overreacted simply because the factories were still operating Monday morning. Future earnings and the cost of capital can change substantially even when today's operations remain the same.
But I would like to know how much of that decline came from investors genuinely revising their estimates of future cash flows, and how much came from people suddenly abandoning positions built around an election result they expected.
๐ง๐ต๐ผ๐๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฑ๐ถ๐ณ๐ณ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ป๐ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐๐ผ๐ป๐ ๐๐ผ ๐๐ฒ๐น๐น.
When I published my ๐๐ผ๐๐ป๐๐ฟ๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ โ ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐น in August, I was looking at individual companies rather than trying to predict an election. I examined the U.S.-listed stocks and the local B3 securities, including their ๐๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป๐, ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ฐ๐น๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ๐, ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐น๐ฎ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ ๐๐ต๐ฒ๐ฒ๐๐ and the risks behind their apparent discounts.
With ๐ฃ๐ข๐ ๐ข๐ฐ, ๐๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ฅ๐๐ฃ๐ง๐ฐ, I was particularly interested in normalized earnings, credit quality, debt and what ultimately belongs to shareholders.
Now I would go back to those same companies and recalculate their values at the new prices, taking into account what the election may actually change for each business.
I would rather do that work than automatically assume yesterday's decline was either a tremendous buying opportunity or a perfectly rational repricing.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
FRAGMENTS Value retweeted
๐ ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐๐ป๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ป๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป โ ๐ช๐ต๐ผ ๐ข๐๐ป๐ ๐ ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ช๐ต๐ฒ๐ป ๐ง๐ต๐ถ๐ ๐๐ ๐ข๐๐ฒ๐ฟ?
Mercer International ($MERC) trades around ๐ฆ๐ฌ.๐ญ๐ฐ, putting the entire stock-market value at roughly ๐ฆ๐ต.๐ฐ ๐บ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป.
I've been thinking about that number in relation to the ๐ฆ๐ฎ๐ฑ.๐ด ๐บ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป interest payment Mercer did not make on October 1. A single bond coupon is now worth almost three times the market value of every share outstanding.
Mercer is negotiating with bondholders representing more than ๐ณ๐ฑ% ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ถ๐๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ป๐ถ๐ผ๐ฟ ๐ป๐ผ๐๐ฒ๐, with a substantial capital infusion and debt reduction being discussed. The company still has pulp mills, lumber operations, power generation and a North American mass-timber business. Those assets have considerable value, but the creditors also have a very large amount of money tied up in them.
And then there's ๐ฃ๐ฒ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐๐ฒ๐น๐น๐ผ๐ด๐ด, whose reporting group owns roughly ๐ฐ๐ฌ% ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฟ. He was still buying shares earlier this year, even as the financial problems were becoming increasingly obvious.
I'm particularly interested in what happens to his position in a recapitalization. With that much ownership, he has influence, but he still has to negotiate around the banks and bondholders.
In my ๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ ๐๐ก๐ง๐ฆ ๐ฆ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ฎ๐น ๐ฆ๐ถ๐๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐๐ผ๐๐๐ถ๐ฒ๐ฟ, I went through the major mills individually, put values on the assets, examined the German and Canadian debt facilities, the collateral, the bonds and what different transactions could leave for shareholders.
At around fourteen cents, the potential percentage gains might look enormous. But I would want to know what percentage of Mercer today's shareholders could actually own after the creditors agree to a deal.
The full ๐ ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐๐ป๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ป๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐ฆ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ฎ๐น ๐ฆ๐ถ๐๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐๐ผ๐๐๐ถ๐ฒ๐ฟ is available on FRAGMENTS.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
๐ ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐๐ป๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ป๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป โ ๐ช๐ต๐ผ ๐ข๐๐ป๐ ๐ ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ช๐ต๐ฒ๐ป ๐ง๐ต๐ถ๐ ๐๐ ๐ข๐๐ฒ๐ฟ?
Mercer International ($MERC) trades around ๐ฆ๐ฌ.๐ญ๐ฐ, putting the entire stock-market value at roughly ๐ฆ๐ต.๐ฐ ๐บ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป.
I've been thinking about that number in relation to the ๐ฆ๐ฎ๐ฑ.๐ด ๐บ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป interest payment Mercer did not make on October 1. A single bond coupon is now worth almost three times the market value of every share outstanding.
Mercer is negotiating with bondholders representing more than ๐ณ๐ฑ% ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ถ๐๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ป๐ถ๐ผ๐ฟ ๐ป๐ผ๐๐ฒ๐, with a substantial capital infusion and debt reduction being discussed. The company still has pulp mills, lumber operations, power generation and a North American mass-timber business. Those assets have considerable value, but the creditors also have a very large amount of money tied up in them.
And then there's ๐ฃ๐ฒ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐๐ฒ๐น๐น๐ผ๐ด๐ด, whose reporting group owns roughly ๐ฐ๐ฌ% ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฟ. He was still buying shares earlier this year, even as the financial problems were becoming increasingly obvious.
I'm particularly interested in what happens to his position in a recapitalization. With that much ownership, he has influence, but he still has to negotiate around the banks and bondholders.
In my ๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ ๐๐ก๐ง๐ฆ ๐ฆ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ฎ๐น ๐ฆ๐ถ๐๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐๐ผ๐๐๐ถ๐ฒ๐ฟ, I went through the major mills individually, put values on the assets, examined the German and Canadian debt facilities, the collateral, the bonds and what different transactions could leave for shareholders.
At around fourteen cents, the potential percentage gains might look enormous. But I would want to know what percentage of Mercer today's shareholders could actually own after the creditors agree to a deal.
The full ๐ ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐๐ป๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ป๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐ฆ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ฎ๐น ๐ฆ๐ถ๐๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐๐ผ๐๐๐ถ๐ฒ๐ฟ is available on FRAGMENTS.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ โ ๐๐ฑ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ฆ๐ถ๐
($ASIX)
๐๐ฑ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ฆ๐ถ๐
๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ผ๐๐ป๐ฑ $๐ญ๐ฑ ๐ฎ๐ด๐ฎ๐ถ๐ป๐๐ $๐ฎ๐ต.๐ฑ๐ญ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ฏ๐ผ๐ผ๐ธ ๐๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ. ๐ง๐ฎ๐ป๐ด๐ถ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐ฏ๐ผ๐ผ๐ธ ๐ถ๐ $๐ฎ๐ฒ. It owns five American chemical plants, with fertilizer now its largest revenue line.
Across 2023โ2025, the business generated just $18 million of free cash flow before other investment and dividends. Most of the operating cash went back into the plants.
Todayโs report investigates whether the discount sufficiently accounts for that spending. We value the production assets using industrial transactions and construction costs, deduct the obligations attached to the business, and test the result against its cash generation.
The full Deep Value Report is now available, including our Bear, Base and Bull valuation ranges.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ โ ๐ฆ๐๐ฒ๐น๐น๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ถ๐ ($STLA)
Stellantis trades around $๐ฐ.๐ฎ๐ณ per share. Its last reported book value is roughly $๐ฎ๐ฐ.๐ณ๐ฌ per share, using the exchange rate in my report.
We're talking about Jeep, Ram, Peugeot, Fiat, factories around the world, more than โฌ46 billion of PP&E and a substantial Financial Services business. There is a lot of value inside Stellantis, although I wouldn't assume shareholders can recover anything close to reported book.
At the end of 2023, Stellantis had โฌ๐ฎ๐ต.๐ฑ ๐ฏ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป of Industrial net financial assets. By June 2026, removing the proceeds from the new hybrid capital, my calculation gets closer to โฌ๐ฑ.๐ญ ๐ฏ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป.
They also completed a โฌ3 billion buyback in 2024, recorded โฌ11.645 billion of new warranty provisions in 2025 and have spent billions restructuring the business.
But Stellantis is still selling millions of vehicles. Q2 generated โฌ1 billion of positive Industrial free cash flow. The latest Q3 shipments were down 12% in North America and up 10% in Europe. I want to see what those volumes produced in operating profit, what happened to dealer incentives and how much cash was left after the remaining restructuring payments.
๐ข๐ฐ๐๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฎ๐ด will give us another set of financial numbers.
At these prices, I find Stellantis very interesting. I also think you can make a serious mistake buying an automaker simply because its reported assets are worth several times the stock price.
I went through the Industrial balance sheet, debt maturities, hybrids, Financial Services, warranty, factories, regional profitability and capital allocation. I then calculated what different levels of recovery would mean per share, including what happens if the turnaround only partly works.
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐ณ๐๐น๐น ๐ฆ๐๐ฒ๐น๐น๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ถ๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฝ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ฎ๐ถ๐น๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ผ ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐ถ๐ฑ ๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ ๐๐ก๐ง๐ฆ ๐๐๐ฏ๐๐ฐ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ
$STLA
FRAGMENTS Value retweeted
๐๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐ข๐ป๐ฒ $CABO โ $๐ฒ ๐ฎ ๐ฆ๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ฎ $๐ฐ๐ด๐ฌ ๐ ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐
Cable One's entire common equity is worth roughly ๐ผ๐ป๐น๐ $๐ฏ๐ฐ ๐บ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป. Meanwhile, the company is trying to pay ๐บ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ป ๐ญ๐ฐ ๐๐ถ๐บ๐ฒ๐ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ ๐ฎ๐บ๐ผ๐๐ป๐ โ $480 million โ for the remaining 55% of MBI, even though its own accounting implies an equity value of approximately $54 million for that interest. MBI also carries an estimated ๐บ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ป $๐ต๐ฌ๐ฌ ๐บ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐ถ๐ป ๐ป๐ฒ๐ ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฏ๐. One of Cable One's largest secured lenders has gone to federal court to stop the payment.
I went back through the agreements to understand how they got here. Since 2020, MBI has borrowed money and distributed cash to its owners, while Cable One and the sellers renegotiated their purchase arrangements. The owners received substantial payments along the way. Today, the business has fewer customers, generates considerably less cash after capex and still has an enormous amount of debt.
Now Cable One is trying to refinance roughly ๐ฏ๐ถ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ผ๐ป๐ ๐ถ๐ป ๐ผ๐ฏ๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป๐, with GTCR involved in the negotiations. Depending on how that financing is structured, today's shareholders could end up owning a much smaller percentage of the company.
What caught my attention was how much the answer changes once you work through the actual agreements instead of just looking at the stock price.
For our latest ๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ ๐๐ก๐ง๐ฆ ๐ฆ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ฎ๐น ๐ฆ๐ถ๐๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป, I traced the payments back to 2020, examined the cash flow and debt maturities, and calculated what could happen to the existing shares if GTCR receives equity. I also revisited our previous $24-per-share valuation and explain why those assumptions can no longer be taken for granted.
At around $6, there could be considerable value in the broadband assets. ๐๐ผ๐ ๐บ๐๐ฐ๐ต ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ถ๐ ๐๐น๐๐ถ๐บ๐ฎ๐๐ฒ๐น๐ ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐น๐ผ๐ป๐ด๐ ๐๐ผ ๐๐ผ๐ฑ๐ฎ๐'๐ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ต๐ผ๐น๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐ฎ ๐บ๐๐ฐ๐ต ๐ต๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐พ๐๐ฒ๐๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป.
The full investigation is below.
Here:cundilldeepvalue.substack.coโฆ











