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Bristlemoon just published a report on $FTAI, a newly initiated position in the Fund. Despite revenues expected to grow 50% in FY26/69% in FY27, and with even faster EPS growth expected, the stock is on a 15x P/E. We try to unpack the nuance in a fairly complex business...
MasterBrand $MBC just announced a cheeky immediate CFO transition the week before their earnings print. Never a good sign. We wrote up this short in our latest quarterly letter. See below.
We published our September 2026 quarterly letter, with the Bristlemoon Global Fund returning -8.4% for the September 2026 quarter, with a -5.9% return for the month of September 2026, net of fees. We are not happy with these results and they mark a very disappointing last 12 months for the Fund. While we remain excited and optimistic about the Fund's holdings, many of these stocks have continued to derate to depressed levels, despite robust fundamental performance those businesses. We look forward to a time when we can report better news.
In the letter we discuss the lack of market breadth, how AI is commoditizing analysis, and outline our theses on 4 shorts: $CPB, $REA AU, $MBC and $PII.
Very much an environment that has favored aggressively trading names (I say this having not done that). Lots of range bound stocks over LTM that have added vol and no returns to a portfolio.
George Hadjia retweeted
Two things from $SPCX today.
[preface this with Elon's singular ability to secure funding - so let's assume he's good for whatever amount this will cost]
1) If SPCX can bring 10GW online in 2027 as an exclusive $NVDA customer, that's probably ~40% of ccs data centre revenue for NVDA. If Jensen allows this level of single-customer concentration, the compute market will likely remain extremely tight in 2027 because maybe 20% of incremental compute flops is going to a single hyperscaler that also doesn't have much 1P model inference to serve. (and >half of incremental TPU flops prob goes to a single customer as well)
If that's the case, compute available to rent in 2027 should also remain extremely tight, which means the $40-50B/GW scarcity pricing SPCX is getting on its short-term rentals might persist for longer than anyone expects (maybe Elon is not bullshitting with $500B ARR). This constrains competing frontier labs' access to compute (except Meta) while giving XAI multiple GW of training compute that can be paid for with ~1Y of GPU rental revenues (e.g. 4/6GW rental/training split).
This could also prove hugely beneficial to the smaller neoclouds. If the party that corners most of the rental compute market is renting out at $40-50B, this should help the neoclouds secure higher pricing for their multi-yr contracts (say >$25B/GW) and possibly better prepayment / backstop terms. Anything that makes the NVDA neoclouds less fragile is a tick in Jensen's books.
Maybe even Zuck gets in on the rental action, which should mitigate the inevitable (IMO) disappointment with Muse adoption and retention (let alone monetisation).
2) Surely a single hyperscaler (which wasn't even on the scene a year ago) confident in bringing on 10GW incremental power in 2027 and gunning for 20GW stretch target using "every other source of power we can obtain" is a big tailwind for a broad swathe of the power equipment vendors?
What an incredible account of the Seinfeld story that’s beautifully told. I’m im-pressed.
@gilbert @djrosent
podcasts.apple.com/au/podcas…
Have been watching the GTA VI launch trailer on repeat today. Genuinely think it's going to blow us all away more than we can fathom.
$TTWO
Totally agree with Paul, and I conveyed similar sentiments in our latest quarterly letter. Basically, AI is commoditizing analysis and the job of an investment analyst is likely to drastically change (already is):
Management meetings/field research is more important than ever. Assume 75% of the work you do at your desk for 8-12 hours a day will be done better by agents running 24/7. Being on the road more should be part of the job description for analysts.
Model build tests as a screen to hire analysts will eventually go away and perhaps be replaced with mock management interviews or mock information synthesis.
Being a nob in shared meetings, sabotaging yourself and those you share with will become fatal.
Every possible input into the numbers inside one of the three financial statements – product, sales, distribution, input costs, discretionary opex, balance sheet utilization, capital allocation, etc , etc, etc . . . . seemingly always fall into one of two buckets.
1.) Things within management’s control.
and
2.) Things outside their control.
When given the opportunity to meet with company executives, it’s almost always more productive, when faced with limited time, to ask specifically about things they control. There are certain questions only management can answer. Ask those questions first. Too much time in management meetings is spent asking execs to speculate on short term things outside of their control.
Great to have been included in the Australian Financial Review discussing our REA Group short.
afr.com/markets/equity-marke…
We published our September 2026 quarterly letter, with the Bristlemoon Global Fund returning -8.4% for the September 2026 quarter, with a -5.9% return for the month of September 2026, net of fees. We are not happy with these results and they mark a very disappointing last 12 months for the Fund. While we remain excited and optimistic about the Fund's holdings, many of these stocks have continued to derate to depressed levels, despite robust fundamental performance those businesses. We look forward to a time when we can report better news.
In the letter we discuss the lack of market breadth, how AI is commoditizing analysis, and outline our theses on 4 shorts: $CPB, $REA AU, $MBC and $PII.
Good analysis. We too are short $SBUX
We are short $SBUX with a PT of $70.76 and a 27% projected NTM IRR with 2.8x R/R. The Street believes Brian Niccol’s “Back to Starbucks” turnaround is a success, extrapolating accelerating SSSG into sustained demand and normalized margins. We disagree. Our geospatial imagery analysis, calls to 300 stores, scrape of 1.2M store-week operating-hour posts, permit filing analysis, scrape of 10,082 Glassdoor employee reviews and 80,777 Google reviews, credit card and foot traffic data covering 150M Americans, and survey of 293 customers reveals that 1) store closures are disproportionately concentrated in trade areas where demand can be transferred to nearby Starbucks locations, inflating SSSG by 483 bps, 2) Emerging beverage brands are increasingly locating directly within Starbucks’ trade areas, with competitor openings associated with 8-10% declines in Starbucks traffic, and 3) the Street erroneously models margins reverting to 2022 peak levels despite shops being drastically understaffed, all while employee sentiment declines precipitously.
Our thesis is threefold:
1. Under Brian Niccol’s “Back to Starbucks” plan, Starbucks closed 627 North American company-operated shops in Q4 2025. Since then, SSSG has accelerated from 1.0% to 7.9%, which the Street views as sustained organic growth continuing into FY2027. We believe management has materially understated the customer transfer impact from store closures on transaction growth, with our analysis showing ~483bps of inorganic transaction tailwinds ending after this quarter, most of which management claims is organic.
2. Starbucks has historically dominated the U.S. specialty coffee and drive-thru beverage market. However, its competitive landscape is rapidly changing, as emerging brands ($BROS, 7 Brew) scale into Starbucks’ core markets. Our channel checks indicate 7 Brew will deliver 60%+ unit growth over the next two years, with 500 and 900 openings in FY2027 and FY2028 respectively, while Dutch continues to grow at 17%+. Our analysis of leasing documents shows that 73% of these emerging brand stores are scheduled to open within a mile of a Starbucks, which based on foot traffic alternative data has historically led to 8-10% volume declines at similar locations.
3. In FY2022, Starbucks averaged 26.8 employees/store before cutting North America employees/store to a trough of 19.8 in FY2024, well below competitors’ staffing. Despite Starbucks’ $500M labor investment, which has since increased employees/store to 21.3 in FY2025, we believe Starbucks’ current staffing levels are unsustainable as it adopts a more service-intensive operating model.
Valuation: We model 483 bps of closure-driven SSSG unwinding as Starbucks laps the FY2025 closure cohort, with 181 bps of offset from the FY2026 cohort. This, combined with increasing competition, drives North American SSSG 174 bps below consensus in our base case and 286 bps in our bear case. This steps up by another ~280/420 bps respectively in FY 2028 as the 181 bps tailwind is lapped and competition intensifies. We model labor intensity remaining structurally elevated, forecasting Starbucks increasing employees/store from 21.3 to 24.0 through FY2027, driving FY2027 EBIT margins 263 bps below Street projections. Utilizing a conservative 18.5x/18.5x/20.0x NTM EBITDA multiple on FY2028 EBITDA, our bear/base/bull cases yield price targets of $48.48/$73.39/$113.95, respectively. Weighted at 35%/50%/15%, this yields a weighted average price target of $70.76.
An in-depth breakdown of our primary research and full theses, along with a catalyst path will be published tomorrow.












