Growth Banker retweeted
One of the smartest things @PaloAltoNtwks CEO @nikesharora said about M&A on the pod had nothing to do with price.
When Palo Alto acquires a company, they don’t “integrate” it the traditional way. They flip the org chart.
If the founders beat you with fewer people and less capital, why would you put them under your bureaucracy?
Nikesh’s rule is simple: they run it.
That one decision helps explain why their M&A actually works - and why most corporate acquisitions quietly die.
If you’re a founder thinking about selling, or a CEO thinking about buying, his is a masterclass in how talent (not technology) is the real asset.
Growth Banker retweeted
Read through the replies to this weekend’s post.
5.5 real estate theses investors kept converging on:
Thesis 1: Top of the K - Luxury/Ultra-Luxury
- @antonia_mdprjct: Luxury fares well in both up and down markets
- "Sell expensive things to rich people" is durable across cycles
- Risk: Only breaks if downturn actually impairs wealth creation at the top
- Applies to: residential, hospitality, wedding venues (@weddingowner)
Thesis 2: Bottom of the K - Workforce, Affordable Housing
- @ScottChoppin: Multi-bedroom units enabling "economic sharing" (multi-gen households combining incomes)
- @theficouple: Working class B neighborhoods, stable jobs, good credit
- @Compounds365: Low income housing relatively resilient
- Displaced middle class reorients housing choices downward
Thesis 3: Specific Geographies
- "Texas Triangle" will continue to win. (@SVP_of_Retail)
- Houston suburbs (@AdamB1438): Diversified economy, low professional services concentration, steady CA/NY migration
- Military metros like Huntsville, San Antonio, Fayetteville ... BAH guarantees income, transient renters, defense spending persists through downturns
- Seattle (@jdklein33): diverse enough to both benefit from AI and have industries immune to it; e.g. Tech + Boeing + Military + fishing + timber + port + Costco HQ etc
- Avoid: single-industry dominant markets vulnerable to AI & offshoring; high energy costs / grid fragility
Thesis 4: Asset Classes Resilient to AI Displacement
- Class B industrial and flex (@AdamB1438): trades, logistics, light manufacturing require physical presence
- Medical office (@clint_turner)
- Contractor garages (@andrewhoelzel): trades hold up
- Cold storage and processing infrastructure
Thesis 4a: Farmland, specifically
- @bradford_hardin, @GrowthBanker: Farmland with (impt caveat!) water rights
- "People will always need to eat"
- Supply tightening (datacenters, warehouses, solar eating into ag land) so grade A farmland is shrinking
Thesis 5: Options & Distressed Strategies
- @CaseyMericle: Don't buy, option. Control assets while limiting downside.
- @SVP_of_Retail: Three-tier LOI approach (30-40% cash quick close / 60% seller finance / 12-18mo close at projected value)
- Tax liens (@andrewhoelzel): complexity keeps most investors out = opportunity
- "Your price, my terms"
Counter-arguments
- @mortgagetruth: If scenario plays out, government housing assistance likely props up landlords
- @MarkAllenMulti: Trump policies may prevent unemployment spike; consumer inflation under control
- @fmeyrath: AI finds equilibrium; premium on interpersonal communication returns
- @AdamB1438: Macro timing is hard; track record for getting these calls right is weak
Key Real Estate Investment Filter Criteria
- Low AI displacement risk on near-term horizon
- Physical presence required
- Diversified local economy
- Structural demand floor (defense, healthcare, trades, logistics)
- Ensure a Margin of safety / limited downside
- Double down on who wins in the new economy
teapawt.net/amandaorson/status/200…
Where are you actually putting capital in real estate if jobs disappear but rents can’t rise?
Here’s the scenario I think plays out over the next 3–5 years:
- Unemployment spikes esp in white collar service businesses, and white collar mid-career and entry-level roles (AI, offshoring macro trends)
- Inflation stays elevated, esp in energy, food, housing
- Real wages stagnate or fall & labor force participation drops
This isn’t 2008. And it’s not the 1930s either, b/c during the Depression, at least prices collapsed.
In this AI x inflation scenario, prices stay high while jobs vanish; stagflation with mass displacement.
If you think this is even plausible, I’m curious how you’re thinking about the following:
- Which real estate asset classes hold up when affordability collapses but shelter demand persists?
- Which are structurally broken?
- Do SF, LA, NYC permanently reprice lower; or does AI concentration increase the premium in certain hubs?
- Which tenant profiles actually stay solvent through a prolonged downturn?
- What are you avoiding, even if the yield looks attractive today?
Not looking for “real estate always goes up” or generic long-term optimism.
But I'd love to hear your specific asset class, specific market, and contrarian takes.
Growth Banker retweeted
The S&P returned 18% in 2025. 14% from earnings growth, 3% from multiple expansion and 1% from dividends while ending the year at 22x earnings, coming into the year at 21.5x.
The S&P delivered in 2025 and looks poised to do so again in 2026.
Growth Banker retweeted
Another datapoint from Sourcegraph:
"Advertisers have said that they’re willing to pay anywhere from $500 to $1,000 per qualified action.
The ads are currently generating between $5 million and $10 million in annualized revenue, he said."
theinformation.com/articles/…
Growth Banker retweeted
I think the majority of societal problems right now are all downstream of housing affordability.
Growth Banker retweeted
There is insane demand for people who can understand and explain technology in a compelling way.
Growth Banker retweeted
A "crowded" market is not really crowded if it's just a bunch of crappy options. Music players were crowded before iPod. Earbuds were crowded before the Airpods.
(Inspired by meeting a founder today who's building in a "crowded" market and steamrolling everyone.)
Growth Banker retweeted
Some people view everyone as a potential competitor and others view everyone as a potential collaborator.
I'm not sure which is more successful on average, but the collaborators certainly seem happier.
Growth Banker retweeted
Warriors got a lacrosse player throwing in Kareem skyhooks. You all should never ever doubt Steve Kerr again.
Growth Banker retweeted
"Why buy a company when you can build it?"
— Building it takes time
— You might not do it well
— You may not get distribution
— Competitor may grow even more
— Eliminates a competitor
— Immediate revenue
It's not about if you CAN build it.
It's whether the price is cheaper.
Growth Banker retweeted
Replying to @TheDrugMoney
Rich kids learn that the ultimate goal is to own equity either as a business owner or investor.
Poor kids learn that the ultimate goal at best to have a great job that pays well that makes you look successful to others.
Growth Banker retweeted
"Venture capital spent the last decade pulling itself in two. The vast amount of capital resulted in the expansion of early investing while also keeping companies private for much longer.
It’s easy to find people talking at cross purposes because they exist at opposite ends of the market. The differences are so fundamental that they are practically separate asset classes.
It is in these differences that the future of venture capital lies: the value unlocked by embracing the divergent strengths of early and late stage managers — with the former selling significant stakes from their portfolio to the latter."
(source: "Why venture capital should embrace divergence")
It became clear in the aftermath of 2022, when the venture market took a tumble, that many early stage VCs were frustrated with the state of venture. They had watched portfolio companies get "foie grased", becoming sluggish and overvalued — no exit in sight.
Indeed, it highlighted a serious problem that is unique to early-stage VC: managers are exposed to the late-stage market as their portfolio companies mature.
For no other category of investor is this the case. Asset managers would never find themselves with a book that no longer fit their own strategy. And yet, for early VCs, this was the norm.
(Originally, VCs would partner with a startup from inception to exit, when exits took ~4 years. The greats like @Benchmark and @USV have adapted to today's ~12 year horizons, but many seed investors lose board seats / get crammed-down — losing relevance.)
Unfortunately, there was no other option. Liquidity was unlocked at exit, and the limited volume of secondaries had a negative signal attached.
Fortunately, this is now beginning to change. The obvious desperation for liquidity has — for now — removed the stigma associated with secondaries.
This is an opportunity for venture capital to embrace the divergence, building a new structure around shorter feedback loops, faster liquidity, stronger pricing tension, more responsive investing, and focused investor attention.
There's a great read on this topic by @hunterwalk, running through the 'traditional' role of secondaries versus the opportunity today — looking at everything from pricing to signalling and the impact on startups:
"Balancing and consolidating the cap table on behalf of the founder to make sure the later investors have enough skin in the game. Sometimes we’ve seen founders proactively asking if we want to sell because they have more investor demand than they want to service."
(source: "Praise Our Lord For Secondary Markets, Because Selling Shares Is Now an Essential Part of (Seed) Venture Capital")
Unsurprisingly, @chudson is already skating to where the puck will be, talking about the importance of secondaries to investors at the earliest stages like @PrecursorVC:
"For funds like his, selling stock of private startups to other investors will be “75% to 80% of the dollars that [limited partners] get back in the next five years,” Hudson told me from his office in San Francisco’s brick-lined Jackson Square."
(source: "How Charles Hudson’s Precursor Is Navigating the IPO Drought")
Indeed, some investors (like @m2jr) have seen this for a while — recognising the shifting priorities as private companies mature over much longer periods of time, and how that is reflected in the cap table:
"Let's be realistic here; you're better off in the fullness of time if certain players are in your cap table, and not a seed fund."
(source: "Mike Maples: Three Frameworks to Evaluate Startups and Founders")
In summary:
There are now three distinct strategies in venture (more on that "trifurcation" in the quoted post), and secondaries play an important role for each in terms of exit, entry, or both.
The main question seems to be how many years of 'private market growth' a company might have in its strategy. Meaning, high-speed / low-margin growth for capturing market share (ugly financials).
Beyond a certain point, when the growth of a company begins to decelerate, it makes sense to help them mature towards a traditional IPO or M&A exit (more attractive financials).
For most companies, the traditional path is likely to remain the most appropriate. Indeed, if the goal of venture banks is to build the 'MAG-7 of private markets', it's not clear how many players that strategy can really support — for all that it is the 'loudest model' today (h/t @kwharrison13 for the lingo).
The resistance to this idea is in the 'power law' wisdom that value comes from the compounding value of the biggest winners. It's difficult to see how much of this is just status-quo bias.
There are a number of factors which must be accounted for:
The status-quo may no longer be appealing as:
- Companies are taking much longer to exit
- Dilution is much greater
- Preference stacks are larger
- Early investors lose relevance
OTOH, earlier liquidity via secondaries means:
- Faster returns / better IRR
- Better survival rates
- Less dilution at exit
- Better understanding of risk/environment
It doesn't mean VCs are exiting the position entirely, just that they are properly executing their fiduciary responsibility: taking enough money off the table for LPs before the portfolio company grows beyond their influence — at which point risk is much greater.
For seed investors that continue to hold until the ultimate exit, it's difficult to see that strategy as anything but letting Jesus take the wheel.
This quoted post is unavailable.
Growth Banker retweeted
This is a brilliant article by @jennywxiao, posing important questions about the valuation of AI companies.
The core premise: venture capital is systematically overvaluing AI companies because it fails to take into account the "zero-value threshold" — the point at which models are surpassed and shed users.
This is true, however, the root problem is not that the venture industry is doing valuation poorly, but that it doesn't really do valuation at all.
Essentially, Jenny is asking why VCs aren't accounting for windage when taking their shot — while they're running around with tommy guns.
So, the question is not why don't they care about windage, but why don't they seem to care about hitting the target in the first place?
Every cycle in venture, the same thing has happened:
1) ...the market heats up
2) "you must be in the winners" narrative domination
3) investors start using dumb ARR multiples
4) startups get soaked in capital
5) inflated top line growth and poor health
6) they can't exit, the market blows up
7) the disciplined investors survive
8) things slowly improve, returns grow
9) more capital feeds into venture
10) the market heats up...
This means, every cycle, there's a reset back to the fundamentals. Competitive strategy (7 powers, 5 forces), moats, margins, EBITDA, valuation... The market becomes more investor friendly, prices come down, companies are leaner, returns go up.
This broke in 2022, between step 6 and 7, for two reasons:
• The incredible hype around AI, FOMO from GPs and LPs which once again cast-aside discipline.
• The giant multi-stage firms which were now so big they could ride out the dip without blinking.
So there was a significant cull of investors, but it wasn't the disciplined which survived — it was the largest and most well-networked.
Thus, the dominant narrative today is still that VCs should get into all potential winners at any cost (the tommy gun strategy), rather than a return to the traditional pursuit of outlier value (the marksman).
The upshot of this is 'venture stagflation'; less capital and activity, and prices that are still irrationally high.
This means there is growing fragility, dependent on the narrative about AGI / AI's transformation of industry.
The "bubbles are a feature, not a bug" argument is also being abused to support this narrative, but that's too much of a digression for today.
In summary: VCs rushed face-first into the AI hype, having had no refresher-course on competitive strategy or financial literacy — and this is the fundamental problem that Jenny's article refers to. It's just worth understanding the deeper "why".
I recommend checking out the thread below, which includes the link to her full write-up.
Growth Banker retweeted
A few years ago I created a two-page summary of my expectations of associates and of my commitments to them
I shared it in a comment to good reviews, so I thought I'd share it here too
I may write a bit more about each element. I hope you find it useful.
Growth Banker retweeted
When should companies hire their first CFO?
Same principles apply for hiring any executive. Who you need varies a lot depending on the stage of the company
Soo many folks get this wrong👇
saastr.com/when-to-hire-your…
Growth Banker retweeted
17 years to a $600m exit
This stuff can take time
“Thomson Reuters snaps up AI-powered tax automation startup SafeSend for $600M” siliconangle.com/2025/01/02/…































