Mediazona data compared to adjusted General Staff reported.
I disagree with this analysis, which contradicts me, so I think it’s necessary to come back to it. The author opens with “all evidence available point to the opposite”, yet he doesn’t cite a single piece of evidence.
🔶Saying that the drop in Russian armored vehicle losses proves Russia is losing fewer men is not only wrong, it’s actually a lie. First, armor has been sidelined since early 2024, which explains the drop. Second, Mediazona’s data (which is nearly complete up to early 2024) shows that losses are lower during periods of mechanized assaults (autumn 2023) than during periods of limited armor use (summer 2024).
Moreover, the author deliberately leaves out that while far fewer armored vehicles are being destroyed (because they’re used less), strikes on unarmored vehicles have exploded. We’re talking about 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles hit per week. These vehicles are barely counted, and they are struck daily 10, 20, 30 or even 50 km from the front. The human losses from these strikes are fairly high, since the vehicles are unprotected and can’t withstand drone attacks. To see this, you’d need to do a minimum of research and actually watch the videos. Strikes on unarmored vehicles also happen very far from the front: mid-range strikes alone have hit more than 2,000 confirmed vehicles since the start of the year, often more than 50 km from the front.
The author will probably bring out his usual line that these strikes have no impact and that vehicles can easily be replaced by buying them on the famous big used-car market in Central Asia. That’s one more thing he deliberately leaves out: the cost of the vehicles hit, the goods, ammunition and soldiers that never reach the front, the wounded and killed in these strikes (judging by the videos, this happens very regularly), and the knock-on effect on Russian logistics, which is far from negligible.
🔶Claiming that Mediazona proves there are fewer losses is also wrong. Mediazona takes time to update its list of losses and holds back part of its data, so as not to reveal weaknesses in the Russian government that would push it to shut down the information channels being used. Mediazona’s data is broadly complete up to the end of 2023, and as we’ve seen, entries are still regularly being added for 2024, two years ago. The chart showing the year each entry was added makes it very clear how much longer it now takes to record losses. As for the claim that no OSINT data shows any change in losses: well, that’s easy to say when you don’t do any OSINT yourself, have no contacts on the ground, and therefore bring no additional data.
🔶The 2026 attrition ratio is not more favorable than 2025’s. That’s false, and there is no “more balanced attrition approach.” This ignores Ukraine’s advantage in drone strikes (the kill zone is deeper) and Russia’s manpower problems, which force it to concentrate the offensive on certain areas. The infiltration strategy itself proves that attrition is not under Russian control. Does Russia have the advantage in artillery? No. It fires more, but at shorter range and with less accuracy, against Ukrainians who move less and stay camouflaged in their positions. Losses from artillery are minimal. The Ukrainians fire less, but further and more accurately, against a larger number of Russian troops. The Russians do have the advantage in airstrikes, but losses are mainly caused by drones, not KABs.
🔶The next point is less problematic. The rest is mostly a change of subject: why bring up deep strikes (which I never disputed) when the topic was first and foremost the front? Fine, it does tie back to attrition, but in doing so the author quietly admits that Russia is failing on the front and is focusing on a deep-strike campaign in the hope of making Ukraine give in.
I struggle to understand the author’s obsession with everything that’s negative for Ukraine and positive for Russia. For a “military theorist”, it’s a shame not to cover the whole picture, especially since he always finds a rational explanation for the Russian plan (“no, actually, if Russia isn’t advancing, it’s because it chose an attrition strategy”. Very funny 😊).
Michael Bond retweeted
Part 2 of my conversation on the Russian military with Perun. Recommend his channel. youtube.com/watch?v=Hc2Wx-ag…
Michael Bond retweeted
I disagree with this analysis, which contradicts me, so I think it’s necessary to come back to it. The author opens with “all evidence available point to the opposite”, yet he doesn’t cite a single piece of evidence.
🔶Saying that the drop in Russian armored vehicle losses proves Russia is losing fewer men is not only wrong, it’s actually a lie. First, armor has been sidelined since early 2024, which explains the drop. Second, Mediazona’s data (which is nearly complete up to early 2024) shows that losses are lower during periods of mechanized assaults (autumn 2023) than during periods of limited armor use (summer 2024).
Moreover, the author deliberately leaves out that while far fewer armored vehicles are being destroyed (because they’re used less), strikes on unarmored vehicles have exploded. We’re talking about 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles hit per week. These vehicles are barely counted, and they are struck daily 10, 20, 30 or even 50 km from the front. The human losses from these strikes are fairly high, since the vehicles are unprotected and can’t withstand drone attacks. To see this, you’d need to do a minimum of research and actually watch the videos. Strikes on unarmored vehicles also happen very far from the front: mid-range strikes alone have hit more than 2,000 confirmed vehicles since the start of the year, often more than 50 km from the front.
The author will probably bring out his usual line that these strikes have no impact and that vehicles can easily be replaced by buying them on the famous big used-car market in Central Asia. That’s one more thing he deliberately leaves out: the cost of the vehicles hit, the goods, ammunition and soldiers that never reach the front, the wounded and killed in these strikes (judging by the videos, this happens very regularly), and the knock-on effect on Russian logistics, which is far from negligible.
🔶Claiming that Mediazona proves there are fewer losses is also wrong. Mediazona takes time to update its list of losses and holds back part of its data, so as not to reveal weaknesses in the Russian government that would push it to shut down the information channels being used. Mediazona’s data is broadly complete up to the end of 2023, and as we’ve seen, entries are still regularly being added for 2024, two years ago. The chart showing the year each entry was added makes it very clear how much longer it now takes to record losses. As for the claim that no OSINT data shows any change in losses: well, that’s easy to say when you don’t do any OSINT yourself, have no contacts on the ground, and therefore bring no additional data.
🔶The 2026 attrition ratio is not more favorable than 2025’s. That’s false, and there is no “more balanced attrition approach.” This ignores Ukraine’s advantage in drone strikes (the kill zone is deeper) and Russia’s manpower problems, which force it to concentrate the offensive on certain areas. The infiltration strategy itself proves that attrition is not under Russian control. Does Russia have the advantage in artillery? No. It fires more, but at shorter range and with less accuracy, against Ukrainians who move less and stay camouflaged in their positions. Losses from artillery are minimal. The Ukrainians fire less, but further and more accurately, against a larger number of Russian troops. The Russians do have the advantage in airstrikes, but losses are mainly caused by drones, not KABs.
🔶The next point is less problematic. The rest is mostly a change of subject: why bring up deep strikes (which I never disputed) when the topic was first and foremost the front? Fine, it does tie back to attrition, but in doing so the author quietly admits that Russia is failing on the front and is focusing on a deep-strike campaign in the hope of making Ukraine give in.
I struggle to understand the author’s obsession with everything that’s negative for Ukraine and positive for Russia. For a “military theorist”, it’s a shame not to cover the whole picture, especially since he always finds a rational explanation for the Russian plan (“no, actually, if Russia isn’t advancing, it’s because it chose an attrition strategy”. Very funny 😊).
The “Russian losses increased” narrative is a fabrication, since all evidence available point to the opposite. Vehicle losses have decreased significantly compared to 2025, with armor down by a factor of 5 in average. (source: Oryx)
Mediazona’s in-year 2026 personnel-loss count remains 50% below 2025, without a valid explanation. The claim that bodies are harder to retrieve is insufficient: the battlefield and grey zone remain as dangerous as in 2025. Russian courts process MIA-to-KIA cases at high rates, and a body is not required to file for procedure. There has also been no specific additional documented enforcement of obituaries concealment which could explain such a sharp decrease.
Regardless, there are absolutely no OSINT data available supporting claims of increased total Russian (or Ukrainian) casualties in 2026. For all we know, it could be inferior, equivalent, higher...
The 2026 attrition ratio is more favorable for Russia than in 2025. Progress has slowed but stays within 2024 ranges once the AFU Kursk advances are factored in.
2025 was peculiar: the Kursk pocket collapse and rout destabilized Ukrainian forces and enabled rapid Russian advances front wide for 6 months.
All signs indicate that 2026 reflects a more balanced attrition approach after the extremely costly 2024 and the front-wide pressure of 2025 that leveraged the post-Kursk situation, but at high cost.
Another myth is: “if attrition worked Russian advances should accelerate”. In attrition warfare theories, the principle is to cause collapse of the adversary to enable decisive gains; not that advances will gradually increase in a linear way, which is subject to both side’s respective effort at a given time. For instance, the weaker side could expend massive resources in a surge attempt, stabilising in apparence the front but collapsing 6 months later.
In 2025, Ukrainian forces suffered a sector collapse in the Sudja pocket, which rendered an entire part of the army combat ineffective. Hence, advances ensued.
Nevertheless, Ukraine has accelerated mobilization (aggressively) and alternative means to recover, and is nowhere near a collapse of its ground military forces for the time being. Though, with a mobilization ratio currently standing at around 18-20% of the remaining military aged male population, it may be nearing sensitive levels.
The point is to separate military objectives: conquest of the 4 oblasts against which Moscow can measure military success, and political objectives: demilitarisation and neutrality of Ukraine, central to the strategic settlement Moscow continues to seek. (Ideally enforced by a favorable regime change)
This matters because to achieve its strategic political goal, Russia needs to continue investing in its expensive ballistic and drone programs to collapse the economy at the rear, and make rational choices for expenditures. Losing 4,000 armor a year is not an option anymore.
The ground offensive’s primary goal is therefore not military conquest but applying pressure on the entire Ukrainian economic and social apparatus, to support the achievement of the political ambition. Seizing Donbas is a secondary and corollary territorial objective, because the political goal naturally secures the territorial one.
Understanding this principle is the basis of analysing this war correctly.
Moscow’s objectives in this conflict have not changed, but the strategy adopted has been evolving regularly based on various factors, including setbacks. Kyiv has also been adapting continuously to prevent its success. In 2026, the military situation has somehow improved for Ukraine, but the social and economic ones deteriorated at an accelerated pace.
There is however no way to tell whether the Kremlin’s plan will ultimately succeed, even partially.
See an earlier analysis in reply to understand attrition warfare performance measurement methods.
#UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy #Attrition
Michael Bond retweeted
As discussions about a possible Trump–Putin–Xi summit resurface, it is worth revisiting a memorandum prepared by Professor Richard Pipes for President Ronald Reagan in May 1982.
Pipes explained what Soviet leaders sought to achieve through summits with American presidents - and under what conditions Washington should agree to such meetings.
A remarkably relevant and timeless lesson in how to deal with Putin's Russia. Diplomacy requires more than a willingness to talk. It requires a clear understanding of what the other side hopes to gain.
👇
"Washington, May 14, 1982
Summits with Soviet Leaders
Soviet leaders are keen on summits with U.S. Presidents and for good reason. They feel confident they will come out ahead in such encounters because:
- their government has greater continuity than ours and therefore greater store of expertise in international affairs;
- well-publicized summits arouse expectations in free societies which enable Moscow, by manipulating Western opinion, to exert pressure on their opposite numbers for unreciprocated concessions.
They further favor summits because they afford them the opportunity to size up the President as a person and as a statesman.
Experience indicates that U.S.-Soviet summits, from Roosevelt’s Yalta to Nixon’s Moscow, have generally turned out to the disadvantage of the United States. Still, inasmuch as every U.S. President since 1933 has personally met with his Soviet counterpart, it will be difficult for you to reject a summit altogether. A full-fledged summit, however, should take place only if the following conditions are met:
- Moscow demonstrates by deeds rather than words that it is prepared to negotiate seriously.
- The groundwork is well prepared beforehand so that you discuss concrete agenda items and do not become embroiled in longwinded ideological disputes of the kind that Khruschev lured Kennedy into in Vienna in 1961 and which invariably end in the hardening of respective positions.
A good model to follow in this matter is President Eisenhower who had given it much thought. In 1953, after Stalin’s death President Eisenhower came under great pressure from our Allies (especially Britain) and the State Department to hold a summit with G. Malenkov, Stalin’s immediate successor.
In his memoirs, Eisenhower tells why he resisted these pressures. He reviews the disappointing experiences of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt with summit meetings and says: “I was . . . not willing to meet with Communist leaders unless there was some likelihood that the confrontation would produce results acceptable to the peoples of the West”. I developed a stock answer to any question about a possible Summit. I would not go to a Summit merely because of friendly words and plausible promises by the men in the Kremlin; actual deeds giving some indication of a Communist readiness to negotiate constructively will have to be produced before I would agree to such a meeting.”
He was rewarded for his firm stand with a Soviet troop withdrawal from Austria. This is a good principle to keep in mind as the Russians increase their pressure for a summit. It would be best to have no summit this year: but if one is to be held the Russians should be required to demonstrate their good will by such actions as acceptance of our “zero option”, withdrawal from Afghanistan or lifting of the martial law in Poland."
FRUS, 1981–1988, t. III, dok. 170, „Summits with Soviet Leaders".
Michael Bond retweeted
I've been trying to keep up with the growing number of reports of AI acting beyond instructions and limits, so I built this small project to track what devs and researchers have disclosed.
73 cases so far, summarised and linked to their source: benjaminstrick.com/ai-overre…
Michael Bond retweeted
German soldier led local branch of Putin-linked Night Wolves biker club for years, The Insider finds
Dual German-Russian citizen Alexander Sautner was only dismissed from the Bundeswehr on Feb. 5, 2026.
theins.press/en/news/298842
Michael Bond retweeted
It looks like a tiny panic in Kaluga.
Just 550 m west of the Yandex data center that was recently struck, a new SHORAD tower has likely been under construction since October 20.
54.579897, 36.341436
(⚠️Not yet confirmed.)
Michael Bond retweeted
"Thanks to striking UGVs in Vivaldi, about 2,500 lives were saved. The robotic systems carried out more than 200 strikes and performed 94 assault and sabotage operations without risk to Ukrainian troops." thedefender.media/en/2026/10…
Michael Bond retweeted
This evening, Alice Rufo, the Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces, confirmed that France will indeed begin training Ukrainian pilots in the coming days to fly Rafale fighter aircraft.
Michael Bond retweeted
NEW | 🇺🇦 🇷🇺 Ukraine's military intelligence says Russia plans to offer five African countries simplified port access for its warships and support vessels during the Russia–Africa summit in Moscow on October 28–29.
The countries named are Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Nigeria and Togo.
Such agreements could make Russian naval visits and resupply easier to arrange but they wouldn't automatically give Moscow permanent bases.
Michael Bond retweeted
🇷🇴🇷🇺
Romania summons Russia’s ambassador over the Carfil sabotage incident. The Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying investigators had established Russian responsibility.
The diplomatic action follows the previously disclosed investigation into sabotage at Carfil in Brașov.
#Romania #Russia #Diplomacy #Sabotage
🔗 Romanian Foreign Ministry via Mediafax Publication:
mediafax.ro/politic/mae-l-a-…
Michael Bond retweeted
Pretty sophisticated Russian recruitment scam: This guy targeted homeless men, told them they wouldn't actually fight in the war, arranged enlistment, then arranged fake marriages for them, obtained financial control and collected KIA payouts. He sent 5 into the war, 4 were KIA.
Michael Bond retweeted
Ukrainian military intelligence mural in Kyiv #ArtofSpying mezha.net/eng/news/84ed365c_…
Michael Bond retweeted
A private geospatial intelligence firm said it examined 40 missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia by Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in #Yemen and militias in Iraq between July 1 and Oct. 19. In every case, the firm found the same pattern of Russian government and military satellites orbiting above the areas for days before and after.
The findings illustrate how Russia is believed to be helping Iran and its allies in the region target Saudi Arabia’s oil and military infrastructure in attacks that have helped raise global energy prices.
Three officials, including one from Saudi Arabia and another in the top ranks of the Houthis, as well as a private intelligence analyst, told The Associated Press that the Houthis and other Iranian allies have benefited from Russian intelligence, as well as Chinese capabilities. Iranian advisers in the field analyzed and transferred the intelligence to their allies, according to AP reporting.
-Via AP
apnews.com/article/russia-ir…
Michael Bond retweeted
🚨🚨🚨 End of Russia's continuous naval presence in the English Channel?
After more than three months operating in and around the English Channel, Russian frigate 🇷🇺 NEUSTRASHIMY has reportedly returned to the Baltic Sea alongside Russian Navy replenishment tanker 🇷🇺 VALENTIN RYKOV.
Both vessels reportedly transited the Great Belt southbound yesterday.
However, VALENTIN RYKOV has remained at anchor near the Fehmarn Belt since yesterday and is still stationary today, according to the latest AIS data.
⚠️ Their departure could mark the first interruption in Russia's sustained naval presence around the English Channel since April, initially maintained by ADMIRAL GRIGOROVICH.
Whether another Russian warship will replace NEUSTRASHIMY remains unclear. 👀
Michael Bond retweeted
New details from court proceedings on the #RAF #Fairford incident in the #UK, including alleged ties to #Iran and Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyya (#HAYI):
- Mohmed Ahmad Abdulkarim (24) and Nouman Essghir (24), both of #London, appeared in court charged under the National Security Act 2023.
- Abdulkarim, who appeared seated in a wheelchair, is accused of assisting a foreign intelligence service by acting as an “intermediary” for a handler known as “Ali.”
- Essghir is charged with entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK, relating to an alleged reconnaissance mission on 22 August (approximately one month before the main incident).
- According to the prosecution, a group of five men involved in the operation were ordered by the handler “Ali” (whom police believe was working on behalf of Iran and is thought to be abroad, acting in the interests of the Iranian state) to drive vans loaded with petrol to RAF Fairford.
- After loading the vans and travelling to the base in Gloucestershire, they were allegedly told by the organiser over the phone to park the vans and walk away.
- Shortly afterwards, a message was received indicating that there was a bomb in the vehicles, and one of the five men called the police.
- Police attended, located three white vans and the five men, who were arrested.
- No explosives or improvised explosive devices were found. Police discovered a metal oil drum in each van (two of which contained petrol), along with hard plastic water butts and internet-enabled dashcams.
- Before the men (allegedly enlisted by Abdulkarim) travelled to the base, £300 worth of petrol was filled into the drums in the backs of the vans.
- Prosecutors allege that Abdulkarim aided Ali by buying equipment for the mission and receiving multiple payments from him totalling around £70,000 (approximately $93,000).
- Essghir is also alleged to have known Ali. He was among those arrested near the base on 27 September and was re-arrested on 20 October. The charge against him specifically relates to the alleged filming of the perimeter of RAF Fairford on 22 August at Ali’s request.
- The court heard that Ali is potentially connected to an incident at the Israeli embassy earlier this year, in which propaganda videos were posted online suggesting it had been attacked with a chemical weapon by a drone. The incident was claimed by HAYI.
- Abdulkarim was granted bail with conditions including residence restrictions and the surrender of his passport. Essghir has been remanded in custody. Both are next due to appear at the Old Bailey on 20 November.
Michael Bond retweeted
New: The US and Russia are discussing bringing American oil majors back to Russia, reviving energy exports to Europe via the Druzhba pipeline and a host of other business deals as Washington seeks to entice Putin to end the war in Ukraine. as.ft.com/r/2349d7fb-66a0-43…
Michael Bond retweeted
Muutama ajatus Stubbin ja Støren puhelusta Putinille.
Tapahtumaa on vaikea tulkita muuna kuin hankalassa tilanteessa olevan osapuolen reaktiivisena toimena, jossa Ukrainalla tai sen tukijamailla ei ole selkeää vastausta tuleviin sotilaallisiin uhkakuviin. 1/
Michael Bond retweeted
Unwinding sanctions on the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) would make the temporary license for Russian diesel imports look like small potatoes.
But the administration cannot simply remove all sanctions on RDIF without confronting several statutory restrictions.
1. CAATSA: RDIF is sanctioned under EO 13662, making its delisting subject to congressional notification and review, with a mechanism for Congress to block the action. Even a broad OFAC license that significantly alters U.S. policy toward Russia could trigger congressional review.
2. The REPO Act: Releasing RDIF assets that qualify as blocked Russian sovereign property would implicate additional statutory prohibitions, certification requirements, and congressional notification.
If the administration proceeds without the required notifications, it would present an extraordinarily consequential test of Congress's willingness to defend its own authority over U.S. sanctions policy.
Litigation could prove necessary.
After the diesel deal, the US is considering dropping sanctions on Russia's flagship government investment fund nytimes.com/2026/10/27/us/po…
Update on Russian diesel cargos to the US
AGIOI FANENDES still suspected.
@TankerTrackers updates that 2/3 (TAURUS and IBLEA) previously identified as loading diesel are in fact carrying UAN. They loaded at the correct berth for diesel and are bound for US ports that seldom receive UAN - so an unusual pattern made them likely diesel cargos. This is similar to the previous belief the MINERVA ZEN could have been a diesel cargo but turned out to carry UAN
xitter.cf/tankertrackers/status/…
@FT identifies TALISMAN 9292060 (bound for “Atlantis”) and LERUO 9385831 (bound for “Atl. coast for order”) as the other two diesel cargos.
ft.com/content/d847744f-cfa5…
I confirm that I saw TALISMAN load at the correct berth in Primorsk on Oct 21 (see quoted thread), but I did not catch the berth of LERUO.
Replying to @HelloMrBond
As Pimorsk and St Petersburg are the more likely spots to load diesel, I checked them too. Maps below.
Primorsk light products are berths 8-9 (see linked tweet from @evgen1232007).
One ship, TALISMAN, is loading. No ships in port or anchorage declare the US
St. Petersburg diesel loads in PNT 3 & 4 (upper left). No ships loading. No ships declaring US. May have been affected by strikes on Oct 18.
xitter.cf/evgen1232007/status/19…
I also note that the bipartisan letter was reportedly sent to chief executives of major US banks, including Goldman Sachs, as well as the port authorities of Houston, Corpus Christi and Beaumont in Texas and New York/New Jersey.
We will have to watch which ports these current three suspected ships declare as destinations.
The article also notes:
“These warnings reinforce my view that most of any Russian diesel cargos will go to countries outside the US and that it is mostly diplomatic theater” - @reziemba
xitter.cf/RFERL/status/211503991…
A bipartisan group of US lawmakers have warned American banks, port authorities and fuel-industry groups against facilitating imports of Russian diesel, raising the prospect of congressional investigations and legal action over President Donald Trump’s decision to ease restrictions on Russian fuel. @ralexdc
rferl.org/a/amid-legal-uncer…





































