FUD The claim that NOXA can turn @cashcat_token (cash-cat:native) into a honeypot is not supported by the token bytecode. There is an important technical distinction being missed in the claim that the NOXA developer can turn cash-cat:native, $JUGGERNAUT, and every other NOXA-launched token into a honeypot simply by changing a fee parameter from 0 to 100. I reviewed the contract creation code and deployed runtime bytecode provided for the CASHCAT token at: 0x020bfc650a365f8bb26819deaabf3e21291018b4 Based on that bytecode, the claim is not technically supported, at least as it relates to CASHCAT’s token contract. The CASHCAT runtime does not appear to contain an administrator-controlled function for changing buy or sell taxes. There is no identifiable setter for a transfer fee, no blacklist management function, no pause switch, no trading-enabled flag, no function that can disable sales, no runtime minting path, and no function for changing a fee recipient. The token is also not an upgradeable proxy. The runtime does not contain a DELEGATECALL-based implementation mechanism, meaning the developer cannot simply replace the existing transfer logic with a malicious implementation later. The token’s core transfer behavior is effectively equivalent to: balances[from] -= amount; balances[to] += amount; emit Transfer(from, to, amount); There is no visible logic equivalent to: fee = amount * feeRate; balances[feeRecipient] += fee; balances[to] += amount - fee; There is also no additional token transfer to a developer wallet, treasury, launch factory, burn address, or other fee recipient. In other words, the CASHCAT token itself does not appear to implement a mutable transfer tax. The most important issue is whether CASHCAT consults the NOXA factory during every transfer and reads a mutable platform-controlled fee or permission setting. The provided runtime bytecode does not appear to do that. The relevant external read call is effectively a DEX factory lookup: dexFactory.getPool( address(this), pairToken, poolFee ); This call is used to determine the token’s liquidity-pool address. It supports the temporary anti-whale restrictions that applied during the initial launch period. It does not appear to query NOXA for a current tax rate, blacklist status, sell permission, trading-enabled flag, or global honeypot setting. The NOXA launch factory address is embedded in the CASHCAT bytecode, but embedding an address is not the same as giving that address ongoing control over the token. No call path was identified in which CASHCAT asks the NOXA factory what tax rate to charge or whether a holder should be allowed to sell. This means that changing a separate NOXA parameter from 0 to 100 does not automatically alter CASHCAT’s ERC-20 transfer logic. To prove otherwise, someone would need to demonstrate a direct execution path connecting that mutable NOXA parameter to CASHCAT’s transfer function. No such path is visible in the provided runtime bytecode. The technically accurate conclusion is therefore: Based on the provided CASHCAT deployed runtime bytecode, no mechanism was identified that would allow the NOXA developer to later impose a 100% sell tax, blacklist holders, pause transfers, mint additional supply, or upgrade CASHCAT into a honeypot. Accordingly, the claim that changing a NOXA fee parameter to 100 would automatically turn CASHCAT and all other existing NOXA tokens into honeypots is, at least for CASHCAT, technically unverified and unsupported by the token’s bytecode.