
I'm not here to coddle you! Awake not Woke. #Politics #FreeTrutherBot #InternetTrollHunter (RT's are not endorsements) Vi veri veniversum vivus vici
Detroit, MI
Joined December 2009
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❄Mugger_Mike❄ retweeted
The Littleton Police Department (LPD) is asking for the public’s help locating 38-year-old Tyler Barton, a City of Littleton employee.
Barton was reported missing early Monday morning, November 16. Barton was last seen around 5 a.m. Monday after leaving his home in Roxborough, Colorado, for work.
His disappearance was reported to LPD Monday evening and is concerning and inconsistent with his normal behavior. Barton is believed to be driving a gray Toyota Tacoma with Colorado license plate BGM-P53.
Anyone who may have seen Barton, his vehicle, or has information that could help investigators locate him is asked to contact the LPD at 303-794-1551. police.littletonco.gov/News-…
❄Mugger_Mike❄ retweeted
America's Air Traffic Control System: Forty-Five Years of Patching a Problem That Should Have Been Fixed
A firsthand perspective from the radar scopes of Los Angeles Center, the 1981 PATCO strike, and the technology gap that Washington still needs to address.
By a Former U.S. Marine Corps Radar Controller and Los Angeles ARTCC Controller
Every time I hear about another air traffic control problem, another system outage, another communications failure, or another round of congressional promises to modernize America's air traffic control system, I can't help but think: Haven't we been here before?
I know something about this subject because I lived it.
I was a radar controller with the United States Marine Corps, assigned to Marine Air Control Squadron 7 (MACS-7). The equipment I worked with at MACS-7 was among the latest technology being developed and evaluated through DARPA-related military programs and the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA).
Then came August 3, 1981.
That was the day the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) went on strike. I was sent from MACS-7 to the Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center (LAARTCC) in Palmdale, California, to help keep America's air traffic moving.
I remember walking into LAARTCC and thinking I had stepped backward in time.
The technology gap between what I had been using in the Marine Corps and what I encountered at Los Angeles Center was astonishing. The military was developing and using advanced tactical air control systems, while civilian air traffic control was still heavily dependent on aging computer systems and equipment rooted in an earlier technological era.
It was like going from the future back to the Stone Age.
And I wasn't looking at this from a visitor's perspective. I was a radar controller who had to work with that equipment.
August 3, 1981: The PATCO Strike
The PATCO strike was one of the most significant events in the history of American aviation.
President Ronald Reagan's decision to dismiss striking controllers resulted in an enormous loss of experience throughout the FAA. Approximately 11,400 controllers were eventually dismissed, and the agency faced the enormous task of rebuilding its workforce.
Military controllers were brought in to help keep the system operational while the FAA recruited, screened, hired, and trained replacements.
I was one of those military controllers.
I remained at Los Angeles Center for two years, helping maintain operations until the new generation of controllers could be brought through the FAA Academy and into the system.
I worked as a radar controller in D Sector. Our schedules were demanding: 12-hour shifts, four days one week and five days the next. That's 48 hours one week and 60 hours the next.
This wasn't a theoretical discussion about aviation safety. These were real aircraft, real pilots, real responsibilities, and real people depending on us to get the job done.
I also had the opportunity to see firsthand what happens when a system has to depend on its people to compensate for the limitations of its technology.
The PATCO strike is generally remembered as a labor dispute involving wages, working hours, and retirement. Those issues were real and documented. But from my perspective, the broader crisis also highlighted serious questions about the technology supporting the people responsible for controlling the nation's airspace.
The workforce was in crisis, but the technology challenge wasn't going away.
The Problem Was Bigger Than the Towers
Today, whenever there's an air traffic control incident, the public conversation frequently focuses on airport control towers.
But there's another part of the system that deserves considerably more attention: the Air Route Traffic Control Centers, or ARTCCs.
These centers are the brains of the national air traffic control system.
Airport towers manage aircraft movements at individual airports. ARTCCs manage aircraft traveling between airports, coordinating traffic across enormous areas of airspace.
They are responsible for maintaining the orderly flow of aircraft over long distances, coordinating with other facilities, and ensuring that aircraft remain safely separated.
When something goes wrong at a Center, the consequences can extend far beyond one airport.
That's why I believe the public needs to understand that modernizing airport towers alone will not solve the underlying problems facing America's air traffic control infrastructure.
We need to look at the entire system.
Forty-Five Years of Upgrades, But Have We Fixed the Foundation?
Here's what bothers me.
For decades, administrations from Reagan forward, along with successive Congresses, have approved programs, budgets, and modernization initiatives intended to improve the nation's air traffic control system.
There have been technological improvements. I'm not suggesting that absolutely nothing has changed.
For example, the FAA's En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) program replaced the older Host computer system at the nation's continental en route centers, completing deployment in 2015.
But replacing one major computer system does not mean every underlying problem has been solved.
There is a difference between upgrading software, replacing individual components, and undertaking a comprehensive modernization of the infrastructure that supports the entire operation.
Communications networks, radar systems, backup capabilities, physical facilities, and other critical components all have to work together.
You can keep upgrading pieces of an aging system, but that doesn't necessarily mean you've addressed the fundamental weaknesses.
That's the distinction I believe Washington has failed to communicate adequately to the American public.
We keep hearing about modernization, but the question should be: Are we actually replacing the aging infrastructure, or are we continuing to build around it?
What Happens When Automation Fails?
Another concern I have is the changing relationship between controllers and automation.
When I was working at LAARTCC, manual radar control and the ability to manage traffic without today's automated assistance were essential parts of the job.
Today's controllers have access to considerably more sophisticated automation. That technology provides tremendous benefits, improves efficiency, and helps manage increasingly complex traffic.
But automation also creates a responsibility.
Controllers must be prepared for situations when the equipment, communications, or automated functions they depend on become unavailable.
My concern is whether enough emphasis is placed on maintaining those fundamental manual control skills through regular training and practice.
You don't want to wait until something fails to discover that the people operating the system haven't had sufficient opportunity to practice the backup procedures.
Technology is an excellent tool. It should never become a substitute for the underlying knowledge and skills of the people responsible for safety.
Aviation needs both.
Where Has All the Money Gone?
This is where the American taxpayer deserves some answers.
We've spent decades funding air traffic control modernization. Administrations have announced new initiatives, Congress has approved funding, and the FAA has implemented successive technology programs.
Yet we continue to hear about aging equipment, communications vulnerabilities, infrastructure problems, and the need for major replacements.
Why has it taken so long?
Why have successive administrations and Congresses continued to approach modernization as a series of individual projects rather than treating the entire air traffic control infrastructure as a critical national priority?
This isn't about assigning all the blame to one president or one political party. The problem spans administrations and congressional sessions.
It's easy to announce another modernization initiative. It's much harder to commit to the sustained funding, planning, engineering, and implementation necessary to replace aging infrastructure.
And that's what needs to happen.
We Cannot Keep Kicking the Can Down the Runway
I have been away from the radar scopes for many years, but I haven't forgotten what it was like working at Los Angeles Center.
I remember arriving there from MACS-7 on the very day PATCO went on strike.
I remember the technology difference.
I remember working D Sector as a radar controller, putting in those 12-hour shifts, and spending two years helping keep the system running while the FAA rebuilt its workforce.
I also remember wearing my disco suit in 1981!
That photograph represents a very different era of aviation, but the questions I have about our air traffic control infrastructure are still relevant today.
We cannot continue treating America's air traffic control system as though another software update, another equipment replacement, or another temporary fix will solve every problem.
We need comprehensive modernization.
We need dependable communications.
We need reliable backup systems.
We need properly maintained infrastructure.
We need controllers who are thoroughly trained in both automated and manual procedures.
And we need a long-term commitment that doesn't disappear when one administration leaves office and another takes its place.
This is not a Republican issue or a Democratic issue. It's an aviation safety issue and a national infrastructure issue.
The American public deserves an air traffic control system built for the demands of today's aviation environment and prepared for tomorrow's.
I've been on those radar scopes. I've seen the technology gap firsthand. I was there when the PATCO strike began, and I spent two years helping keep the system moving.
I can tell you that the problems we're discussing today didn't suddenly appear yesterday.
They have been building for decades.
It's time to stop putting bandages on an aging system and finally address the underlying problem.
We shouldn't have to wait for the next major failure to find the political will to do what should have been done years ago.
Author's note: The accompanying 1981 photograph, featuring my disco-era attire at Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center, is a personal reminder of my time there following my assignment from USMC MACS-7. – at Harrison, MI
❄Mugger_Mike❄ retweeted
Replying to @Mugger_Mike @C1TYofFL1NT
Love the venue to death but the way they were tracking down people lighting up joints was wild to watch lol
We pushed for this over twelve years ago when the Ann Arbor police fatally shot 40-year-old Aura Rosser inside her home on November 9, 2014.
Replying to @CrimeInTheD
We pushed for this over twelve years ago when the Ann Arbor police fatally shot 40-year-old Aura Rosser inside her home on November 9, 2014.
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The Straight of Hormuz is still closed...
UKMTO WARNING 201-26
Click here to view the full product.⤵️
ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/prod…
#MaritimeSecurity #MarSec
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Ohio State's College Football Playoff hopes are official on life support after a humbling home loss to Oregon. usatoday.com/story/sports/nc…
❄Mugger_Mike❄ retweeted
New York Democrats have declared WAR ON THE AMISH. Thanks to their unconstitutional attack on religion, they're now able to fine EACH unvaccinated Amish child $2,000 EVERY SINGLE DAY.
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The $118,000 bill is one day, not the cap. Three one-room schools alone already owe that much for 59 children, at $2,000 each.
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Health Commissioner Mary Bassett imposed it on December 15, 2022. She called the sum conservative because it assumed only one day out of compliance.
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Dygert Road was billed $52,000 for 26 children. Pleasant View was billed $46,000 for 23.
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Shady Lane was billed $20,000 for 10.
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Footnote 9 of the Second Circuit opinion records the state's view. Each day an unvaccinated student attends is a fresh violation and a fresh $2,000 fine.
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Another day for those 59 children is another $118,000. A 180-day year at that rate is about $21 million, and the families say they cannot pay the first bill.
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Joseph Miller, Jonas Smucker, and Ezra Wengerd run the schools. The schools sit in Clymer and Heuvelton, plus the Canajoharie settlement, and take no public money.
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They had a religious exemption for decades. On June 13, 2019, Democrats repealed it after measles spread through Orthodox Jewish neighborhoods in Brooklyn and Rockland County.
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Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the bill. Governor Kathy Hochul left it in force.
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A parent may not excuse a child for faith.
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Senator James Skoufis said the exemption was made up and fake. Assemblyman Jeffrey Dinowitz called it utter garbage.
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Counsel Aaron Siri told the New York Post the families can pay only if the state takes their land. Some in the community have talked of leaving the state.
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The case is Miller versus McDonald. The Second Circuit ruled against them on June 30 in 2026.
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A Supreme Court petition was due around September 28.
Make sure EVERYONE sees this. If WE don't stand up for these incredible men and women - WHO WILL?!?!?!
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Where is the “my body my choice crowd now”? 





















