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Building https://teapawt.net/t.co/pvBwULLOsP Providing data tools: natural gas, oil & power. Subscribers are welcome to share premium data and screenshots. By @agraddy

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Joined April 2019
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PipeRiv retweeted
Freeport LNG gets NG from 3 pipelines. Two are via TETCO or Texas Eastern Transmission.
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FEW THOUGHTS ON THE NEW OPEC+ STRATEGY The outcome of the last OPEC+ meeting was met with conflicting reviews by analysts and with a bearish reaction from the market. I believe, the market is wrong in this case. Let us go through the details. OPEC+ decisions are: * To roll all the current cuts (Oct 2022, April 2023 and the last batch from Nov 2023 ) till the end of Q3. * UAE, Russia and Nigeria got the quota increases of 300kbd ,121kbd and 120kbd. Russia’s and Nigeria production capacity were assessed higher before. UAE quota increase, reflecting it’s very large (in % terms) spare capacity is new and will be phased in throughout 2025. * The “group of 8” countries (KSA, Russia, UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Oman) will start unwinding the 2.2mbd of November 2023 voluntary cuts  (they include the Saudi’s “extra” 1mbd one) at the pace of 200kbd per month from October 2024. While the group also mentioned that the unwind could be paused or reversed, this plan has caused a bearish reaction from the market, since demand growth that OPEC projects (2.2mbd in 2024 and 1.8mbd in 2025) is clearly unrealistic and may not support the full unwind of 2.2mbd of cuts.  Tbf- this was not the only driver of oil weakness, but the rest Is mostly noise for now. Why is “group of 8” important? Because those are the countries, doing real cuts. The rest are either exempt or are producing below the target anyway. What does it all mean? First, let us focus on 2024: * 2023 was roughly a balanced year (IEA, GS, OPEC, Citi and EIA see it as a deficit year, IEA, JPM see a surplus of 0.3mbd and 0.4mbd) * OPEC+ current supply is circa 1mbd lower than 2023 (as most of the cuts happened in the 2nd half of the year). * Most houses/agencies see 2024 vs 2023 petroleum demand growth in 1-1.5 mbd range (GS and JPM being at the high end, EIA STEO is the lowest at 0.97mbd). I am ignoring OPEC’s own projection as it is way too high. * Non-OPEC+ petroleum supply growth is seen around 1mbd with US delivering 0.5-0.6mbd of that note that this is already a revised-down figure, incorporating Jan freeze-offs; large part of the growth is “baked in” even in the scenario when US does not grow *from here* - simply due to higher 2024 base Net-net, if OPEC+ would leave the supply at current levels, it would result in a 1mbd annual deficit. This is a material deficit, concentrated in the 2nd half of the year – large both in terms of pace of draws and final inventory level that would reach 2022 lows. OPEC+ unwind during Q4 only adds 0.1mbd to global balances (on an annualized basis). So, my first point is that while we are discussing what may or may not happen in 2025, there is a much higher probability (and predictability) of a very real 2024 deficit in the next 3-4 months. The highest deficit months are the summer ones – when we have a big seasonal increase in demand and a shift in demand from petchem to fuel (crude-driven products) as we are entering travel/holiday season. With flat OPEC+ production until Q4 quite a few agencies and banks have summer (June-August) draws above 2mbd: * Rystad (“deficits of 2.7 million bpd on average, with a high of 3.2 million bpd in the peak month of September. Fourth quarter balances signal a deficit of 2 million bpd”) seems to be the most bullish, but they are not alone. * JP Morgan is at 2mbd for the summer, EA – around 1.7mbd,  GS (who post Currie’s departure is much less bullish) sees a deficit of 1.5mbd for Q3 and higher for summer months. IEA is around 1mbd deficit for Q3 and probably higher for summer (they do not forcast monthly balances), EIA STEO (which is not of great quality)  is around 0.8mbd. Crude draws should be even larger as refineries are exiting their maintenance period and refinery runs will increase by north of 3mbd vs April lows.  Note that I am not using OPEC’s forecasts here. And while other, less bullish forecasts may prove to still be optimistic there is a large room for error. Looking at 2025, I agree that demand growth probably won’t be strong enough to allow the full unwind of 2.2mbd cuts. Still, it can be substantial: * Growth engine is currently in non-OECD ex-China group of countries, representing 40% of world demand with a working population growth of 1.5%, healthy GDP growth and non-existent EV infrastructure. Most of the ICE vehicles energy savings are probably already captured and there is a strong shift towards SUVs, which reverses fuel economy. So I do think that demand growth could continue to surprise on the upside and absent recession register a 1.3-1.5mbd increase * Non-OPEC+ supply growth is expected to be quite strong. But to match or exceed the demand growth, US needs to deliver 0.7+ mbd growth in all liquids vs an already high 2024 base. It is possible, but there is certainly room for disappointment. For simplicity let us assume that non-OPEC+ supply growth matches demand growth for 2024/25. Let us also assume Iran/Veny production is flat (it is not an aggressive assumption, given the recent US legislation). Then, OPEC+ would start the year with a 400kbd deficit (after increasing production by 600 kbd in the last quarter of 2024) and low inventory level. This should leave some room for more unwinds, although the full return of 2.2mbd would prove excessive. Two more points: 1) If OPEC+ manages to return at least some barrels, maintaining cohesion should be easier, allowing to delay increases, should inventories start to build. 2) Group of 8 has not implemented all the agreed cuts – overproduction is between 0.77 and 1.05mbd, depending on the data source. It is therefore reasonable to expect that at least some of this overproduction would be netted vs the 2.2mbd increase – so the effective increase would be smaller even if done in full. Finally, why is OPEC+ doing this? On one hand, reversing the famous Jeff Currie argument “Long-term shortages create Near-Term Surpluses”(*), the promise of long-term surpluses would hurt the current price. Which is what have happened post OPEC+ meeting. (*) if the market believes in future shortage, prices will rise, hurt demand and incentivize more immediate supply – even if long-term concerns are unresolved and still support the prices resulting in prices being high vs inventory. This was the case earlier in the century: in 2003-07 despite oil prices surging 3x, market was oversupplied almost the entire time. The prices typically incorporated a hefty (geopolitical) “risk premium” that was estimated to be worth as much as $20 per barrel. However, OPEC+ has another lever: inventories. Current inventory level is not high (especially considering longer supply routes and more fragmented market. Whatever the market expectations are about the future, OPEC+ could force the spot higher via reducing the inventory enough and putting the curve into a relatively steep backwardation – since oil is much more of an opex than investment commodity. This is, btw, what OPEC+ has proclaimed to target back in 2016-17. So mopping inventory while not letting the NOPEC producers to get too comfortable by announcing the plans to release the spare capacity seems to be OPEC+'s game. The strategy is not without flaws: maintaining the right level of inventory for a cartel with at least 5 prominent players (of which one – Iran - is exempt) and in the market that got confident that any shortages would be quickly resolved (due to success in Russia’s exports rerouting as well as abundant, 5md+ of OPEC+ spare capacity)  is not easy. At times market stays unresponsive (causing complaints about speculators) and sometimes (e.g. in Sept 2023), OPEC+ overtightens. But if OPEC+ manages to indeed release some barrels in 2025, it will make managing the market easier. They might even get some of the risk premium back …. Let us see. So, to recap: I find the oil market again oscillating between euphoria and despair, largely ignoring the short-term forecasts and the current state of the market: 2 months ago, Brent rallied above $90 even when everyone, including the bulls were warning about the refinery maintenance season and seasonal overall weakness right ahead of us. Now we are entering a season of hefty draws with no extra OPEC+ volumes with prices down $15 from the April peak  - apparently because OPEC+ *could* mismanage spare capacity in 2025 … In my view prices could easily be $10 higher by the end of summer. There are plenty of ways to play it, especially since vol is on the low end of the post-covid range. 2025 is far away, and I assume that demand will allow for *some* increase for OPEC+ supply (even though I do agree, that having 2.2 mbd returned is not likely). Not an investment advice.
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A good example of How to Display Data Badly to be included in the examples here stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/co…
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Total EU gas imports in 2023 = 290 bcm of which pipeline gas imports = 169 bcm LNG imports = 121 bcm
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In 2023, EU natural gas production was 38 bcm (⬇️20% compared to 2022) Total gas consumption amounted to 330 bcm (⬇️7%) Domestic production covered 11% of gas consumption energy.ec.europa.eu/news/qua… need binoculus to read many charts, but still, very useful information
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🇨🇦🛢️ Western Canadian Select crude differentials are quite narrow at the moment, currently at ~$13.35/bbl in Hardisty, AB, thanks to the start-up of the Trans Mountain Expansion pipeline. Here's how I view the rough composition of that differential over the past decade:
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Updated U.S. natural gas demand breakdown: -Through 22 weeks, total demand is ~ 4.5 bcf/d higher than last year, while supply is ~ 1.1 bcf/d higher than last year. #oott #eia
Updated U.S. natural gas demand breakdown: -Through 21 weeks, total demand is ~ 4.6 bcf/d higher than last year, while supply is now only ~ 1.2 bcf/d higher than last year. #oott #eia
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✉️ Golden Pass LNG: Project is now expecting to place its supporting 2.5-Bcf/d natural gas pipeline into service during the first half of 2025.   PDF at is.gd/aAZufj   #LNG #ONGT #NatGas #Shale #OOTT #Houston
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We typically think of most pipeline capacity as a relatively fixed thing. But that couldn't be further from the truth for Enbridge's Mainline system, which is constantly evolving and growing:
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PipeRiv retweeted
Our analysis of #oil and #naturalgas companies shows cash from operations decreased to $678 billion in 2023—21% lower than in 2022 after accounting for inflation. eia.gov/finance/review/?utm_…
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PipeRiv retweeted
Sales of bunker fuel in Singapore have increased to all-time highs, indicating increased global consumption as cargo ships, tankers, and other marine vessels take longer routes to avoid the Red Sea. eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail…
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Stocks of crude oil and big 3 products entering summer. Historical comparisons below 👇 #oott
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Global commercial oil inventories, US inventories, Aramco Reduced oil prices to Asia, Vietnam coal consumption at record high, , US EV credits, Japan grid backup, and more.
Ignore the hype about declining inventories. see below Daily Energy Report #Oil #OPEC #LNG open.substack.com/pub/afalha…
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Shipping >
#Yemen’s Houthis conduct three military operations targeting three vessels in the #RedSea and the Arabian Sea, the Iranian-backed group’s military spokesperson Yahya Saree says. english.alarabiya.net/News/m…
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TC Energy shareholders approve spin-off of North American oil pipeline business, creating new firm South Bow Corp with assets including Keystone pipeline. $TRP #TCEnergy
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Replying to @NGdaily1
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