Manuel Mueller-Frank

Above 50% the conclusion reverses. If one miner controls more than half the hash power, we show that every equilibrium is centralized: that miner asymptotically owns essentially all blocks in the longest chain. 9/n

Main theorem: If every miner has less than ½ of the mining power, then for sufficiently large I, inertial mining is an equilibrium. No single miner can gain from any unilateral deviation. 4/n

New paper (with Minghao Pan and Omer Tamuz)🚨 Bitcoin functions without a central intermediary, but the decentralized consensus among miners is vulnerable to profitable deviations. We show how Bitcoin’s intended decentralized consensus can be sustained in equilibrium, without redesigning the chain.🧵

Not all is lost, however. We construct a sequential direct voting mechanism that satisfies strong (sequential-)continuous implementation and that is not subject to single-deviation. 6/n

A dictatorial mechanism satisfies SCI but is centralized. The tension between SCI and decentralization generalizes: every simultaneous mechanism is subject to single-deviation, i.e., in every equilibrium profile a single agent can change the outcome by changing his report. 5/n

We show that an oracle native staking/fee token is necessary for strong continuous implementation. That is, oracles relying on stablecoins, ETH etc. for fees/staking are highly vulnerable to obfuscation attacks that disrupt common knowledge of the oracle state. 3/n

🚨New paper alert🚨 Oracles perform well when reporting agents commonly know the state (say ETH/$), i.e., all know the state, know that all know it and so on. In our new paper, @siyangxiong and I analyze the robustness of oracles when common knowledge is slightly disrupted. 1/n