Ray Howard

In November 2023, a Palantir-led consortium was awarded a £330 million contract to run the NHS Federated Data Platform. It was awarded by the Conservative government. What happened next happened under Labour. In April 2025, Chinese researchers were granted access to NHS Biobank data despite MI5 warnings that Chinese organisations could be ordered by intelligence agencies to work on Beijing's behalf. One in five successful applications for UK Biobank data came from China. BGI, a Chinese genetics company blacklisted by the United States for links to military programmes and the surveillance of ethnic minorities, was among those granted access. Health officials pressed ahead regardless. Two days later, a former deputy head of MI6 warned publicly that China could use NHS data to develop a targeted bioweapon. MI5 had already warned that Chinese access to UK data posed direct national security risks. The government's response was to say it had strict security procedures in place. In May 2025, Chinese state-linked hackers directly attacked University College Hospital and University Hospital Southampton in what intelligence firm EclecticIQ described as a credible espionage campaign linked to a Chinese intelligence gathering group operating across multiple countries. In November 2025, former defence secretary Gavin Williamson wrote formally to Darren Jones warning that Chinese access to NHS data posed an immense risk and constituted a direct threat to national security. Britain, he said, was lagging behind its allies. The government did not act. This week, the health data of half a million UK Biobank volunteers appeared for sale on Alibaba, listed by three Chinese research institutions. Researchers described it as the 198th known exposure of Biobank data since last summer. The escalating pattern sits alongside connections the government has not explained. Palantir's NHS contract was facilitated in part by Global Counsel, the lobbying firm Peter Mandelson co-founded and in which he held a 24 percent stake. Global Counsel had Palantir as a registered client. The connection between Global Counsel and Palantir was reportedly absent from Mandelson's vetting as ambassador. On February 27 2025, Mandelson arranged an undeclared meeting between Starmer and Palantir executives in Washington with no minutes taken. Seven months later Palantir won a £240 million MoD contract without competitive tender. Meanwhile Wes Streeting gave instructions in October 2024 to press ahead with transferring half a million GP records to Biobank despite objections from GPs and privacy campaigners, at precisely the moment Chinese access to that data was under active security service scrutiny. Since Palantir was awarded the NHS contract in November 2023, the incidents have escalated significantly. Synnovis ransomware June 2024. Chinese state-linked hospital hacks May 2025. Repeated Biobank exposures throughout 2025. The Alibaba breach this week. Whether that escalation is connected to Palantir's expanding presence in NHS data infrastructure, or reflects other vulnerabilities being exploited simultaneously, is a question that has not been asked with sufficient rigour. Why were MI5 warnings about Chinese access repeatedly overridden? Why did the government expand Chinese researchers' access to NHS data while being warned it posed a direct threat to national security? Why was the meeting between Starmer, Mandelson and Palantir not declared? And why did a company with a direct financial connection to the British ambassador win a three quarter of a billion pound defence contract without competition? The warnings were formal, documented and delivered by serious people. They were ignored. The breaches escalated. And the connections between the decisions that enabled both have never been explained. "Streeting gave instructions in October 2024 to press ahead with transferring half a million GP records to Biobank"