Michelle Rickard

I have no direct knowledge about what happened but based on this post, I think I can add some clarity to things I read in the comments. There are many types of ranges within the CFB Wainwright training area & there is an attached permanent base area that has training & administrative buildings, dining halls, barracks & even a whole community of houses for married permanent staff members. All ranges are in the training area several kms from the base area. Some ranges are permanent & fixed in place, some amount to an area on the map & range orders that tell the user what types of weapons can be fired within that designated area. This type of live fire range is likely where this incident took place. Once you decide that a live fire range is going to happen a Range Safety Officer must be designated. The RSO works with Assistant RSO’s who are qualified to template (safely determine where a weapon can be fired from based on its maximum range, if it’s an indirect fire weapon like an artillery or mortar shell, there’s lots of added factors to be considered) the different weapons that will be used from rifles to medium & heavy MG’s to anti tank weapons to 2 calibres of mortars to artillery. All these folks work with a permanent base organization called Range Control who ensure all the templates are properly done, all the safety rules are understood, all the temporary safety staff are qualified for their jobs & that flags, road barriers & guards on the outer perimeter have been assigned & are in place so no one just wonders into a shit storm. They assign a safety frequency separate from the tactical frequency. Whenever any obstacles or sensitive things are located within a designated live fire training area or range, they are made known to the range safety staff by Range Control so that buffer or restricted zones can be placed around them. The area indicated (see the map) near the 2 lakes was never authorized for indirect fire & if my memory is correct, it was never authorized for any form of live fire training. It should also be noted that prior to any live fire range involving multiple weapons systems (especially indirect fire) & movement by troops, the safety staff would not just rely on maps & templates & written rules, they would be walking the ground repeatedly so they were 100% familiar with what is referred to as the trace, which is just another way of saying, the direction the training troops would generally follow. A good range gives as much latitude to the tactical officer or NCO in charge to fire & maneuver using the ground to their advantage but still ensuring that their weapons are staying within the safety arcs. This takes a lot of effort by a very large safety team & must also stand up to the inspection by a full time Range Control Officer. Typically indirect fire is tightly controlled both by the safety staff assigned to monitor the tactical fire controllers requesting the indirect fire & by the safety team at the gun or mortar line positions to ensure the rounds will land safely & avoid any potentially dangerous targets such as a gas well. This is double checked by those doing the firing & their safety monitors several kms away. So two things jump off the page with this report. One based on my years of working in Wainwright both as a trainee, as permanent staff & as a safety officer for indirect mortar fire countless times including on static & maneuver ranges, I can’t imagine this part of the training area ever being used for any form of live fire let alone indirect fire. And two, the idea that at least 6 people would have had to miss the fact that a restricted target had been selected or the folks at the gun line had entered the coordinates incorrectly into the targeting computer or set up the gun line incorrectly is beyond imagination. There are so many safety redundancies built into using indirect artillery fire with troops on the ground it’s nearly impossible to believe. Hope this helps!