Conor's article, and the other one saying "550 vehicle fleet to be bought" seems to have started a surprising amount of utterly unjustified handwringing, as if there is some massive course correction pending for the Irish military. Before answering the question "Is this a good idea", one must first answer the question "what is the Army for?" The third question is "How to frame the size of the proposed purchase?" First, disclaimers. What I know: How to fight brigades and battalions. What I don't know: What guidance the Irish DF are operating under, what assumptions they have made, and what the various machinations are going on behind the scenes. So I'm inferring with what I know to inform me. Much though it may shock certain people to realise it, but the Irish Army has always been organised to fight a "conventional" battle. The function of the Defence Forces, oddly, is "To defend the State against armed aggression," (It says so on its website) and this is not new. To do that, it needs to be able to fight. It trains to do so. Ireland's Army came out of WW2/The Emergency with hundreds of armoured vehicles, those who want the details can find the excellent Karl Martin book on the subject. Over time, size and numbers decreased. In 1945, Ireland had eight "PDF" brigades, in two divisions (1st (Thunderbolt), and 2nd (Spearhead) (As I now look up the dates of creation of the US 3rd Armored and 11th Armored divisions) of three brigades each and two independent brigades. The brigade structure back then is fairly familiar to folks of today, and has generally remained similar for most armies around the world: Because it tended to work. Three battalions of infantry, an artillery regiment, a cavalry squadron, supporting companies of engineers, signals, medics etc. There were also some independent units with token numbers of tanks, air defence, whatever. Over the years, the numbers have dropped. They started with eight regular brigades. Back in my FCA days, there were three. Come 2012, down to two. But though the number of brigades has changed, the basic structure and function (form following function, after all), has remained the same for longer than my father's lifetime, let alone mine. Ireland has a long and proud tradition of UN operations, but UN operations aren't always quiet peacekeeping. They kicked off with the Congo, which was the wake-up call that claimed neutrality does not guarantee immunity, and that both training and equipping to fight is of paramount importance, even on UN operations. Jadotville might have gone much differently had the losses the year prior not resulted in a crash arms buy with modern kit. In any case, peacekeeping as people are familiar with from recent years like UNIFIL does not require a brigade structure, with artillery batteries in support, a cavalry squadron answering PIRs, etc. A fighting force can, and as far as I know in every country does, provide peacekeeping forces out of their warfighting configuration. Warfighting forces cannot be created from peacekeeping organisations. The purchase of hundreds of armoured vehicles does not change the DF's capabilities or character, it only changes how good it is at them. If Ireland right now has two warfighting infantry brigades, and then buys 550 armoured vehicles, what does it then have? Two warfighting infantry brigades, at least one of which is now mechanised. It doesn't change what the brigade does: It's a maneuver asset, generally designed to attack a battalion or smaller sized enemy of similar makeup, and defend against a brigade or two sized attacker. A mech brigade is more mobile and more flexible, and that mobility comes with better protection courtesy of armour, but it does the same operational job. A brigade-without-light-armor isn't expected to fight the Third Russian Shock Tank Division, and a brigade-with-light-armor also isn't going to fight the Third Russian Shock Tank Division. Other armies tend to have armored brigades for that sort of job, even really small armies like Lithuania. Fortunately, I don't think anyone really envisions a situation where that requirement would ever come up for an Irish unit in the first place. For comparison, a US Army SBCT has about 325 Stryker vehicles, very similar to a MOWAG. Plus 600 or so JLTVs, light armor a bit like the Irish LTAVs. However, a Stryker brigade also is part of a division and has access to division support assets. It also doesn't need to add additional vehicles as training sets or attrition reserve. Ireland doesn't have a division any more, so the brigades have to be configured to be independent brigades, inherently they are a bit larger since they have to be self-sufficient. The Irish purchase would also presumably include some training set vehicles, and some spares for inevitable losses. Further, to be equivalent to a US SBCT in capability, it needs more than just wheeled vehicles. Each US squad has a Javelin missile. They're currently a battalion asset in Ireland. They come with 155mm artillery (Ok, came, they have now been moved to DivArty, but are expected to operate in support) for fires. Let alone all the other assets which a US SBCT commander can request or has, those are just two really obvious ones. When it comes to people going "Oh, they are preparing to go fight in Europe", there are two answers. 1) Yes, of course they are. Fighting to defend Balriggan would look pretty similar to fighting to defend Jadotville (Just fewer snakes). Fighting to kick a light battalion out of Knock Airport is going to be pretty similar to fighting to kick a light battalion out of Kaunas airport. In any case, it's the Army's job to prepare to fight wherever the government decides to fight, at home or abroad. It has for the entire existence of the State, this isn't new. 2) That government decision has absolutely nothing to do with what the equipment they have is. A brigade is a brigade, a battalion is a battalion. There was nothing stopping the Costello government from dispatching one of Ireland's infantry brigades to fight in Korea. It had a UN mandate from the Security Council (To keep the Triple Lock folks happy. Even Sweden sent a field hospital to treat UN troops). It had brigades trained and organised to do it. Korea has suitable terrain for light infantry brigades to operate. Whatever reasons Ireland had in the 1950s to have brigades and to use them or not use them, they remain pretty much identical today. Europe is a bit more interlinked now, is the main difference. What happens in Finland, Estonia or Poland now has greater effect on Ireland. For those who are saying "drones make armor irrelevant and are a waste of money", they are....ill-informed. The Navy called it the jeune ecole. There's a really long answer to this entirely different topic (and see my video "no, the tank is not dead", but the short one is "Presume the folks around the world in military procurement know what they are doing and look what they are doing." Drones are a fact of modern military life, and modern forces should be both able to use and counter them. Unfortunately, that merely adds complexity to the overall problem, yet another issue for folks to worry about, to add to every other military technology which keeps piling on and adding complexity ever since we moved on from stabbing our enemies. We still can do that, bayonets on rifles are a thing, but there's more on top of it. Unfortunately, answers to increasingly complicated problem sets are rarely simple or cheap. For those who are saying "Ireland needs airplanes and ships", they are not wrong. Related to the above, the correct answer is neither simple nor cheap. In terms of military capability, it's not an either/or decision. One needs an Army capable of doing its job well as well as an air corps/force capable of doing its job well, as well as a Naval Service/Navy capable of doing its job well. Half-assing anything can lead to rather fatal consequences. Though I would note that the Government has not committed to LOA 3, which is the one which has fighters, capable warships, etc, so buying for the Army but not the other branches is consistent with stated government policy. Which brings us to that third question I mentioned: How to frame the size of the proposal. There is a prevalent view that "because the move is from 80 to 550 vehicles, there is a change in nature of the force". There are two assumptions in that: First, that 80 was the correct size for the DF to do everything it was expected to do for the three brigades it had back in 2000. It's a relatively token force, 45 of them are APCs: Not even enough to lift a full battalion. Did someone in the DF do an operational analysis and say "80 is the correct number of armoured vehicles we need to do all our jobs", or did the DF go "We need this many vehicles" only to be met by Finance going "you must be having a laugh, mate, we'll fund you for this many". I have no data, but I have my suspicions. The second assumption is that even is 80 was the correct vehicle number three decades ago, it is still the correct vehicle number today. As the drone advocates have noted, the battlefield has somewhat changed. It might have been well enough getting around in MAN trucks, Ford Transit vans and commandeered CIE buses back in the day, but when paramilitaries have access to drones, or when artillery ranges further on conventional battlefields (also observed by drones, most likely), or whatever, the tactical need has also changed. I can think of few instances where anyone has ever said "I wish we had fewer armoured vehicles" when trying to maneuver on a battlefield. Or in Lebanon. Or in Bosnia. Or Liberia (Note how the Swedes brought CV90s?) So, to summarise. If absolutely nothing changes in Ireland's security planning or foreign policy goals, a large armored vehicle purchase to equip a warfighting brigade is entirely consistent with those long-standing policies. It allows the DF to better achieve what it is already tasked to do and may be tasked to do in the future. If it is believed that Ireland should not have a conventional warfighting capability, then that will be a change, someone needs to tell the Defence Forces to stop planning to fight, and to instead become a peace-keeping force. And then hope that the Triple Lock goes away because otherwise there will be no peace-keeping opportunities for them to do it.