The ‘have three, only have one is available for ops’ is a well-known thing, which has been recklessly discounted by the British 'to do more with less' for many years. Originally 16 x Type 23s. Three sold to Chile 2005, left 13. Therefore four approx avail for global ops (though more could be deployed in time of crisis/war). But in recent years there have only been eight anti-submarine specialist (ASW) Type 23s, as rest general-purpose vessels. And so, even then only three max T23s (at any one time) could actually fully handle the vitally important ASW roles (protecting the deterrent working in northern seas and monitoring Russian submarine routes more generally). The UK also failed to replace 6 x Type 22 (Batch 2) ASW ships that were axed late 1990s/early 2000s, then binned 4 x T22 (Batch 3, ASW/general-purpose) without replacement in 2011. The T23s were meant only to replace Leander Class and Type 21 frigates btw. The abandonment of common sense 3:1 rule and so having a fleet with, say, 10 frigates available for global ops at any one time, coincided with the notorious 17-year 'frigate building holiday'. Fewer ships left in service were pushed harder and wore out even quicker. We are now fast approaching a nadir in British naval history (esp with no SSNs on ops) - even a shocking a low in modern global naval history for a so-called leading maritime power. But it should surprise nobody, especially in government or the higher reaches of the military (recent past and present) . And certainly not a surprise for readers of @WarshipsIFR magazine via our repeated warnings of where things were going, since the first edition in 1998, plus the numerous warnings of other naval specialists on here and elsewhere.