WesternFault retweeted
This will get missed in the news of Jensen resigning, but it's super important.
Singapore says it was holding Alice Huang's passport thru Feb 2026, but got little help from the U.S. in its investigation. Trump was briefed on Alice in fall 2025.
That means the U.S. did nothing for months as Singapore held a Chinese spy who the U.S. knew was in a relationship with the most important person in A.I. Hard to understand. nytimes.com/2026/11/12/busin…
WesternFault retweeted
Replying to @TheIranWatcher
One of the best articles I've ever seen about Iraq and the IRGC backed militias, thank you very much for your time and effort, you have nailed every major important point and beyond, sooner or later Iraq and Iran will be free from the Islamic Republic 🫡🇮🇶🇮🇷.
WesternFault retweeted
About 40K bikes roll through Tehran
Slogan: "I am ready to give my life for Iran."
Participants spoke to Sputnik after the ride.
WesternFault retweeted
President Trump’s media company wants traders and investors to pay for instant access to his Truth Social posts on.wsj.com/4pm78XH
WesternFault retweeted
China's imports of gold are up (Switzerland) and everyone is spending a lot more on imported chips and imported energy ...
Machinery imports jumped in q1 but that now seems to be faltering
1/
WesternFault retweeted
NATO allies refuse to join Trump's Strait of Hormuz blockade
(Reuters) - The United States' NATO allies said on Monday they would not get involved in President Donald Trump's plan to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, further ratcheting up tensions within the increasingly fragile alliance.
* Britain and France refuse to join blockade
* Macron proposes multinational mission to restore navigation
* NATO allies seek diplomatic, non-military solutions
WesternFault retweeted
🚨🚨 SENIOR IRANIAN SOURCE TO REUTERS: IF THE SITUATION GETS OUT OF CONTROL, IRAN’S ALLIES WILL ALSO CLOSE BAB EL-MANDEB WATERWAY
WesternFault retweeted
RBI has told banks to reduce their dollar positions
Banks can now hold only up to $100 million in dollar-rupee exposure
Right now many banks are holding much larger dollar positions
They must cut this down by April 10
WesternFault retweeted
Amid intensifying global tech competition and supply chain restructuring, China is shifting from market-driven opening-up to innovation-led collaboration. Platforms such as the Zhongguancun (ZGC) Forum are emerging as key hubs for aligning global resources and technologies, facilitating deeper integration of capital, innovation and industry. Foreign firms are evolving from investors to active participants in China’s innovation ecosystem, with the country’s role in global corporate strategies becoming increasingly prominent. globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1…
WesternFault retweeted
Chinese maianland's Taiwan Affairs Office envisions a "road trip to Beijing" after peaceful reunification. Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian today said the Strait Rapid Channel and Beijing-Taipei Expressway would be built, allowing Taiwanese to drive from the island to the capital. She promised a "round-the-island" high-speed rail and infrastructure upgrades.
WesternFault retweeted
Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. says a "very serious" restructuring of relations with China is "certainly going to happen...its happening now." He says the Philippines will "redraw our legal relationships, in terms of international law."
He did not comment further when asked on what he meant by "redraw our legal relationships."
WesternFault retweeted
I work on an FX desk in South Korea, and I still remember the issue that surfaced in May 2023.
To start with the background, things became complicated after the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed sanctions on Iran. At one point, South Korea was importing Iranian crude under a sanctions waiver, and the payments were accumulated in won-denominated accounts at two banks, effectively functioning as escrow-type accounts.
However, once the waiver expired in May 2019, the two banks suspended Iran-related settlement services, and as a result the crude payment balances became, for all practical purposes, frozen in South Korea.
At the time, the funds were generally estimated at around USD 7 billion, or roughly KRW 8–9 trillion depending on the exchange rate cited in the Korean media. Personally, I was told the actual amount may have been even larger.
The reason people described the funds as “frozen” was that, while the money legally belonged to Iran, Korean banks could not freely transfer it or send it through the dollar clearing system without risking a violation of U.S. sanctions.
If Seoul had returned the funds on its own initiative, it could have exposed itself to secondary sanctions risk. As a result, the Korean government managed the funds in a highly restricted manner, allowing only limited uses such as Iran’s UN dues or humanitarian transactions involving medicine and food.
In fact, in 2022 the Korean foreign ministry stated that, at Iran’s request, part of the frozen won funds had been used to pay Iran’s UN contributions, and the government continued to explain that the funds had been handled only for humanitarian purposes.
Then the situation began to shift. In May 2023, amid signs of easing tensions between Washington and Tehran and discussions surrounding a prisoner arrangement, a solution for the frozen funds in South Korea also started to be discussed.
Reports in late May said that Seoul and Washington were reviewing ways to transfer roughly USD 7 billion, while Iran continued to press for the return of the money. That said, this was still only at the review and consultation stage; the funds were not actually returned to Iran in May.
The actual framework took shape in August and September 2023. Rather than releasing the money directly to Iran, the United States agreed to a structure under which the funds in the restricted Korean accounts would be transferred to restricted accounts in Qatar.
According to Reuters and the Korean foreign ministry, the funds were moved to a third country and were structured so that they could be used in Qatar only for humanitarian purchases such as food and medicine.
OFAC also made clear that the Qatari humanitarian channel was not a mechanism for freely releasing funds to the Iranian government or Iranian companies, but one subject to strict review and controls.
That did not mean, however, that Iran had obtained unrestricted access to the money. In October 2023, the United States again stated that Iran would not be able to access those funds freely in the near term and that Washington retained the authority to re-freeze them if necessary.
In other words, the end result was less a full release of the funds than a conversion of the South Korea-based freeze into a tightly restricted humanitarian-use structure in Qatar.
The OFAC general license appears to go no further than permitting transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, and offloading of Iranian-origin crude oil that had already been loaded, through April 19. It does not appear to designate a specific payment channel.
My experience tells me the following.
If a workable route for purchasing Iranian crude were to be established, through what channel would the payment actually be made? Based on South Korea’s previous experience, would it go through Qatar again? Under current circumstances, however, the Qatari route looks practically unavailable.
Would renminbi settlement be possible instead? China may be able to use that route, but Seoul almost certainly cannot.
The U.S. Treasury has repeatedly sanctioned Chinese networks and small independent refiners for supporting the payment and financial flows tied to Iranian crude.
In other words, it is not that a renminbi route does not exist; rather, that route exists mainly within China or in sanction-evasion networks.
For a Korean refiner or a Korean commercial bank to follow that model, it would need unmistakable support from Washington.
Would payment then have to be made through the United States? Even in that case, it is far from clear that Iran would readily accept such an arrangement. Russia? Europe? None of these routes is easy to identify with confidence. At this point, the only even remotely plausible route I can see is Switzerland.
Of course, I said this in jest.
The truth is, all Iranian oil flows into China, and specifically, into the Chinese teapot (aka independent) refineries. If the oil was waiting on water before, it would have eventually flowed into the teapots at the right price.
Furthermore, with Venezuela cargoes off limits since January, the teapots would have drawn down more on Iranian and Russian crude and fuel oil on floating storage.
So seriously, if there are any extra Iranian oil left on water, who can buy it? And how would the payment be made to fulfil the promise that "Iran will have difficulty accessing any revenue generated by the move"?
Maybe the teapots can optimize by selling it to China's state owned refineries if the margins to do so is better than outright running the crude themselves. But I think that's about the best it can go.
Intra-China base case for me. Nett zero impact to the rest of the world.
Pure conjecture on my end, but it really doesn't solve our big crude supply imbalance issue.
Helpppppppppp......
#oott
WesternFault retweeted
I agree that the SPR release is necessary. You have to do it just to slow down demand destruction even a little bit.
But even if they're considering a coordinated release of 300-400 million barrels like the FT reported, all that volume isn't hitting the market instantly.
After the US decided to release 180 million barrels of SPR in 2022, the most they ever released in a single week was 8.4 million barrels in the week ending 2022/9/4.
We've got a supply disruption of over 10mb/d in the Middle East, but the historical max release rate is only ~1.2mb/d.
The US, which holds the most SPR among Western nations, stores its oil in underground salt caverns, not regular surface tanks.
These salt caverns are spread across four major sites along the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana: Bryan Mound, Big Hill, West Hackberry, and Bayou Choctaw.
They're artificial caves drilled into giant salt layers a thousand feet underground, and each cave is big enough to fit the Empire State Building.
To pull the oil up, they inject freshwater into the bottom of the cave. Since water is heavier than oil, it pushes the oil upward.
In theory, the max release capacity of the US SPR is estimated to be around ~4mb/d. In reality, there were several physical constraints that kept the weekly max at 8.4 million barrels.
Every time you inject water to push the oil out, the salt walls dissolve a little(Leaching). If you keep releasing at a large scale for a long time like in 2022, it can mess up the cavern's structural stability.
If the cave gets too big or the walls get too thin, there's a risk of collapse, so the DOE had to control the release speed to protect the caverns.
The oil pushed up from the caves has to travel through pipelines to nearby refineries or port terminals. At the time, the SPR volume overlapped with commercial oil flows, and pipeline capacity hit a saturation point.
Also, since the tanker berths and pump capacities for loading oil onto ships are limited, it takes physical time to handle all that volume pouring out at once.
Lastly, SPR releases happen through an auction process. No matter how much you want to release, the refiners or traders who buy it need to have the storage space or refining capacity to actually take it.
Given the current logistics network of the US oil industry, there’s bound to be a limit on how much the winners can take at their desired timing.
In conclusion, everyone could've predicted the SPR release. But what we need is oil that's available right now.
With refineries and petrochemical plants already declaring force majeure, if they don't get feedstock immediately, more of them will have to shut down.
So they're desperate to get feedstock somehow. You can't offset a loss of over 10mb/d with a supply rate of 1-2mb/d.
Without a solution to the fundamental problem (Strait of Hormuz), the upside pressure on the front end of the curve won't go away.
It’ll just let out a little steam, but it’ll still be hot.
#oott #com
WesternFault retweeted
As cross-border Chinese currency payments rise, we find evidence that a key U.S. financial sanctions tool may be weakening . . .
cfr.org/articles/how-cross-b…

































