Michael Deth

BOLO: U.S. Homeland Plot Commander Name: Mohammad al-Hawshani Nationality: Saudi Arabian Age: 21 Affiliation: Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) Role: Selected as one of the commanders for al-Qaeda’s upcoming U.S. homeland plot Location: Unknown, assessed to be on U.S. soil This story begins with deception as this is a war after all. The ruse started in the Calmiskaad Mountains, a range in the northeastern Bari region of Puntland, Somalia. After a strike on suspected terrorists there, a Saudi passport was recovered. The passport belonged to Saudi ISWAP member Mohammad Al-Hawshani. It was left intentionally to be found. For al-Qaeda’s upcoming plot, the selection of attackers and elevated positions such as Mohammad’s commander role was not based on battlefield skills alone. Candidates were screened for clean profiles: no criminal or terrorist history, not on watchlists, and so forth. For the most critical operatives, the plan went even further: to render them effectively “dead” in official records. The idea was that leaving Mohammad’s passport at a location likely to be struck would lead one to conclude he was killed, and authorities are far less likely to pursue someone believed dead. That same kind of ruse allowed Hamza bin Laden to plan the homeland plot with relative impunity as late al-Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s deceptions convinced parts of the U.S. intelligence community (IC) he was dead, leaving agencies years behind on his networks and plots. What we know about Mohammad: he progressed through a highly connected selection process reminiscent of the 9/11 hijackers, but with a far broader operational role. Commanders chosen for this effort do more than act as individual attackers; they run portions of the plot on the ground, oversee pre-attack preparation, and manage multiple cells. These cells have varied objectives: some target hometowns and veterans’ communities, some target high-value sites in the Washington, D.C., area (including the FBI building), and others are slotted as suicide operatives for al-Qaeda’s Bojinka-inspired airline plot. Our assessment is that Mohammad is involved in running cells intended to strike in local communities where people live, work, and play. To assume this role, Mohammad required at least two senior approvals. He needed endorsement from the then-head of the ISIS Military Commission, now-deceased Abdullah Makki Muslih al-Rifai. Since Makki was the ISIS official in charge of deployments and of ISIS external operations cells (like Shamsuddin Jabbar’s cell, for example). and he also required approval from the head of al-Qaeda’s Military Commission, Hamza al-Ghamdi (Osama bin Laden’s former bodyguard), because Mohammad’s role is part of an al-Qaeda plot, and as al-Ghamdi leads operations in Somalia for al-Qaeda central. In some cases, commanders were met or hand-selected by Hamza bin Laden or the mastermind of the plot, Saif al-Adel; whether Mohammad had a face-to-face meeting with either is unknown. Mohammad received his Saudi passport on November 26, 2024, and transited through Egypt en route to Ethiopia, which issued him a visa upon his arrival on December 18, 2024. He used Ethiopia as his gateway into Somalia. He left behind all of his documents in those mountains, including credit cards—materials now in the possession of the Puntland Counter-Terrorism Forces (linked below). While he intended to travel to the U.S. under a false identity, both the Saudi government (which issued the passport) and the Ethiopian government (which issued the visa) hold legitimate biometric records for Mohammad. We request, in good faith, that each government (@KSAmofaEN, @KSAmofa, @MFAEthiopia) provide those biometrics to @DHSgov and the @ODNIgov at the soonest available opportunity. We have observed signs of nepotism in some homeland plot appointments, and given Mohammad’s age, we strongly suspect he is a second-generation terrorist. We request that the Saudi government also provide full familial details for Mohammad to U.S. authorities. History appears to be repeating itself: a Saudi national poised to attack the U.S. in a 9/11-style event (although this attack by the sons of bin Laden is far grander in scope and size). If Mohammad had departed directly from Somalia, we believe he could have reached his intended transit point at the U.S. southern border as early as the end of January 2025. If he chose to undergo additional training in Africa, that would likely have delayed him by roughly six months. Mohammad likely traveled from Africa through illicit pipelines to South America, up through Central America and Mexico, and then over the southern U.S. border. Because these journeys rely on many different pipelines, we request information from anyone who may have encountered him along the route: what name he gave, what nationality he claimed, where he said he intended to go in the U.S., and who was facilitating his movement. While such travels are dangerous, we currently assess that Mohammad did not die en route, but welcome any credible, contradictory information. In the U.S., Mohammad was expected to oversee multiple terrorist cells. Cells average five to ten operatives and are generally geographically based. So he would likely not run cells in a handful of states, but is operating within a state and possibly a neighboring state. Then another commander would be in a separate region of the U.S. running those cells. Mohammad’s responsibilities include direct communication with, and at times in-person contact with, homeland attackers on U.S. soil. This presents an opportunity to locate not only him but other cell members. Importantly, these cells are not limited to a single group like al-Qaeda or his group affiliation ISWAP. They are intentionally mixed: IMU, TTP, ISIS, HTS, Haqqani network elements, al-Shabaab, and others may be interwoven within the same cell. Focusing only on group labels risks missing the cells themselves—that’s by design. Al-Qaeda understood that stovepiped analysis across the intelligence community categorizes terrorists solely by group affiliation. Under that system, intelligence officials and law enforcement would fail to identify mixed cells, operating instead on outdated assumptions that al-Qaeda and ISIS do not work together. We ask the public to report any sightings of Mohammad directly to law enforcement, and to more than one authority: local police, county and state agencies, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security, given that this suspect is likely in the country illegally and living under a fraudulent identity. Do not confront or question Mohammad if you are not law enforcement; he should be considered armed and dangerous. Please see my linked post below on security considerations regarding this Be on the Lookout (BOLO). If you have information, please contact your local authorities and federal partners immediately. Time is critical. BOLO: U.S. Homeland Plot Commander

Inside the Playbook — What U.S. Responders Need to Know This operations order reads like a manual: disciplined timing, strict comms control, OPSEC, exploitation detachments, media plans, and an explicit priority on taking hostages. Those elements together make a small, well‑trained force far more dangerous — they don’t need to fully meet manpower targets to cause massive disruption. Translate that into what matters for us: expect attackers who move silently (no phones), hit multiple places in sync, directly affect law enforcement and first responders to exploit confusion, and use real-time footage to shape the narrative. Those are distinct threat vectors you can detect, disrupt, and plan against now — not after the fact. Do three things immediately: (1) Red‑team your own routines from an attacker’s vantage — surveil your staging, comms, shift changes, and fix what’s easy to exploit; (2) Harden communications with redundant, practiced systems and stage deployable comms caches; (3) Pre-stage casualty collection points and embed tactical-med teams with entry teams so medical care and hostage-rescue options remain available simultaneously. Simple, practical 90‑day checklist: run a red‑team surveillance exercise and implement fixes; stage at least one deployable comms cache for your mutual‑aid region; pre‑position a casualty collection template and train a tactical‑med team on it; pick three high‑risk windows or venues and harden them for two weeks as a live exercise; schedule a multi‑agency full‑scale exercise that includes multiple active shooters, medical surge, and effective guidance and information sharing with the public. Prepare now — or accept predictable failure later.

The Master Plan — Al‑Aqsa Flood The following is an excerpt from the operation’s master plan recovered after the Hamas attack. Presented for analytic and reporting purposes only, it outlines the structure and force allocations described in the document. Assessments indicate that, during the attack, Hamas achieved roughly 75% of the staffing levels set out in this plan. Notably, the plan’s scope was grand: it called for simultaneous breaches at 25 separate locations, a multi‑axis operation designed to overwhelm defenses and seize multiple objectives at once. —Excerpt (see attached document)— The Plan Breach the separation line at 25 locations opposite 25 road intersections simultaneously, and take control of the road-intersection sites with separate trained groups. Each group: 100 fighters. Total: 2,500 fighters. Evacuation patrols: each patrol consists of 10 operatives, assigned to each settlement. Required number: 10 patrols × 221 settlements = 2,210 fighters/patrol slots. Mission: Expel the settlers using their vehicles. Priority: children and women. Detain between 17–50 prisoners. Seize mobile phones and any documents. Evacuation of small towns: 200 fighters per town × 8 towns = 1,600 fighters. Evacuate the settlers with their cars and buses toward the coast. Evacuation of large cities: 400 fighters × 3 cities = 1,200 fighters. Direct them toward the sea. Neutralize military areas by isolating them with combat groups around each entrance. For example, at [a training base — unclear name]: deploy around 20 groups, each group of 10 fighters — total 2,000 fighters. Blow up the site. Total approximately 10,000 for the offensive — highly trained, intensive units. The general overall objective of the plan must not be disclosed to others.

FLASHING RED—The factors for the next 9/11 are already in motion, and they’re not hard to see: ✔️The fall of Kabul handed al-Qaeda its sanctuary back, while the U.S. lost 98% of its intel collection. ✔️Terrorists were evacuated out of Kabul among real refugees. ✔️Thousands of terrorists have been allowed across the U.S. border unvetted, most with fake identity documents making watchlisting completely ineffective. ✔️DHS and ICE immigration sweeps aren’t prioritizing deporting high-risk terrorist nationalities. ✔️Washington continues funding the Taliban, the very group that harbors bin Laden’s sons and Saif al-Adel. ✔️Abu Mohammad al-Julani, Sirajuddin Haqqani, and Abdul Aziz Haqqani have been quietly removed from the U.S. bounty list. ✔️Julani himself was allowed to take a victory lap on U.S. soil. Terrorists praised it similar to the fall of Kabul, the fall of Syria and the success of October 7th. ✔️There has been no increase in the $1 million bounty for Hamza bin Laden while the Intelligence Community still covers up CIA’s incorrect assessment that he’s deceased; A new CIA Director has not course corrected the agency’s Stockholm syndrome with the Taliban, particularly the Haqqanis. ✔️Negotiations with terrorists continue in both Gaza and Afghanistan; a seat at the table gives them continued legitimacy. ✔️The U.S. is helping bankroll fake ISIS counterterrorism operations in collusion with the Taliban and Julani in Afghanistan and Syria; U.S. taxpayer funds from this program get diverted to a handful of designated terrorist groups. ✔️The FBI still can’t wrap up Shamsuddin Jabbar’s Louisiana cell—or admit that it links directly back to ISIS’s military commission and the Syrian Ministry of Defense. ✔️Aviation security has been weakened due to weak leadership in the TSA and FAMS: no real push to detect al-Qaeda’s invisible bomb, and even has downgraded screening against shoe bombs. ✔️State-wide fusion centers are not sharing a NCTC al-Qaeda homeland threat alert written for law enforcement with local law enforcement and first responders. ✔️ Ignoring the fact that both Qatar and Turkey are actively working against our core objective—keeping our homeland safe and our republic strong—is reckless. ✔️ Failing to recognize the extent of cooperation between the Iranian government and al-Qaeda, after Iran sheltered the group’s leadership and their families for two decades. If we ask what sets the stage for another catastrophic attack on our homeland, this is it. We’ve seen this movie before—but the sequel will be far worse, and the public will blame the government for failing to prepare our communities when every warning sign has been flashing red.