Our auditor @cryptanu is taking the stage at @summit_defi in Mumbai! Damn Vulnerable Daml: live CTF-style challenges built from real bugs he found on the Canton network while reviewing Daml code. Inspired by Ethernaut and Damn Vulnerable DeFi. 1st Nov, 02:30PM IST, Amber room Save it to your agenda: defisecuritysummit.org/2026/… See you there. 🛡️

Scan your smart contracts before attackers do. We are opening beta access to QuillShield, our multi-agent auditor for EVM smart contracts, for the first 50 teams. October has made it clear that waiting is no longer an option. In the last few days alone: • PHP: pre-auth remote code execution, CVSS 9.2 • GitLab: CVSS 10, self-hosted servers back to 2014 • Node.js: 10 CVEs in one release • Railway: customer secrets accessed • LiteLLM: credential stealer shipped on PyPI AI helped find some of these bugs, and attackers have the same tools. A bug in a deployed smart contract can drain funds in a single transaction, so we built QuillShield to find them first. Here's what it has done so far: > 25 Critical or High vulnerabilities caught across 155 projects > 497 findings, with 85% of auditor-reviewed ones confirmed valid > 350,000+ lines of Solidity reviewed > 83.8% on EVMBench, against 45.6% for the best published model Here's the beta link: shield.quillaudits.com/

If your deployer key was sitting in a Railway variable, who owns your contracts right now? Possibly the attacker. Railway was breached today. Their disclosure says an unauthorised party may have accessed customer environment variables and decrypted some of them. Railway thinks the target was AI inference keys. On-chain trackers say a sweeper script went through the same dump and hit 200+ addresses across 19+ EVM chains, around $371k as of Oct 21 evening UTC. Here is the part the “rotate your keys” advice skips. An API key has an issuer. You revoke it with OpenAI or Stripe or your database provider and get a new one. A private key has no issuer, so there is nothing to rotate. Once it has been read, that address is gone, and the balance in it is usually the least of what it controls. The same key is the owner, upgrader or minter on whatever contracts you pointed it at, and that is what the attacker can use next. So if you ran a bot, relayer, keeper, indexer or backend on Railway with a signing key in its variables, do these 5 things first, from a clean machine with a new key. None of them touch Railway, so you don’t have to wait for deploys to come back. 1. Treat every address whose private key or seed phrase was in a Railway variable as controlled by the attacker. Move what’s left and retire it. One key is the same address on every EVM chain, so check all of them, not just mainnet. The sweeper already did. 2. Find every contract where that address holds a role. Owner, admin, proxy upgrader, minter, pauser, oracle updater, guardian, relayer allowlist. Transfer each to a new address. Start with the deployer key, because in most codebases the account that deploys a contract becomes its default owner and nobody ever changes it. 3. If the key is a signer on a Safe or another multisig, replace it. Then check the threshold still makes sense without it. 4. Revoke token approvals. The ones that address granted, and the ones other addresses granted to it. 5. Set monitoring on the old addresses and on the attacker address in the first reply. A role the attacker hasn’t used yet can still be used. Then rotate the normal secrets. RPC keys, database passwords, registry credentials, AI API keys. Do it with the provider that issued them, because changing the value inside Railway does nothing to the old one. And go through services you stopped months ago. One engineering lead on X traced a stolen AWS key to a Railway service that had been idle since July. A stopped service keeps its variables. None of this is unusual practice, which is the uncomfortable part. At least one template on Railway’s own deploy page asks you to paste a 0x-prefixed wallet private key straight into a variable. Longer term, three things. A hot key on someone else’s platform holds a few hours of float and no admin roles at all. Admin roles sit behind a multisig with a timelock. If you can, sign through a KMS or HSM so the raw key is never in an env var in the first place. It is also worth running a key leak drill once, because the thing most teams discover mid-incident is that nobody can list which contracts a given key still controls.

8 years of auditing smart contracts. Thousands of findings. And the same pattern every time: the code was done, the audit was next, the launch was waiting. We built something that reviews the code while it's still being written. First look at QuillShield. The most powerful AI security reviewer for onchain code we've ever built. It reviews every pull request with the full context of your protocol, starting from a complete audit of it. Opening a small beta. DM for access.

On the DSS 2026 agenda: @cryptanu of QuillAudits. “Damn Vulnerable Daml” Explore the talk, then add it to My agenda: defisecuritysummit.org/2026/… Join us in Mumbai: luma.com/9qtxqqxx

With Devcon coming up and attackers actively looking for opportunities through social engineering, it is important to have a security checklist before you travel, while you are there and after you come back. Here is what I would keep in mind:

Another audit wrapped at @QuillAudits_AI . 10 findings: 1 Critical, 5 Medium, 4 Low.