Our auditor @cryptanu is taking the stage at @summit_defi in Mumbai! Damn Vulnerable Daml: live CTF-style challenges built from real bugs he found on the Canton network while reviewing Daml code. Inspired by Ethernaut and Damn Vulnerable DeFi. 1st Nov, 02:30PM IST, Amber room Save it to your agenda: defisecuritysummit.org/2026/… See you there. 🛡️

If your deployer key was sitting in a Railway variable, who owns your contracts right now? Possibly the attacker. Railway was breached today. Their disclosure says an unauthorised party may have accessed customer environment variables and decrypted some of them. Railway thinks the target was AI inference keys. On-chain trackers say a sweeper script went through the same dump and hit 200+ addresses across 19+ EVM chains, around $371k as of Oct 21 evening UTC. Here is the part the “rotate your keys” advice skips. An API key has an issuer. You revoke it with OpenAI or Stripe or your database provider and get a new one. A private key has no issuer, so there is nothing to rotate. Once it has been read, that address is gone, and the balance in it is usually the least of what it controls. The same key is the owner, upgrader or minter on whatever contracts you pointed it at, and that is what the attacker can use next. So if you ran a bot, relayer, keeper, indexer or backend on Railway with a signing key in its variables, do these 5 things first, from a clean machine with a new key. None of them touch Railway, so you don’t have to wait for deploys to come back. 1. Treat every address whose private key or seed phrase was in a Railway variable as controlled by the attacker. Move what’s left and retire it. One key is the same address on every EVM chain, so check all of them, not just mainnet. The sweeper already did. 2. Find every contract where that address holds a role. Owner, admin, proxy upgrader, minter, pauser, oracle updater, guardian, relayer allowlist. Transfer each to a new address. Start with the deployer key, because in most codebases the account that deploys a contract becomes its default owner and nobody ever changes it. 3. If the key is a signer on a Safe or another multisig, replace it. Then check the threshold still makes sense without it. 4. Revoke token approvals. The ones that address granted, and the ones other addresses granted to it. 5. Set monitoring on the old addresses and on the attacker address in the first reply. A role the attacker hasn’t used yet can still be used. Then rotate the normal secrets. RPC keys, database passwords, registry credentials, AI API keys. Do it with the provider that issued them, because changing the value inside Railway does nothing to the old one. And go through services you stopped months ago. One engineering lead on X traced a stolen AWS key to a Railway service that had been idle since July. A stopped service keeps its variables. None of this is unusual practice, which is the uncomfortable part. At least one template on Railway’s own deploy page asks you to paste a 0x-prefixed wallet private key straight into a variable. Longer term, three things. A hot key on someone else’s platform holds a few hours of float and no admin roles at all. Admin roles sit behind a multisig with a timelock. If you can, sign through a KMS or HSM so the raw key is never in an env var in the first place. It is also worth running a key leak drill once, because the thing most teams discover mid-incident is that nobody can list which contracts a given key still controls.

We’re starting Quill Findings 🥷 Detailed write-ups of real issues from client audits. What we caught, why it mattered, and what the fix was. First one: Eligibility Replay in Tokenized Assets. A gold-backed vault where the bar left and the custody certificate did not. That leftover NFT minted a second claim. Full breakdown below 👇

Getting licensed in Dubai is the easy part. VARA doesn't shut down the projects that get hacked, it shuts down the ones that can't prove they were protected. The 7 things that have to be in place before you go live👇

RWA security is not an ERC-20 review with extra steps. $38B already live. $355B represented. Almost all of it sits on three standards: 3643: identity + freeze/force 4626: share price + rounding 7518: partitions + lock math This is the attack surface. Checklists in the thread 👇

🚨 @term_labs was hacked for 8.5M in a governance exploit. The attacker didn't break governance. He was the governance. Across 7 USDC vault proposals attacker held 100% of the voting power, and drained 5 of those vaults. In the ETH Meta Vault attacker was the majority holder. 2,841.74 WETH and 1,679,639 USDC were drained across six vaults total, the USDC later swapped to DAI. Attacker EOAs etherscan.io/address/0xD5183… etherscan.io/address/0x68645… etherscan.io/address/0xa908b… Example Attack tx etherscan.io/tx/0x284fc544f3… etherscan.io/tx/0xca084d9489…

Audit Notes: Canton - Ep. 1 Canton Network has no bugs: Myth. DAML removes reentrancy, front-running, and delegatecall risks by design. What it can't remove: authorization gaps and business-logic flaws. The risks don't vanish on Canton. They shift. Anu (@cryptanu) explains in 50 seconds 👇

Before you read our H1 2026 DeFi Security Report, here is our own H1 2026 track record. • 50+ protocols audited • 375 vulnerabilities identified • 0 exploits across any QuillAudits-audited project • 36,000+ NSLOC reviewed across 25+ chains • 20+ protocol categories covered • Full lifecycle coverage: Design, Detect, Validate, Secure Ops, Monitor Secure Operations (OPSec) remains our core focus, and this report's own data explains why: 82.7% of H1 2026's losses came from key and trust failures, not code bugs. Full report 🧵👇