
Threat Researcher @proofpoint | @Cryptolaemus1
Joined May 2010
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Btw @Malwarehunterr found their staging template a while ago, this is used to stage the clickfix used in all their various campaigns, these Amazon ones, Fortnite , LinkedIn etc. and @500mk500 was correct in attrib
xitter.cf/Malwarehunterr/status/…
Fortnite: anvildevelopment.us/fortchec…
🚨 Fake Google Merchant Center pages are being used with ClickFix-style fake Cloudflare verification.
The ClickFix JS is supposed to dynamically fetch a command and copy it to the clipboard, followed by Win+R -> Ctrl+V -> Enter.
Interestingly, these sites expose the literal {{WINR}} placeholder, suggesting the ClickFix template/infrastructure is misconfigured and the server-side value isn't being substituted. The actual malicious command is therefore not present in the page source.
I found 30 similar URLs, with 100s of such sites appearing to be live right now.
IOCs:
hxxps://recipebistro[.]com/
hxxps://www[.]kitchensecretbook[.]com/
hxxps://yummyhomebase[.]com/
hxxps://ultimategrillhub[.]com/
hxxps://yumrecipebox[.]com/
hxxps://mastergrillrecipes[.]com/
hxxps://perfectpitmaster[.]com/
hxxps://progrillguide[.]com/
hxxps://mastergrillhub[.]com/
hxxps://grillchefsecrets[.]com/
hxxps://pitmasterrecipes[.]com/
hxxps://mastermyrecipe[.]com/
hxxps://thegrillbible[.]com/
hxxps://searedrecipes[.]com/
hxxps://perfectgrillguide[.]com/
hxxps://www[.]mastergrillrecipes[.]com/
hxxp://freshmenuideas[.]com/
hxxps://grillrecipespro[.]com/
hxxps://dailychefrecipe[.]com/
hxxps://www[.]grillchefsecrets[.]com/
hxxps://www[.]ultimategrillhub[.]com/
hxxps://homehearthcooks[.]com/
hxxps://quickkitchendishes[.]com/
hxxps://www[.]ovenwisdom[.]com/
hxxps://grillmastersrecipes[.]com/
hxxps://www[.]chefstablehub[.]com/
hxxps://www[.]searedrecipes[.]com/
hxxps://grillgastronomy[.]com/
hxxps://grillprocraft[.]com/
hxxps://simplegastronomy[.]com/
#ClickFix #Malware #ThreatIntel @malwrhunterteam @500mk500 @skocherhan @_ChezDaniela @KirkDerpca @urlyzeio @James_inthe_box @AndrewPetrus @muha2xmad
Replying to @malwrhunterteam
It must be the same HoK ransomware operators you keep finding there, check this out related to the last one:
blog.deception.pro/blog/kong…
cc @malbeacon
Tommy M (TheAnalyst) retweeted
2/ The Node.js BYOR package here is custom-tailored specifically for NightshadeC2. The decrypted 19.3 MB Rust binary literally hardcodes C:\ProgramData\NodeView\node.exe, index.js, dsc.dat, and WU_PPID into its own watchdog supervisor (src/watcher.rs).
cc @YungBinary
Tommy M (TheAnalyst) retweeted
1/ I'm sorry, but no. If we must use names: Your first MSI is CastleLoader, which ends with it loading CastleBot from /v6. You then likely got two download-and-execute tasks from the C2: NetSupport and NightshadeC2. There is zero Lumma and zero process hollowing here.
2/ The Node.js BYOR package here is custom-tailored specifically for NightshadeC2. The decrypted 19.3 MB Rust binary literally hardcodes C:\ProgramData\NodeView\node.exe, index.js, dsc.dat, and WU_PPID into its own watchdog supervisor (src/watcher.rs).
cc @YungBinary
1/ I'm sorry, but no. If we must use names: Your first MSI is CastleLoader, which ends with it loading CastleBot from /v6. You then likely got two download-and-execute tasks from the C2: NetSupport and NightshadeC2. There is zero Lumma and zero process hollowing here.
Replying to @HuntressLabs
Before this causes too much confusion it's "CastleLoader", and final payload doesn't have anything to do with Lumma. @LawrenceAbrams @BleepinComputer wrote about the campaign a year ago bleepingcomputer.com/news/se… and it hasn't changed much since then.
Replying to @vxunderground @malwrhunterteam
Best part is that it has been around on the compromised sites since July 🤷
xitter.cf/ffforward/status/21122…
Replying to @ffforward @malwrhunterteam
3196034ef1196c9151395859019674e14e3c06e3fdbf230c7e0d0c5f6211824a seen on various websites since end of July:
urlscan.io/search/#hash%3A31…
Replying to @ffforward @malwrhunterteam
3196034ef1196c9151395859019674e14e3c06e3fdbf230c7e0d0c5f6211824a seen on various websites since end of July:
urlscan.io/search/#hash%3A31…
Replying to @malwrhunterteam
You guys have done a lot already and IDed it, but for completeness:
This is a variant of "Device Manager Agent" (which in it's turn is just a throwaway name). C2 over DNS tunneling on 158[.]94[.211[.]185. Likely ClickFix affil and used for automated task deployment. Belongs to a cluster where both me and @k3yp0d takes issues with attribution 😅
Replying to @malwrhunterteam
Looked at this one a bit last week
Found some IOCs here too: github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools…
Something's off, second set of domains (but same actor) is used against RU and BY. Also odd w. english panel imo. (won't link, unprotected and has live IP but easy to figure out). Moving to EtherHiding for the injects too.
Replying to @UK_Daniel_Card
DS them self are soft-routing to 4.1-Flash even if you select Pro because they think it's superior. But I wonder if it isn't better to have both Qwen3.8-Flash-Next and GLM-5.3-Flash working together if you have access to run models of that size?
Replying to @cyb3rops
Getting these kind of refusals from 3.7, worked when stepping back to 3.6
No, #Trickbot is NOT back. What Fortinet forgot to mention is that the samples they analyzed are known Anchor DNS from 2020. I'm not even kidding.
Better read from back then: netscout.com/blog/asert/drop…
🚨 TrickBot is back with a stealthier command and control method.
The new variant replaces traditional HTTP communications with DNS tunneling, making malicious traffic harder to detect on Windows.
Listen/Read: hackread.com/new-trickbot-va…
#CyberSecurity #Malware #TrickBot #Windows
Replying to @malwrhunterteam
Always fun to ask Gemini about the SPA JS on these 😅
ErrTraffic C2 cdnpro-987[.]xyz
PS Payload domain cdnportal-us[.]xyz (dynamic PowerShell command and URI path)
PowerShell downloads a 16MB encrypted 7z file, > EXE. The EXE will do profiling (including refresh rate) > #NetSupportRAT and run it.
NetSupport C2 178[.]16[.]55[.]191.
So for those interested, the "scam" was an #ErrTraffic affil that got their inject on the site. It served NetSupport RAT to Win users and another (possibly broken) payload to mac users. If you did follow any of the fake #ClickFix captcha your computer might be infected. >
We identified and resolved a security incident on our site earlier today. A compromised account was exploited to inject a malicious script, briefly exposing users to scam content. The site was taken offline immediately, the script removed, and the account secured.
We're back up. If you notice anything unusual, reach out.
Replying to @DarkandDarkerWA @vxunderground
Yeah, the command you get is dynamically built so the full URI and filename it will be saved as will differ over time. The zip is encrypted and contains an exe in this case. That EXE will profile the machine and if passed, it will drop and run NetSupprt.

























