Charl Botha retweeted
Adding some more detail here...you're absolutely right that procedural knowledge is vitally important to AI systems 'replicating' human investors
Nobody has ever written it down because it's all learned by experience and codifying unconscious process is HARD to do manually
But there's a real meta point here I'd like to make about 'decision ledgers'
I'm not talking about your trade logbook or anything like that, I'm taking about every single micro decision you make on a daily basis as an investor
'I saw this on the cf statement, so I went and check this for this reason, and it was high/low so I checked this'
No firm in the world has a record of that journey, probably not even a single firm in the world that has one of those full journeys recorded.
I've spoken to so many firms that go 'we have 20 years of investment notes and mgmt meeting notes, what an amazing dataset'...
Those notes are final form, or near final form. They don't capture thousands of smaller decisions you made along the way.
'This product is good for X reason'
'Don't think this competitor matters'
'This competing technology is probably 10 years away'
All of which is super important to understanding how you reached the investment decision.
I think encoding human knowledge and know-how is only the first step in building Ai systems for fundamental investing (but a story for another post...)
Decision records/journals are quite exciting for fundamental investors for 3 reasons:
1. They build themselves - as people use agents as copilots, much more of the investigation can be recorded as it happens; the questions, avenues explored or dismissed and reasons why etc. Computer use/session recording could cover anything not done with a coding agent too.
2. You can actually review how you think - over time, you have something to postmortem (albeit careful of sample size). Which assumptions do you repeatedly get wrong? Which risks do you overestimate? Why?
3. You can assess the ideas you never invested in - traditional portfolio analytics and attribution focused on the invested companies. What happens when you can also assess the ideas you turned away, why you rejected them and how they subsequently did. What can you learn from that?
This gets you much closer to assessing the whole process...
MUCH more useful than another review of the portfolio which inevitably ends with 'you don't hold your winners long enough or cut your losers early enough'
Replying to @uncovered_alpha
Very cool insights: Agree 100%. One thing I would add is this: many/most investment professionals (perhaps as a result of learning efficient market theory or some such) may think that there is too much information - but I think this is false in a crucial sense...yes, we have never had more information available to us - and yes, the market is extremely good at processing that information...but in another sense it is false: there is one kind of information that we have very little of in the market (or very little available to most people)...and that is procedural knowledge...knowledge of 'how-to', rather than propositional or representational knowledge (graphs, pictures, data, theory etc.)...So what is procedural knowledge and why could it be a crucial missing ingredient? Procedural is the difference between knowing how to hit a forehand and being able to describe it or draw a picture of it...it is the difference between running a company and learning the theory of how to run a company...it is tacit...
A picture may be worth a thousand words - and there is a good reason why there is this saying (related to information theory for those who are interested) and its implication - that a thousand and one words many be worth more than a picture....the challenge and opportunity of tacit/how-to/procedural knowledge is that it is difficult to - or seems incredibly hard to - turn into a recipe or a picture...not impossible (as humans do it, and we are "computers"), but it seems that whereas a picture may require a 1000 words, know-HOW - would require a thousand pictures or a million words....
In short (lol, I see the reply turned out much longer than I initially planned!): (So, in long): I think we have way too little of this procedural knowledge available to AI's at the moment (they are trained on propositional and representational knowledge - and tangentially by procedural knowledge as fragments of our know-how seep through into our language and representations)...To gain more procedural knowledge, and hence the possibility to map human nature and behaviour much better - would require AI's to gain access to procedural knowledge in a far more effective way (how? AI's need more - and different kinds of sensors: just like a blind person won't know what red is because they sadly lack the right sensors for that kind of knowledge, AI's largely lack the kind of sensors that can "see" procedures to the extent required for their analytical and synthetic powers to create mastery...somehow, they need to see/feel/experience us acting, this final step would be a fantastic learning experience for them...one that they currently only "see" through the metaphorical and pictorial traces we make available to them through the Internet/etc.
Charl Botha retweeted
I agree with the argument that investment judgement is largely learned.
What we call experience is an accumulation of mental models, pattern recognition, causal understanding and feedback from previous decisions.
An experienced investor has seen businesses succeed and fail, navigated different economic environments and developed an intuition for which pieces of information matter.
There is no obvious reason why machines couldn’t learn many of these things. In fact, they have some considerable advantages.
An investor might experience three recessions in their career. An AI system could study hundreds of historical episodes across thousands of companies, identify recurring mechanisms and test whether those relationships hold elsewhere.
But I think there’s an important distinction we can add to this debate.
Learning patterns is not necessarily the same as understanding the underlying mechanisms.
Financial markets are particularly difficult environments for machine learning.
Relationships are constantly changing. Feedback is noisy and delayed. Historical correlations break down. And the behaviour of market participants changes in response to the very signals they are trying to exploit.
A machine might learn that declining restaurant traffic tends to precede earnings downgrades.
But understanding whether that decline reflects temporary weather disruption, structural brand deterioration, competitive displacement or a deliberate pricing strategy requires something more than pattern recognition.
The initial evidence might look remarkably similar. The eventual investment outcomes could be entirely different.
This is where causal reasoning, competing hypotheses and an understanding of how businesses actually operate become so important.
The real opportunity is therefore not just to build AI that learns from historical investment outcomes, but AI that develops and continually challenges its own understanding of the world.
Imagine a system that connects company filings, alternative data, industry dynamics, management commentary, historical precedents and market expectations into an interconnected body of knowledge.
It develops hypotheses, identifies relationships, investigates anomalies and builds competing explanations for what is happening.
It makes forecasts, tracks the outcomes and examines where its reasoning was wrong.
Importantly, it doesn’t simply adjust a forecast when it misses. It investigates whether the underlying mental model was flawed, whether the evidence was misleading or whether the world itself has changed.
Over time, it develops a more sophisticated understanding of businesses, industries and the relationships between them.
This is fundamentally different from automating the existing research process.
There is another challenge, however: investment outcomes are not clean feedback signals.
A good decision can lose money. A poor decision can make money. A forecast can be wrong for entirely legitimate reasons in a probabilistic world.
The system must therefore learn to distinguish between errors in reasoning, errors in forecasting and the randomness inherent in the outcome.
Otherwise, it risks optimising for historical patterns that have little predictive value.
And this leads to what I think will ultimately define investment edge.
Human investment methodologies evolved around human limitations.
We have limited attention, memory and processing capacity. We cannot investigate every company, connect every dataset or test every possible explanation.
Our research processes, organisational structures and investment frameworks have all evolved around those constraints.
AI changes that equation.
The question is no longer just whether AI can learn to invest like us. It’s whether we can build systems that learn how to invest in ways we haven’t yet imagined.
Charl Botha retweeted
I think there’s a fundamental assumption here worth challenging: why should machine judgment resemble human judgment in the first place?
Human intuition is, in many respects, an evolutionary workaround for severe cognitive constraints. Limited working memory, finite attention, emotional attachment, confirmation bias and an inability to consistently reason probabilistically.
We seem to assume that the pinnacle of investment decision-making is the judgment of an exceptional human investor. But why should that be the ceiling?
A sufficiently capable AI could simultaneously evaluate thousands of competing hypotheses, continuously update probabilistic beliefs, identify causal relationships and dynamically allocate attention toward information with the highest expected value.
Crucially, it need not inherit the same cognitive limitations that make human judgment so fallible. Of course, machines can develop their own biases, but those need not resemble ours.
And today’s hedge funds are hardly a definitive test of machine intelligence. Most still use sophisticated technology within fundamentally human-designed investment frameworks.
Perhaps we’re asking the wrong question.
Instead of asking whether AI can replicate the intuition of a brilliant portfolio manager, we should ask whether that intuition is simply a computational shortcut developed by an intelligence with severely limited processing capacity.
The real opportunity isn’t to automate human judgment. It’s to discover forms of judgment that human cognition could never achieve.
Think about how sophisticated today’s hedge funds have become.
Billions of dollars under management.
PhDs in mathematics, physics and computer science.
Massive data science teams.
Thousands of data feeds.
Alternative data.
Satellite imagery.
Machine learning.
Artificial intelligence.
High-frequency trading.
Thousands of GPUs.
Complex risk-management systems.
They can monitor markets, companies, supply chains and investor behavior at a level that was almost unimaginable 20 years ago.
And yet, some of the most sophisticated investment organizations in the world just suffered enormous losses.
That should make everyone stop and think.
If this level of technology, data and intellectual firepower isn’t enough to consistently produce good investment decisions, what exactly are we building?
The next generation will have even more data, faster computers, more powerful AI agents and increasingly complex models.
But will they have better judgment?
Or will we simply create bigger, faster and more sophisticated versions of the same mistakes?
The future of investing may not belong to whoever has the most data or the most computing power. It may belong to whoever knows what information to ignore.
Technology can process information.
It cannot guarantee wisdom.
Charl Botha retweeted
This is a fascinating observation @futurewealthP, and I think you’ve identified perhaps the most important challenge in what I’m envisioning.
Connecting thousands of businesses, economic variables, hypotheses and potential causal relationships creates a search space that becomes computationally intractable remarkably quickly.
But I think your point about intuition is particularly interesting.
Perhaps much of what we call human judgement is actually a highly developed mechanism for allocating attention under conditions of extreme uncertainty.
We don’t consciously investigate every possible explanation for an observed outcome. Our intuition directs us towards a small subset of possibilities that seem worth exploring.
In other words, human intelligence doesn’t solve the combinatorial explosion problem through exhaustive reasoning. It solves it, imperfectly, through selective attention.
And perhaps that’s precisely the next frontier for autonomous research systems.
Imagine an interconnected investment knowledge graph where the system doesn’t attempt to investigate every conceivable relationship, but instead continuously estimates where additional research is most likely to improve its understanding or change an investment decision.
It could prioritise hypotheses according to their expected information value, economic materiality, uncertainty, existing evidence and computational cost.
But here’s the part I find particularly exciting.
What if the system could learn not only from the outcomes of its predictions, but from the success or failure of its decisions about where to investigate in the first place?
Then you’re no longer simply building a system that discovers relationships.
You’re building one that learns how to discover relationships more efficiently.
Its research process becomes endogenous and adaptive. An unexpected observation in one industry could trigger an investigation elsewhere, not because someone explicitly programmed that relationship, but because the system has learned that certain patterns of evidence warrant further attention.
Of course, this doesn’t eliminate the search-space problem. It introduces another difficult problem: how to distinguish genuinely promising research directions from attractive but ultimately spurious patterns.
That requires careful treatment of uncertainty, exploration versus exploitation, and the cost of pursuing the wrong hypotheses.
But it does suggest a very different architecture from simply deploying increasingly powerful agents against existing research workflows.
And I think your final philosophical observation is equally important.
If we eventually develop systems that are superior at determining how to achieve a particular objective, then deciding which objectives are worth pursuing becomes increasingly consequential.
In investing, we often treat maximising risk-adjusted returns as an obvious objective. But even that conceals questions about acceptable risk, time horizons, liquidity, externalities and what we’re ultimately trying to achieve with capital.
Optimisation is not the same thing as choosing what is worth optimising.
Perhaps the really interesting transition isn’t simply from human judgement to machine judgement, but from humans being primarily responsible for finding answers towards being increasingly responsible for deciding which questions and outcomes are worth pursuing.
I suspect we’re only beginning to appreciate the implications of that distinction.
Replying to @uncovered_alpha
Very cool tweet @uncovered_alpha - the most serious obstacle I see is combinatorial explosion: even for a super super super computer, the search space will be too large to search without some sort of choosing-where-to-search
Incidentally, this is what I think humans do with our “feelings” or “intuitions”)…these are our indicators of where to jump into the unfathomably large possibility space…This is all - or most - of what I think human judgement is - where to focus attention in the search space and our emotional/valence/hedonic reactions are the pointers or metal detectors if you will of this…what would this look like in AI…I think we are already seeing it…
Im no expert, but once AI agents approach models where they can have a model of where to direct their attention- and learn how to do so based on their vastly superior working memory and analytical resources, its game over for human judgment in terms of making “better”’decisions in arena’s where we aim for the same goal (better risk adjusted investment returns for example)…the most important is that we remain the masters of choosing values - that they are OUR values…
I think society is entering a phase where what used to be rarefied philosophical questions (what is valuable, what is meaning, what is good, etc)…will be much more important for many to work through, for many have built their identity and lives on their differential intellectual or analytical ability…we are entering the age of values and qualities imo (in short: in the trinity of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, Beauty and Goodness is about to get a much needed positive re-valuation)….
Charl Botha retweeted
Couldn’t agree more. It strikes me that most AI adoption in finance has focused on automating or accelerating existing workflows, rather than questioning whether those workflows are optimal in the first place.
As an analyst, I understand the appeal of getting to an answer faster. But surely the more interesting question is whether AI can help us arrive at fundamentally better answers?
I’ve always been fascinated by the idea of an interconnected investment brain. Something akin to Obsidian, but purpose-built for investing, where companies, industries, themes, mental models, investment hypotheses and evidence exist within a continuously evolving knowledge graph.
I’ve actually started experimenting with a prototype of this concept, which I’m calling Labyrinth.
Imagine discovering something material about one business and being able to trace its implications across an entire network of companies, assumptions and investment theses. Rather than research existing in isolated notes, PDFs and spreadsheets, knowledge becomes interconnected, cumulative and increasingly useful.
Now combine that with probabilistic modelling.
Instead of a financial model producing a single target price based on point estimates, imagine one that represents a distribution of possible outcomes, understands the dependencies between assumptions and updates those probabilities as new evidence emerges.
The analyst’s role shifts from manually maintaining models and processing information towards challenging assumptions, evaluating evidence and exercising judgement.
I suspect Excel will eventually become less central to the investment process, replaced by something more dynamic, interconnected and probabilistic.
Perhaps the biggest opportunity for AI in investing isn’t helping us do the same work faster.
It’s fundamentally changing how we think, connect information and make decisions under uncertainty.
This is so bang on, a lot of investing involves far too much false precision, and it's because it simplifies it for human understanding...this is why I'm excited about AI's use in investing
when you think from first principles, it seems crazy to be putting a precise number on something we know is uncertain...
analysts assign target prices, estimate “fair value” and forecast cash flows five years into the future. The model gives us an answer like $47.83.
but take a step back and think about what went into that number
we don’t know exactly how quickly revenue will grow. we don’t know what margins will be, how much the company will need to reinvest, or what return investors will demand in five years. Every assumption has a range of possible outcomes.
We choose one number for each, run the calculation, and end up with an answer that looks way more certain than anything we put into it.
We all know that investing is about gaining confidence that the probabilistic range of outcomes has a favourable skew
This is why I’m so excited about compute changing how we do this work.
Modelling is part of the problem, it's unfathomable for each cell in excel to have a probabilistic range of outcomes and for you to update those probabilities constantly as information emerges
But AI and newly written software will genuinely make this possible, not to mention the most advanced systems being able to ingest information and update those weights
of course, judgement still exists about the assumptions and their likelihood but I'm really excited to see how this evolves
Charl Botha retweeted
It's a good week to be a centre-left kinda dude.
I believe that billionaires should be allowed to exist. Extreme talent and risk-taking should be rewarded.
I also believe that ordinary people with ordinary talents should be able to live a good life if they do honest work. It's completely absurd that people can't afford to have children, or to have basic healthcare.
These concepts aren't mutually exclusive unless you have idiots in power from either the far left or the far right.
Charl Botha retweeted
Does South Africa have too many malls? moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-opin…
Charl Botha retweeted
Replying to @blaiseaguera @bigthink
Very cool talk/article @blaiseaguera👌Do you think consciousnes might depend on the substrate performing (certain) sorts of calculations at a certain min speed, so that a rock creature wouldn’t be conscious because its speed of “life” would be too low? Closely related, do you think consciousness happens at a certain “framerate” no matter the speed of the substrate if it reaches a certain min speed for consciousness to arise? I find in my own case that anxiety seems to increase the speed of my thoughts - and the urgency of the feel of my consciousness - but there still seems to be a background speed of feeling - the arena within which the events of consciousness happens or the objects change that is constant - or at least slower (and it happens when I realise that I am feeling anxious - that my thoughts are racing, but THAT thought-feeling is not itself “racing”.
Charl Botha retweeted
I sat down with @bigthink to explore self-constructing computation, what defines a mind, why AI is humankind’s new symbiont, and how we can thrive together.
Watch the full conversation: bigthink.com/series/full-int…
Charl Botha retweeted
There is a Hong Kong-based microcap multi-brand restaurant operator that compounds owner earnings at high teens (reinvesting half of annual cash flows at 40% ROI on new stores), pays a dividend yielding close to 10% and retains a fortress of unencumbered cash making up over a third of its market cap.
However, a material mismatch exists between the actual owner earnings the business generates and the accounting profits the company reports.
The discrepancy is due to something seemingly innocuous – despite adhering to the technical accounting standards, the annual depreciation/amortisation charge is materially inflated. Amortising the fixed fit-out costs, kitchen equipment and dining furniture (all one-off sunk costs of new store openings) over an arbitrary fixed period creates a material incongruence with the actual annual cash spent on periodic store refurbishments and the ongoing capital upkeep of its restaurant footprint.
The effect is that a company that is purportedly valued at 7x accounting EPS actually trades at 4x NTM owner earnings – a valuation dislocation of over 50%!
In security analysis, technical accounting expertise is one of the few remaining analytical edges in an investor’s arsenal. It is striking how often reported numbers obscure or distort the true commercial picture of a company. IFRS, US GAAP and other accounting frameworks aim to improve the quality of financial reporting, yet perversely they often have the opposite effect.
This case also highlights the deficiencies of quantitative screening as an idea generation tool, given its reliance on reported financial accounting data. To give yourself the best chance of uncovering hidden gems, you have to get into the nitty gritty – an exercise few are willing to do.
Charl Botha retweeted
What a month. Depending on who you ask, I did something brave or borderline crazy: I launched a global deep value fund. And what a time to do it. That said, is there ever a good time to launch a deep value fund?
I’ve come a long way from my anonymous Deep Value Situations account days, tweeting about obscure setups behind a 90-year-old Walter Schloss avatar. Starting the account was probably the smartest thing I’ve ever done. I will forever be indebted to the FinTwit community – it opened more doors than I could have imagined and put me in touch with brilliant investors all over the world. It’s how I met Jan van Niekerk and Piet Viljoen, who gave me a shot to become a professional investor and sharpen my deep value DNA. Now, with RECM as my partners, I’ve launched the Maxia Value Fund – a Mauritius-domiciled “Expert” fund.
Over time, I will share more details about my journey, investment philosophy and the fund.
In a nutshell, I am running a highly concentrated portfolio of deep value situations that are more of the 70s Buffett persuasion than those of post-Depression Graham. The fund structure is quite simple. Despite full flexibility and an unconstrained mandate, my approach does not rely on leverage, shorting stocks, exotic derivative speculation, macro bets or chasing faddish themes and momentum.
Almost invariably, portfolio candidates are:
- Undiscovered and out-of-vogue businesses operating in boring industries.
- Industry leaders in emerging and frontier markets.
- Almost exclusively small or microcaps that often have no sell-side coverage.
- Collateral damage in a regional orindustry-wide crisis. When headlines scream “uninvestable” I really get to work.
Maxia is a small and nimble investment outfit – operationally very much like the original investment partnership setups of a young Buffett and Walter Schloss. With a one-man investment committee, I am a lone wolf and relish the ostensibly tedious work of combing through entire stock exchanges, A to Z – reading the filings and annual reports of businesses most investors have never heard of.
Virtually all of my net worth is invested alongside fellow investors. These are humble beginnings; however, I have no intention of becoming yet another institutional-like asset gatherer. I am also selective aboutwho I partner with – the right partners share my investment philosophy and think in years, not quarters.
More information and important disclaimers regarding Maxia Capital Management and the Maxia Value Fund are available on the website (link in bio). Fund information is restricted to expert and sophisticated investors as defined under Mauritian securities regulations and, in South Africa, to qualified investors.
I live a lowkey private life. I rarely get bored. Like ever. A quiet room, a book, some music, a long walk, my own thoughts. That’s all I need. That’s all I want. What exhausts me is "performance". Small talk. Noise. Drama. Conversations with no depth. Having to act what I'm not. That shit drains my soul. So I disappear for a while. Just to breathe again. To hear my own thoughts. To feel my own emotions. To reconnect with myself. And honestly, it feels like therapy for the soul.
Charl Botha retweeted
Replying to @evfcfaddict
Despite being up 45%, Argent it's trading at a P/E of 7,5, ex cash P/E of <6 and a FCF-yield around 15%. I might be biased, but I think it has a bit more to give from here (but who knows). It certainly has growth and stability.
Charl Botha retweeted
Replying to @carelnolte @CharlesHSavage
You should expand to a small/mid cap conference.
Charl Botha retweeted
Replying to @VendaVendor
You are very right. We buy too much house & too much car for our needs. People feel they need to signal status with luxury cars, houses & clothing brands … that’s where trouble starts
Charl Botha retweeted
Someone was able to share the author's handle. Great writing, @ssmumbai
Charl Botha retweeted
This is my largest holding. Despite this track record, it trades at just 6.7x P/E TTM and 3.1x EV/EBITDA TTM, with roughly one-third of its market cap in cash. I may be biased, but I believe there is a real mispricing here.


























