Water: Iran Limits the West’s Old Practices In 2017, during the first Trump administration, the US attacked a major dam in Syria. Shortly afterward, they denied it, claiming the reports were crazy, but subsequent investigations confirmed that the Tabqa Dam was attacked by American forces. A secret US Special Operations unit called Task Force 9 struck the dam with some of the largest conventional bombs in the American arsenal, including at least one BLU-109 bunker-buster bomb. The clear objective was to create a catastrophe in that region of the country. But that’s not all. In the First Gulf War, bombings destroyed most of Iraq’s desalination plants and water purification centers. In Libya, NATO bombed a water pipe factory in Brega, claiming that the site was being used as a military depot by Gaddafi’s regime. The destruction compromised the drinking water supply for millions of civilians. This time, after the bombing of the Iranian desalination plant on Qeshm Island, Iran responded by striking one in Bahrain. No one talks about attacking water anymore. Both the Americans and the Gulf countries know that Iran is crazy enough to respond in kind. This is the difference in this war. Iran seems to be teaching some American military leaders their old practices back by imposing limits, and this irritates a lot of people, while another part of the American population simply doesn’t follow the news closely. A large part of the American black book doesn’t work in Iran because they are just as crazy as some American military leaders, and the retaliations can be disproportionate.

Iran Upgrades to Dual Launchers – Entering a New Strike Phase Iran has started using dual launchers for medium-range missiles such as the Kheibar Shekan - 1,400km range. This may indicate that Iran is entering a new stage. Several models of short-range missiles with ranges of up to 700 km are already operating on dual launchers. According to my calculations so far, Iran still possesses thousands of these short range missiles, which target American bases and the infrastructure of Gulf countries.

Iranian Fattah-1 Activates Second Motor and Defeats 12 Interceptors In this video, we can clearly see the missile activating its secondary solid-fuel motor. The Fattah-1 is a classic ballistic missile up to a certain point. It climbs into space on a high parabolic trajectory and re-enters the atmosphere at a steep angle. Up to that stage, it behaves like a conventional missile. The real difference lies in the activation of the re-entry motor and the movable nozzle, which allow it to make sharp corrections, zig-zag maneuvers in the terminal phase, or simply deliver a sudden burst of speed. Without this motor, a conventional warhead would lose more than 50% of its velocity when performing aggressive maneuvers due to atmospheric friction. The Fattah-1’s secondary motor is a small spherical solid-fuel engine, compact enough to fit inside the maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV). Theoretically, it can burn for more than 30 seconds, counteracting atmospheric deceleration and ensuring the warhead strikes at hypersonic speeds. However, from what the video shows, it appears it can be reconfigured for a short, powerful boost of just a few seconds, delivering intense speed in the final phase. The developers claim that in this last stage, the missile reaches speeds above Mach 13. Of course, there’s no such thing as a perfect system. This secondary motor reduces the payload of the warhead due to space constraints, but that loss can be partially compensated by the massive increase in kinetic impact energy.

Why Invading and Occupying Kharg Island Is a Stupid Idea Kharg Island isn’t a place you can just storm, plant a flag, and hold. It’s a tiny coral outcrop,  roughly 8 km long and 5–6 km wide, with a total area of only about 25 km², sitting just 25 km off the Iranian coast and 45-50 km from the Zagros Mountains. That extreme closeness turns it into a nightmare. Beneath the surface lies a vast network of reinforced tunnels dug 20-40 meters deep into coralline limestone. In hard granite, explosions send shockwaves far and wide, cracking everything. In porous limestone, though, the blast energy dissipates quickly by crushing the rock’s own pores around the impact point, protecting deeper fortifications. Satellite images from the last decade of naval base and terminal expansions show concrete plants and shipments of quartz and fine aggregates, clear signs of high-strength concrete being poured for these bunkers. The island is heavily mined, guarded by troops in underground positions, overlooked by mountain firing points, and surrounded by hundreds of Iranian missile-armed vessels. Iranian fragmentation warheads, like those on Shahed-131 and 136 drones, scatter 3,000 to 7,000 pre-formed tungsten fragments,  lethal against unarmored troops. Any garrison crammed onto such a small island would face wave after wave of missiles and drones every day. Survival would come at horrific cost. The Iranian defenders would remain safe inside tunnels with dozens of exits spread across the island. Hundreds of troops, many special forces who know every corner of the terrain, could hold out for days or weeks, launching ambushes like those seen in Gaza. Attacking troops would have almost no safe shelter. The only significant infrastructure is the oil refining and storage facilities, and Iranian tunnel exits and fortifications almost certainly reach into or near them. I can’t imagine special forces with limited or no supplies trading fire in the middle of fuel tanks and pipelines. That’s not combat, it’s insanity. There’s no secure supply route by sea, and the airspace would be fiercely contested, making air resupply extremely dangerous. Even if supplies got through, there’s nowhere safe to store or protect them outside the refining areas. Suppose a landing somehow succeeded by air. Beyond the hundreds of Iranian special forces in the tunnels, the threats would pile up fast: By sea
Iran has over 800 fast attack boats (Ashura, Seraj, and Ra’ad classes) fitted with 107mm rocket launchers in 12-tube pods. Just 80 of them could unleash 960 rockets in one salvo against the tiny island, many carrying Fajr-1 fragmentation warheads with an 8–12 km range. 
Some Zulfiqar-class boats carry two canisters for the Fath-360 ballistic missile (120 km range) loaded with cluster munitions and anti-personnel tungsten. At least 30-40 of these boats likely have that setup. 
Tondar-class boats with 23mm cannons could rake the island at night-Iran still operates around 10 of them.
Even with many larger warships damaged, Iran keeps at least 25 smaller, well-armed patrol vessels active. From the mainland
Iran can strike with at least five types of ballistic ranging 85-200 km. Systems like the Ababil and Fath-360 launch in pods of 6–8 missiles per salvo, often with anti-personnel cluster munitions and tungsten fragments. 
Heavy rockets such as the Zelzal-1 and Zelzal-2 with 150–200 km range, 600 kg warheads, have started receiving guidance kits, now with 50m CEP. By air
Iran operates more than 10 models of kamikaze and attack drones with modern day/night sensors. These can deliver repeated strikes, dropping bombs multiple times a day by models like the GAZA. A landing might be possible with massive air and naval superiority, but actually holding the island would be nearly impossible. In the best case, you’d destroy much of the oil infrastructure during the fight. In reality, it would likely turn into a massacre. Join my Substack: substack.com/@global21