The transition to a more self-reliant Asian security order that requires less of the U.S. is underway. For @nytopinion I argue that this is unavoidable. An over-extended U.S. that has squandered its military power cannot underwrite Asia's security anymore. It will have to pull back & the region itself will have to fill the gaps. It's good news that Asia is already adjusting to this reality.

Let’s be honest: At least the first two options are basically direct NATO Russia war.

Yes, that's intentional for people who think like me right? It's not a mistake or a bug but a feature of restraint. The baseline view is that the United States is secure & should only consider using force when existential interests are at risk.

I am glad to see @Carr12Brandon & @jyjamespark engage w/ my second island chain strategy proposal & offer their view. I'll briefly respond to their critiques here: 1. They argue that if the U.S. pulls back militarily, China will be able to use economic & political power to force Japan, ROK, & others to its side. However, countering China's economic and political influence is not a job U.S. military power can accomplish. To do this, the U.S. needs a coherent economic strategy. Look at Latin America where Chinese economic influence continues to increase even as the U.S. surges military power to the region. U.S. military power in Asia cannot counter Chinese economic hegemony. 2. They are concerned about the risks of nuclear proliferation to allies if the U.S. retrenches. As I note in the paper, this is possible. But I also see some proliferation as inevitable & the result of Trump administration policies, including the war with Iran. The U.S. nuclear umbrella already lacks credibility. My view is some proliferation can be managed & is better than continue U.S. overextension. 3. They argue that the United States essentially cannot defend the first island chain from the second. This is correct, but I don't suggest it should. I acknowledge there are a small set of contingencies where the United States might use force to protect core interests & these contingencies could be managed without a major first island chain presence. Moreover first island chain bases are not survivable or defensible, so what's the logic for keeping them & planning to fight from them? 4. They leave unaddressed several of the core drivers of my recommendations, including the unsustainability of the current strategy (cost wise & limits of military power) & the effect of any U.S. first island chain presence on the risk of war with China, which they seem to accept. The status quo simply doesn't work any more, so any recommendation for future U.S. policy has to address these underlying issues, even if the changes recommended aren't the ones I propose.

Yes, and that percentage is growing. Add to that 1. the growing body of empirical research that shows tripwires don't work 2. the fact that as U.S. commitments have expanded the credibility of extended deterrence has declined. Even w/U.S. forces "at risk", it is insanity to think a U.S. president would use nuclear weapons over the Baltic states.

Remember when the blockade was going to work and be over in 13 days?

“If not a veto” Since when is the U.S. in the habit of giving allies a veto over decisions that affect U.S. national interests? If policymakers decide it is in the best interests of the U.S. to reduce posture, they should do it, regardless of what allies want.

No evidence this deal is on the table.

So we took a strait that was open and turned it into a strait that requires permanent U.S. military presence to be sort of open at a higher cost. Is this a win?

Guess what? It’s not easy at all! Even the U.S. has struggled destroying missile launchers in Iran. Like all the other silver bullets offered, this won’t change the conflict trajectory.

It is great news when an ally says it's ready to be independent. The Trump administration should take this seriously.

Yep. "Civilizationism" is just "liberal international order" in a new suit & with a hair cut.