joe pieracci

(1/6) [ANALYSIS] Russian Armored Vehicle Fleet, 2022–2025. A Thread. Current data suggests that Russia’s armored vehicle fleet is larger today than at the onset of the war in 2022. Contrary to recurring claims that #Russia is running out of armored vehicles and therefore relying on infantry-led infiltration assaults, my analysis indicates that the fleet has actually grown by ~5% at the end of 2025. Drawing on an assessment of losses, reactivation rates, and new production, supported by Jompy (Many thanks for the insights) @Jonpy99’s OSINT work on Russian open-air storage sites and additional sources listed in my final post, I developed a projection model similar to the one used previously for Ukraine. According to the simulation (see Table 1), the 2025 fleet shows: - MBTs and IFVs: slight decline relative to pre-war volumes - APCs: sharp increase of 38% - Overall total: from a pre-war inventory of 19,900 vehicles to roughly 20,900 in 2025 Looking ahead, and assuming conservative production and reactivation levels in 2026, the fleet is projected to peak around 23,000 vehicles before gradually declining as Soviet-era storage stocks are depleted. Even so, the model suggests that totals should not fall below pre-war levels before 2030. By that time, refurbishment capacity will likely shift to additional new production, not matching today’s total output but sufficient to offset current loss rates. A second scenario, of course, is that the war ends and new production is redirected toward replenishing the most modern classes of equipment. Read it on substack: open.substack.com/pub/delwin… #Strategy #UkraineWar #Analysis