santy

Because of limited time, I could not do the full breakdown of the Beirut cocaine bust and the NACOC "controlled delivery" narrative. Here are the key issues that our research has established and possible measures the government should take to set minds at ease. 1. We have serious respect and sympathy for the work of security agencies like NACOC who operate under significant resource constraints. The work is not easy. And they certainly need some secrecy to do that hard work. 2. At the same time, compromised or incompetent security can cause citizens serious harm. So we need to balance circumspection with scrutiny. The only way to do that is through SERIOUS RESEARCH. 3. We have been painstakingly looking into the Beirut cocaine bust issue and the evidence gathered so far is worrisome. 4. A controlled delivery is not something done on the spur of the moment. If Ghana and Lebanon jointly executed a controlled delivery exercise, multiple security agencies on both sides would have had to be involved. 5. The right person to tell us emphatically that this was the case in this instance is the Interior Minister, who has interagency perspective and broad oversight. This goes beyond NACOC. 6. The laws in Ghana and Lebanon require multiple sign-offs before a controlled delivery can occur. A. The Director General of NACOC must sign. B. In Lebanon, the Public Prosecutor must authorise with the DG of Customs, and then the Counter-Narcotics Bureau (NACOC's counterpart there) of the ISF must supervise. 7. Because multiple agencies have interception, inspection, arrest, and various duties, rights, and involvements at both airports (Accra and Beirut), one cannot do a controlled delivery without top bosses at multiple agencies being aware and without ground commanders being in the loop. 8. Without such safeguards, an inadvertent inspection or interception during screening could derail the whole "controlled delivery" exercise. Or lead to a tip-off to the cartel, causing serious damage. 9. We have checked with some of the people who SHOULD BE IN THE KNOW and they deny foreknowledge of this operation. 10. We have also reviewed how Lebanon communicates about joint and controlled delivery operations with foreign agencies in multiple incidents and their standard approach differs from what happened in this case. 11. In 2014, NACOC lied about a similar joint operation and controlled delivery exercise. The UK denied their involvement. The NACOC (then NACOB) board was dissolved. In other instances where there was genuine collaboration (like Operation GRID), the UK openly acknowledged. 12. So, we have both good and bad precedents that should guide us as a country. 13. Most worryingly of all, we found out about a serious incident in late 2025 when a bigger haul of cocaine (70kg) from Ghana was folded into a coconut oil consignment and sent to Beirut. NAFDAC HAS NEVER PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THIS INCIDENT UNTIL TODAY. 14. We undertook our own investigations and built a dossier on a network of freight forwarders operating in Accra and Tema who have had similar brushes with the law and in each case somehow wiggle out and continue to ply their trade. 15. Only a proper INDEPENDENT inquiry can assure us that this situation is really under control. We shall submit our dossier regarding the cartel behind the 2025 cocaine smuggling episode once such an inquiry is in place and we have assurances from the highest authorities about the safety of our investigators.