#Opinion: Many gaps remain in the Chinese public’s knowledge of #India, and vice versa, leaving considerable scope for greater understanding through exchange. If we want our neighbor to understand us better, we must give its people opportunities to see the society as it really is. globaltimes.cn/page/202610/1…

Chinese power vis-à-vis US is constrained in ‘far’ theatres vis-à-vis ‘near’ theatres..it’s because China built there Power prioritising first Island Chain and Taiwan in particular as the first aim.. We have already seen that China can build Artificial Islands and bully militaries in South China Sea where US ‘responds’ by Freedom of Navigation Patrols..so China was forcing US to fight on ‘ground of its own choosing’ The US flipped the coin by testing Chinese power in far theatres..and attacked Chinese interests in Iran and now Venezuela.. What is the difference in US and Chinese Military Power.. I think there are 8 differences I can spot as of now.. 1-‘Reach’ meaning Global Military Bases 2- ‘Global Connectivity’ meaning a foolproof system parallel to ‘Starlink’ 3- ‘Sea Lift and Air Lift Capability’- meaning ability to quickly reach theatre of conflict- US has approximately 4 times higher Strategic Air Lift Capability. In sea lift China does have an edge in Amphibious Ships but it lacks Military Sea Lift capability when compared to US 4-‘Air and Sea Control’—For Force projection..and due to lack of bases..Air and Sea Control is essential..due to higher number of Aircraft Carriers and Fifth Generation Fighters plus their basing US has the ability to constrain Chinese move to distant Theatres 5-‘Alliances’ - Chinese do not have a stated military alliance..compared to US..which has multiple military alliances, forward basing, common equipping and training 6-‘Resources’ - Chinese are moving fast on renewables because chokehold on ‘Oil’ that US can exercise.. 7-‘Influence Operations’- China has excluded itself from Western Influence Zone by the Great Firewall..but arguably it still doesn’t have the global influence similar to US 8-‘Cyber & Electronic Warfare’ - Chinese arguably have near comparable strength

My latest in the @EconomicTimes out today.

I want to supplement a few points that were overlooked in the previous discussion. You’re entirely correct. Even though the PLA has continuously improved soldier compensation, when comparing a soldier’s pay to national average and median wages, the compensation for PLA conscripts remains lower than that of Indian Army soldiers. PLA conscripts generally retire after two years, which, broadly speaking, does not disrupt their life trajectory—they can seamlessly re-enter the civilian workforce. If the state were to draft me into service, I would step forward without hesitation, because I would be entering a far more meritocratic and equitable environment, which would work greatly to my advantage. Conscripts do sacrifice a degree of time and income, but this is a mandatory obligation they owe to the nation. Crucially, that sense of a fair and level playing field leaves them with little reason to complain about lower entry-level pay. However, the true backbone of the PLA is its NCO (Sergeant) corps. In field armies, NCOs account for 65% to 80% of total personnel, and their compensation is remarkably high. By my calculations, their income-to-average-wage ratio comes quite close to that of the Indian Army. As for the leave system you mentioned, PLA personnel indeed enjoy less leave compared to their Indian counterparts. The root cause lies in the PLA's strict regulations on military marriage: with a higher proportion of single service members, leave allowances are naturally more restricted. This is also a key area targeted for future PLA reform. Regarding the shift from lump-sum severance payouts to monthly retreatment allowances, a vital factor is the Chinese marriage dynamic, where the groom’s side is expected to pay a bride price—whereas in India, the dynamic is reversed. Because military retirees held substantial lump-sum payouts, they often became prime targets for extortionate bride-price demands. Furthermore, those who served in isolated military environments were prone to reckless investments upon returning to civilian life. Stripped of their financial cushion—and possessing formidable military skills—they risked becoming a destabilizing element in society. (India harbors similar concerns regarding its Agnipath scheme.) As for pensions, I believe your estimates are somewhat inflated. Unlike the Indian Army, China's social security framework (which encompasses pensions) operates on a co-contribution model—partly paid by the individual and partly by the government. Since PLA service is a high-paying profession, their contribution bracket should sit at the highest tier. To my knowledge, government public servants follow a contribution structure where roughly 22% to 23% of gross salary is deducted for social security funds (covering medical care, pensions, unemployment, workplace injury, maternity, and the Housing Provident Fund), leaving net take-home pay at about 77%. The government then contributes an additional 36% to 37%. In other words, their social security contribution divided by total labor cost comes out to roughly 43%. Currently, pension benefits across China exhibit a wide disparity: ordinary citizens receive around 2,000 to 3,000 RMB per month, whereas many retired government officials draw between 10,000 and 20,000 RMB. The Chinese government is actively working to narrow the wealth gap, which will eventually compress the pension divide between regular citizens and officials. Consequently, this also implies a prospective decrease in expected top-tier pension rates. However, when I speak of 'benefits,' I am referring far more to the predictable upward mobility available to service members rather than mere base salaries, allowances, or pensions. This is why, from the very beginning, I focused on the trend of military compensation rather than raw, isolated figures. China has consistently sought to construct a system where people believe that as long as they work hard, success is within reach. Even if base wages are lower, there are generous severance packages; even if academic qualifications are modest, soldiers can acquire skills in short supply within civilian society; and even if academic performance was poor, sufficient military tenure can still grant entry into official state institutions. This predictable upward mobility is the core driver. For many young Chinese individuals, enlisting in the military is less about serving in a fair, competitive environment—though that is a welcome secondary benefit—and primarily about securing a gateway into government agencies. What it would imply if a similar dynamic played out in India goes without saying. In short, the PLA's distinct advantage lies in transforming a portion of its compensation model into non-fiscal expenditures, using low monetary costs to ignite the internal drive of young people. To borrow a famous European adage: it manages to 'pluck the maximum amount of feathers with the minimum amount of hissing.' To wrap up, I’d like to share an encounter I had last October. I was at an electronics market custom-building a PC (RTX 5080 + i7-265K CPU, 32GB RAM, 4TB SSD, 4K 320Hz monitor) when I met a Rocket Force NCO stationed in Hunan. Naturally, out of courtesy, I refrained from asking any sensitive military details; our conversation revolved mostly around daily life. Like me, he hailed from a rural background. His computer build was nearly identical to mine—if anything, slightly superior—and after realizing we played the same games, we struck up a deep conversation. He mentioned that he enlisted at age 17 and had risen to become a Master Sergeant Third Class (三级军士长) in the Rocket Force, planning to retire this year. According to him, the higher the merit points a soldier accumulates during service, the better the government enterprise or agency they can be assigned to. Based on his accrued points, he expects to be placed at a top-tier state-owned enterprise (SOE) by next year and then get married. One of his close comrades plans to join a local police department; since his comrade's father serves as a police chief, leveraging both his military credentials and family background will allow him to rapidly advance to a police captain rank. I asked if he was married yet, and he replied that he wasn't, though he was currently engaged. When I asked how he met his fiancée, he said it was through a matchmaking arrangement set up by his parents. Coincidentally, his fiancée works at my company. However, with several thousand employees at our firm, I didn't know her even after he mentioned her name. He explained that his posting was quite remote with minimal contact with the outside world, making opportunities to meet women his age exceedingly rare. He had initially hoped to remain in the military indefinitely, but now in his early thirties, he felt it was high time to marry. When I asked about his wedding timeline, he said his parents urged him to marry immediately and have a child by the following year. His parents had already covered the down payment on a home for him, and his Housing Provident Fund balance was more than enough to cover the monthly mortgage payments. Before getting married, he wanted to build a high-end PC to indulge heavily in CrossFire—a game he was willing to spend handsomely on. It happened to be a game from my own youth as well, one into which I poured countless hours, making it a nostalgic topic for us both. He mentioned that this rig cost him roughly a full month's income. My build came out to around 18,000 RMB, while his was close to 19,000 RMB, as he chose a better mouse, keyboard, and case. I asked him if that month's salary represented actual net take-home pay, and he confirmed that it was. I couldn't help but feel a touch of envy. Should he opt for a lump-sum severance package upon exit, it would amount to several hundred thousand RMB—though he declined to disclose the exact sum. His parents' strong preference, however, is for him to take up a government position. After all, here in Shandong Province, securing a government job is viewed as the pinnacle of stability and prestige; even if young people are reluctant, parents will exert every form of persuasion and pressure to push them down that path. I later looked up that state-owned company on my phone: even an entry-level employee's salary there was more than double mine, a fact that left me genuinely envious.

I felt there was quite a bit to unpack here, so I spent a few hours writing a brief commentary in Chinese and translating it into English. If writing the whole thing directly in English would simply test my endurance too much. I don't really view this as a formal article; it's more just a casual exchange of thoughts. Besides, I feel there are still multiple angles from which the gap between the Chinese and Indian militaries can be analyzed, and some of the paragraph transitions might not flow entirely smoothly. For now, capturing the core meaning I want to convey is all that matters. xitter.cf/961957192q83556/status…

Military retirees from PLA have options to choose a monthly retirement payment (逐月领取退役金) or take a lumpsum payment and transition to civilian employment. Earlier they also had an option to opt for “self-directed career” (自主择业) path but this option no longer exist. May read an interesting conversation on retirement options for PLA personnel as well as a story giving a snapshot of post-retirement life of personnel of Tibet Military District. The story is worth a read because it tells that—while so much changes among soldiers from one country to another, so much also remains the same— newreckk.substack.com/p/reti…

On 29 April 1954, India and China signed an agreement on a ‘new deal’ concerning Indo-Tibetan relations. I am calling it a new deal because prior to this period also India had enjoyed a number of privileges in Tibet. But after Chinese military (PLA) entered Tibet in October 1950, China consolidated its control on Tibet. Thus India had to deal with new Chinese government, directly controlling Tibet. In this article, I am sharing extracts of 1954 India-China agreement as well as extracts of research by Claude Arpi, which covers relevant Indian perspective of Indo-Tibetan relations between 1947-62. newreckk.substack.com/p/conn…

On 29 April 1954, India and China signed an agreement on a ‘new deal’ concerning Indo-Tibetan relations. I am calling it a new deal because prior to this period also India had enjoyed a number of privileges in Tibet. But after Chinese military (PLA) entered Tibet in October 1950, China consolidated its control on Tibet. Thus India had to deal with new Chinese government, directly controlling Tibet. In this article, I am sharing extracts of 1954 India-China agreement as well as extracts of research by Claude Arpi, which covers relevant Indian perspective of Indo-Tibetan relations between 1947-62. newreckk.substack.com/p/conn…