Indian law enforcement froze $3M from an innocent Chinese investor after mistaking a crypto bridge for a pig butchering scam. Now an Indian court has ordered Gate to hand his funds to a person they never belonged to.
My analysis of how Indian LE traced through an unlabeled service and wrongly froze @xxxkeym's Gate account:
The case stems from a pig butchering victim who allegedly lost $1.7M of BTC, USDT, DOGE & SOL in May 2025.
Andhra Pradesh CID registered it as Cr. No. 10/2025 and filed a charge sheet in March 2026.
In July 2025, xxxkeym had Gate deposit address 17mpajZ6Nq3dG3T6wUhaXxYF4Qy9HJnYx5 frozen after depositing 15 BTC from 3NcBhqK in the following transaction:
885f3afab562251b222363cf12095e864ddb94636674b01f0cdb05997e5a54a0
This is one transaction Indian LE cites in its notice. 3NcBhqK was funded by xxxkeym's own OKX & Binance withdrawals in Jan 2023 and the coins sat dormant for years until the Gate deposit.
Indian LE never froze his OKX or Binance accounts, the actual source of the 15 BTC, which tells you how flawed their justification is.
Gate froze his entire account, which held roughly $3M at the time and about $1.5M today.
The Indian court order hands all of it to the complainant.
Gate deposit address 17mpajZ also received two deposits for 15 BTC total in 2025 from bc1pkkwqyxn3rm608ryuqg9hyqna0syq4jx5pxkr7pzg8n3usx6tyqfst5u966, which is also controlled by xxxkeym.
Shortly before the deposits to Gate, bc1pkkw was funded in three transactions by bc1quzwkggdf6ly06mrrnnled0qdr57w770k45n5n7 & bc1qtu66zfqxj6pam6e0zunwnggh87f5pjr7vdr5cd.
bc1quzw & bc1qtu66z were reported as alibarbit[.]bit, the same scam named in Indian LE's press release.
That was a mistake. Both belong to the Merlin Chain bridge, which is unlabeled in most compliance tools.
xxxkeym is simply a normal Merlin user trading tokens on the L2. This wrong label is the only place the scam touches his transaction history.
Below is the blockchain data showing each Merlin withdrawal by xxxkeym matched to a BTC payout from those addresses, plus screenshots of the bridge activity.
xxxkeym bridged 50 BTC into Merlin on March 28, 2024, over a year before the alleged May 2025 theft.
His three withdrawals came out of that balance. I found zero onchain connections between xxxkeym and the theft.
Separately on July 15, 2025 xxxkeym had a 7 BTC private key compromise theft which was reported to local police and also SlowMist was engaged. His stolen funds flowed to Wasabi.
This is embarrassing incompetence by Indian LE, who seem incapable of reviewing basic blockchain data.
Indian LE, the prosecutor and the judge all signed off on this, Gate froze the account, and LE did a full press release about it recently, while the real victim here (the Gate user) hasn't had access to his funds for nearly 16 months.
My hot take is VASPs need to challenge weak jurisdictions like India, Canada, etc due to repeated negligence in criminal cases.
Merlin source transactions from xxxkeym
10.1368 BTC - March 25, 2025
0x975081c2a62355019561c3ec0d01c72bf0dadf7121d46764bbb13ac0013a9a06
4.9071 BTC - May 6, 2025
0xa30f7b770e2e8e2e2d0fc0d390aa800e7f880e8e129d1b705dbc4167fc878769
9.9796 BTC - June 17, 2025
0x147429d324520c9ebee8015b0214dbd7bdce97ee37ad25e11819f4b04aecc049
Bitcoin destination transactions to xxxkeym
10.1367 BTC - March 28, 2025
55ab5373c2daa69b1728e6551b59f9dc661d1d78786face798d5251ccbe4685a
4.907 BTC - May 9, 2025
b2222fe38856e65420f15051a4cc419a92868803dec69a218f007948972ea367
9.9795 BTC - June 19, 2025
094f01388638523fb29aac0a0d4f70adf6949fede0847a45cef2c3f930692c73
Merlin Chain bridge
bc1quzwkggdf6ly06mrrnnled0qdr57w770k45n5n7
bc1qtu66zfqxj6pam6e0zunwnggh87f5pjr7vdr5cd
Gate deposit address - xxxkeym
17mpajZ6Nq3dG3T6wUhaXxYF4Qy9HJnYx5
Other addresses - xxxkeym
3NcBhqKnyo8dfzqfG1p5rbaKJFV8yLnx3u
bc1pkkwqyxn3rm608ryuqg9hyqna0syq4jx5pxkr7pzg8n3usx6tyqfst5u966
0x59fd8E3aEca4FAbb53ef6078D2319Dc174fb66a6
July 15, 2025 BTC theft addresses
bc1qjmf2e4fc2r97rq762055ag3g9uhypavta0payq
bc1q80gq7ctfsm6p9h9jh2k45da87jy6s7a87pj3h0
March 28, 2024 50 M-BTC destination transaction to xxxkeym
0xf1ee67ba1d3f97fb2d4776fa8ffc90f0b7ba7d116de3bf510a2c6aeae7d80def
@Sentinacle retweeted
En octubre se adjudicaron 11.198 contratos públicos por 3.033 M€ sin IVA. ¿Dónde hay menos competencia? En Canarias, 2,0 ofertas por contrato y 58 de cada 100 con una sola. Mira tu comunidad y tu sector en nuestro informe de octubre: lalicitadora.es/informes/202…
@Sentinacle retweeted
¿Sabes cuándo vence el contrato de limpieza del edificio público que tienes al lado?
584 contratos de limpieza de un año o más terminan en los próximos seis meses. Muchos volverán a salir, y quien llega preparado juega con ventaja.
@Sentinacle retweeted
Error típico: dejar la oferta para el último día a las 13:55. La plataforma va lenta, el certificado falla o el archivo no sube. Y fuera de plazo no hay recurso que valga: la oferta, sencillamente, no existe.
1/ The $150M+ DSJ Exchange (DSJEX) / BG Wealth Sharing Ponzi scheme collapsed last week. From April 27 – May 3, illicit actors laundered $92M+ across chains to obscure the trail.
I helped lead an initiative with @Tether_to, @Binance Security Team, @OKX, & US law enforcement that has since frozen $41.5M+.
@Sentinacle retweeted
Replying to @schenkty
A cryptographic lock secures the $5.6M liquidity pool, but the $166M KEETA ($KTA) architecture retains a hardcoded kill switch. 🧵
Telemetry Update: Sentinacle confirms an active 3-month third-party LP lock deployed in March 2025.
Our static engine indexed the native token bytecode but bypassed the external locker contract. We have calibrated our indexer to resolve this false positive.
However, the Sentinacle Trust Score remains strictly at 20/100 (Critical Risk).
The market's blind trust in this L1 bridge representation is structurally flawed.
The external LP lock prevents a standard DEX drain, but the execution environment on Base remains lethal.
The contract itself still harbors an unverified SELFDESTRUCT_DIRECT pattern alongside dormant TIMESTAMP_GATE functions.
An L1 governance token bridged to Base with hidden bytecode is a functional black box.
Without a transparent DeFi smart contract audit verifiable on-chain, the execution mechanics remain entirely obscured from the public.
Institutional insight: A time-locked liquidity pool provides zero capital protection if the foundational contract can be wiped via a self-destruct command.
Capital is secured by immutable code, not by PR promises of an upcoming L1 mainnet migration.
Does a 3-month liquidity lock actually protect your downside if the underlying contract architecture can wipe the board?
Telemetry calibrated. NFA.
@Sentinacle retweeted
🚨CoW Swap front-end got hit and we’re already seeing ~$1M+ drained across a few wallets.
If you interacted — revoke approvals ASAP.
Dropping txs from a few victims that already got caught 👇
etherscan.io/tx/0xcee016925c…
etherscan.io/tx/0xab5fbfd457…
🚨🚨
UPDATE: CoW Swap experienced a DNS hijacking at 14:54 UTC (approximately 90 minutes ago).
The CoW Protocol backend and APIs were not impacted, but we have paused them temporarily as a precaution.
We are now actively working to resolve the situation. Please continue to refrain from using swap dot cow dot fi until we confirm that it is safe to use.
@Sentinacle retweeted
$RAVE
A $1.02B market cap propped up by a fragile $920k liquidity pool, masking a literal self-destruct button in the bytecode. 🧵
RaveDAO ($RAVE) on ETH presents a textbook architectural anomaly.
Our Sentinacle Trust Score sits at a catastrophic 12/100. Yet the market trades $885k daily, seemingly oblivious.
A rigorous DeFi smart contract audit of the EVM bytecode isolates a SELFDESTRUCT_DIRECT known pattern.
Ownership remains unrenounced. While the contract owner is a 4/5 Gnosis Safe, this multisig retains the ultimate kill switch.
At any moment, the active controller can trigger a total state wipe, destroying the contract and redirecting all locked funds to an arbitrary address.
Coupled with an active mint function allowing arbitrary supply inflation and a completely fresh deployer wallet, the threat vectors compound.
Dynamic transaction simulation was impossible due to insufficient liquidity on the network fork—a massive red flag for any institutional crypto risk assessment.
Capital preservation dictates avoiding hardcoded rug-pull mechanisms.
Are institutional LPs actually pricing in absolute state-wipe parameters, or just blindly chasing the $1B valuation illusion?
Telemetry only. NFA. #SmartContracts #OnChainAnalysis #Ethereum #DeFi #CryptoSecurity #OnChain #SmartContracts #RugPull #DeFiRisk
Replying to @alexchenn
The alleged co-founder of Spartans is Gurhan Kiziloz who is behind a sketchy project called Blockdag Network which has raised $300M+ from unsophisticated retail investors via social media ads which stated unrealistic returns and misleading partnerships.
They have held the token sale for 2+ years now while off ramping presale funds via middle eastern OTCs.
At the same time Gurhan was spending very lavishly on luxury cars, real estate, watches, giveaways, etc.
When you search his name online it’s a lot of paid PR articles.
In Oct 2025 I outed the Blockdag leadership
as merely figureheads while Gurhan being secretly the co-founder. After I was blocked and he publicly admitted his involvement.
I’ve had 10-15 victims at minimum DM or tag me claiming to have lost money.
Thus I would 100% stay away from any business Gurhan Kiziloz is associated with.
Source 1: dlnews.com/articles/defi/ins…
Source 2: blockdagfile.com/
Source 3: businessinsider.com/lanistar…
@Sentinacle retweeted
💬 Onchain Message:
This is a message from a victim, I know this scammed money I will never see in this life ,blockchain has no rules It has laws , Now I think of that the money I lost I could have travelled to some places and maybe enjoyed my time with my mother but here I am ,I did put around 65k usdc that all I saved and made from brc20 and stuff ,It was 60K but in years this had grown to 75k .I never spent this money on myself and thought I will enjoy it later and my fate has met me I feel completely numb I am from third world country , For the drift team I have nothing much to say the founders will roam free and continue their life they also express grief for publicity while sipping coffee just like that another project turned into dust I see CT saying attack vectors but they forget real people like us have our life ruined also last thing SOL community is just max extraction, solana made many tweets and promoted gambling projects that die in a week and they simply delete it after doing the extraction. The Drift team is who rugged us not you keep every eth and vanish just like you guys do . In next Life I will try my best , You won .
etherscan.io/tx/0x092095b94c…
THEY MADE $3 MILLION MANIPULATING $XPL
7 accounts deposited a total of $1.85M to Hyperliquid to manipulate XPL.
They pushed the XPL price up with leverage longs, then they withdrew a total of $4.63M from their collateral balances at exactly the same time, making $2.78M.
@Sentinacle retweeted
The initial estimated loss of today's @DriftProtocol loss is $285m.
Here is the detailed breakdown:
Hi @driftprotocol, you may want to take a look: solscan.io/account/HkGz4KmoZ…
@Sentinacle retweeted
#CertiKStatsAlert 🚨
@DriftProtocol seems to be a victim of an exploit for ~$136M losses.
Funds are currently being laundered or moved.
~$109M in wallet 7RoMqGAcU7S6ESAhPDvB9iSXvASUhuoE8u7dYRxGBew9
solscan.io/account/7RoMqGAcU…
Stay vigilant!
@Sentinacle retweeted
Here is our March wallet drainer report.
We detected 392 suspicious approvals across 300 wallets, with $2.82M drained.
This month turned out to be less performative for scammers… perhaps due to @web3_antivirus's activity 😜
@Sentinacle retweeted
#CertiKStatsAlert 🚨
Combining all the incidents in March we’ve confirmed ~$59.5M lost to exploits with ~$21.4M of the total attributed to phishing.
That brings the initial losses for Q1 to $501M across 145 incidents.
More details below 👇
@Sentinacle retweeted
🚨 Another major supply chain incident 🚨
axios — one of the most widely used npm packages — has been compromised. Malicious versions [email protected] and [email protected] were published and are actively dropping malware.
The attack pulls in a newly created dependency [email protected], confirmed as a malicious loader: it executes obfuscated payloads, runs shell commands, and attempts to evade detection while wiping traces.
With 100M+ weekly downloads, this is a live, large-scale supply chain attack.
More details: stepsecurity.io/blog/axios-c…
🚨 CRITICAL: Active supply chain attack on axios -- one of npm's most depended-on packages.
The latest [email protected] now pulls in [email protected], a package that did not exist before today. This is a live compromise.
This is textbook supply chain installer malware. axios has 100M+ weekly downloads. Every npm install pulling the latest version is potentially compromised right now.
Socket AI analysis confirms this is malware. plain-crypto-js is an obfuscated dropper/loader that:
• Deobfuscates embedded payloads and operational strings at runtime
• Dynamically loads fs, os, and execSync to evade static analysis
• Executes decoded shell commands
• Stages and copies payload files into OS temp and Windows ProgramData directories
• Deletes and renames artifacts post-execution to destroy forensic evidence
If you use axios, pin your version immediately and audit your lockfiles. Do not upgrade.
@Sentinacle retweeted
Weekly Web3 Security Incident Roundup | Mar 16 – Mar 22, 2026
During the past week, BlockSec detected and analyzed seven attack incidents, with total estimated losses of ~$82.7M.
🟦 Detected by #PhalconSecurity, 📷 Analyzed via #PhalconExplorer.
@Sentinacle retweeted
#CertiKInsight 🚨
Since January 1st, 2026, we have recorded 103 security incidents and 36 phishing scams, with an estimated total loss of ~$480M.







































