A abnormal microeconomic theorist (↤Linguistic BG), interested in the intersection between Econ,CS,OR, and PSY. CN➞JP➞ES➞CH➞US
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ALT We extend the concept of priority-neutral matching, introduced by Reny (2022) in the school choice context, to the roommate problem. We prove three main results. First, a blocking-neutral matching always exists in constrained roommate problems under arbitrary feasibility constraints (Theorem 1). Second, the set of stable matchings is contained in the set of blocking-neutral matchings, which in turn is contained in the set of Pareto-optimal matchings (Theorem 2). Third, whenever stable matchings exist, the set of blocking-neutral matchings coincides with the set of stable matchings (Theorem 3). We also show that existence fails under weak preferences and extend the concept to two-sided school choice.
ALT We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define pseudo-substitutable preferences, a domain that strictly extends the classical notion of substitutability while still preserving the existence of pairwise stable allocations. This domain accommodates limited complementarities among contracts while retaining enough structure to preserve the key stability properties of substitutable preferences. Moreover, we show that, among all preference domains that contain the classical substitutable domain and guarantee the existence of pairwise stable allocations, the pseudo-substitutable domain is maximal. Our results establish that pairwise stability extends well beyond the classical substitutable domain.
