Tom Hussain

Some thoughts on yesterday’s Saudi–Syria meeting in Riyadh, and what closer defence ties could mean for Syria’s regional position and speculation around membership in the Mecca Pact: There is nothing unusual about Riyadh’s interest in Syria’s stabilisation through post-war economic recovery. More noteworthy is the defence cooperation agreement signed yesterday (terms undisclosed), coming days after Syrian FM al-Shaibani confirmed discussions “to evaluate Syria’s entry into the Mecca alliance”. Riyadh has reasons for wanting Sharaa's government to succeed: A functioning Syrian state would help consolidate internal security, constrain the return of Iranian and allied networks, contain extremist groups and trafficking, and reduce the risk of instability spreading through Jordan and Iraq towards the Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s search for additional support against Houthi attacks adds a more immediate security context, although the scope of any Syrian contribution remains undisclosed/unclear. But extending the Mecca Pact to Syria prematurely, with a plethora of unresolved challenges, could spell more problems. What happens when rebuilding Syrian sovereignty and defence capabilities runs up against Israel’s determination to constrain those capabilities and Turkey’s military influence? And any pressure for Syrian involvement against the Houthis would risk diverting attention and resources from an already fragile domestic recovery. Given the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement's NATO-like collective-defence logic, Turkish training, air defence, or personnel could acquire an alliance dimension. It is not difficult to imagine how an Israeli strike could then test the credibility of commitments made by Ankara, Islamabad and Riyadh, even if it does not automatically trigger military response. A Turkey–Israel collision is not inevitable. But the difficulty is that rebuilding Syria’s national infrastructure, restoring its defence capabilities and negotiating regional security arrangements are increasingly connected. At a minimum, there would need to be agreed, credible deconfliction mechanisms in place to avoid escalation and a clear understanding of the consequences of breaches. Even an interim, non-aggression agreement between Syria and Israel would be difficult to negotiate. But on the flip side, the incentive for Damascus to consider diverse regional security arrangements is clear--continued Israeli military pressure gives Damascus reason to seek deterrence mechanisms. It is premature to expect Syria to formally join the Mecca Pact, but these developments add to growing evidence of regional states looking to one another for security assurances and options to improve their bargaining positions.