
Director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute @RUSI_org; recovering former civil servant; all views expressed here are my own.
Joined February 2024
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And yes, plenty under construction, but the current in-service date for the new frigates is 2028 at the earliest (hence the First Sea Lord’s ambitious targets to get uncrewed vessels operating).
But at the moment, hull numbers appear to be dropping faster than the new capabilities are coming online (especially when you factor in attack submarine availability and RFA issues). All in all, a depressing picture, which has been some years coming, and fairly obviously so.
This is part of the reason the Hybrid Navy is being pursued: there is a desperate need to get more capability out of personnel numbers which are unlikely to rise.
Of course, you could deploy the frigate and use a patrol vessel as the Fleet Ready Escort, but that leaves you far more limited in home waters, and again, relying on Allies to protect the deterrent, watch Russian submarines etc.
Of course, we could use Allies again, and build a NATO Task Group. But going to three frigates (ie one or two deployable) effectively makes this an either/or decision on Atlantic ASW, rather than a real choice.
*If* true, the Royal Navy would temporarily cease to be an expeditionary force. We should be deploying a frigate near home waters, while deploying the carrier strike group should involve at least one, if not two frigates, as well as an air defence destroyer.
🚨 ROYAL Navy is on track to have just ONE working ASW frigate available for ops next year.
They need 13
They have 5
2 could be ruled “unseaworthy” in months as per @NavyLookout
That leaves 3, all over 24 yrs old
1 on ops
1 in work up
1 in maintenance
thesun.co.uk/news/40806181/n…
Some travel with the team this week; gives me an opportunity to catch up on some much-needed reading!
Matthew Savill retweeted
Earlier this week, RUSI hosted The Iran Crisis Stocktake: Who Can Sustain the Pressure?
The US–Iran ceasefire has collapsed, there is no clear path back to the MoU signed this summer, and both sides claim control of the Strait of Hormuz—all amid speculation about a third round of hostilities.
I was joined by an excellent panel of experts: Ali Ansari (@aa51_ansari), Mohammed Al-Basha (@BashaReport and Jonathan Hackett (@jonathanhackett).
Watch the full event on the RUSI website:
rusi.org/members-event-recor…
As tensions around the Strait of Hormuz and the wider Gulf continue to escalate, RUSI’s briefing on the Iran Crisis Stocktake offers essential context on where this conflict stands and where it’s heading.
RUSI members can access the full recording here: bit.ly/3VXlG5E
Replying to @alessionaval
'Political warfare' has somehow snuck past my defences, but I basically dislike the *inaccurate* use of 'hybrid'!
Great to see this out and a useful primer given all the current coverage of Russian subversion and political warfare (not ‘hybrid warfare!’).
To Subvert the State: The Ecosystem of Russian Active Measures - Oleksandr Danylyuk and I have just published a book through @RUSI_org on the forms and methods used by the Russian Special Services to manipulate politics abroad: routledge.com/To-Subvert-the…
🌍In the years after the Cold War, it was widely assumed that great powers had moved beyond geopolitics.
Professor Scott Smitson examines why that assumption proved premature in the latest episode of #TalkingStrategy: bit.ly/3Ucdu0C
Replying to @FennellJW
Most of the costs of those operations came from the Treasury Special Reserve, not the core budget.
Final preparations done and the hall is set up for the 2026 RUSI Military Technology Conference. Hopefully we will see many of you there today. If not: you are missing out!
my.rusi.org/events/rusi-mili…
#MilTech26
Replying to @FennellJW @Anglo_Japan45
That is not what KINDRED did when the team was that size.
Replying to @FennellJW @Anglo_Japan45
Yes. But much of what was bought was intended as a stop-gap, or had little in terms of long-term support. A lot of people seem to reference KINDRED without a comprehensive understanding of what it did and didn't do.
Replying to @Anglo_Japan45 @FennellJW
2015 being a prime example, contributing to the overloading of the programme. At least this time the MOD has claimed that these are not necessary to achieve the DIP capabilities (though we should see what actually happens).
Replying to @FennellJW @Anglo_Japan45
Some of those lessons can be absorbed, but the majority of the model was focussed on rapid and sometimes innovative procurement, not efficiency.
A great series from @triclassified covering the awful consequences of Philby's actions, as well as the sometimes farcical nature of the whole affair.
He's back. MI6's greatest traitor returns to @triclassified podcast as we finish the story of Kim Philby. We pick up with him in Washington as liaison to the new CIA. Episode 1 includes possibly the worst dinner party in history when old friend Guy Burgess drops by......
Matthew Savill retweeted
Russian Military Satellite Stalks Ukraine-Linked Spy Satellite in Orbit, Closing In to Just 5 Km
united24media.com/war-in-ukr…
Matthew Savill retweeted
👀 Interesting new Instagram post by "C", Blaise Metreweli, asking for tech professionals to join SIS/MI6
🔗 instagram.com/reel/Dejx7Azg3…










