My thoughts on the Israeli elections: This result matters more for the Iran war than I first assumed. Exit polls show Netanyahu’s bloc falling from 68 to roughly 50 seats. Neither bloc reaches 61, and the Arab parties, at 17–18 seats, are effectively kingmakers. Netanyahu is likely on his way out, though nothing is final until a coalition is formed, and that process realistically takes six to ten weeks, with a repeat election a real possibility. Until then, Netanyahu stays on as caretaker prime minister with formal war powers. There’s no leadership vacuum, but his political room has collapsed. A discretionary escalation against Iran now would be self-defeating: he has just lost his majority, and a strike seen as a survival tactic would hand the opposition exactly the justification it needs to close ranks, including accepting Arab-party support, and remove him. The Attorney General and President Herzog add institutional friction on top. In practice, Israeli-initiated escalation is off the table until a new government forms, which will be well after the US midterms on November The American side was already closed before the midterms, assuming this is true, since Trump publicly pledged no strikes on Iran before the vote. Taken together, the pre-midterm window for a resumption of the war is close to zero. The remaining risk sits in the lame-duck period between November 4 and January 3. Trump is term-limited, the outgoing Congress doesn’t constrain him, and he has said the war will “end” after the election, by deal or by force. If Washington moves, Israel can join as the junior partner with political cover, because the decision is visibly American. An Iranian provocation is the other tail risk. After January 3, a Democratic House, likely though not certainly alongside a Senate flip, constrains any sustained campaign through appropriations. Congress can’t stop a short strike, but it makes a prolonged war in 2027 much harder to fund. A successor Israeli government would still be hawkish on Iran, but more coordination-minded with Washington and less inclined to escalate for domestic political reasons. Net, this election is a real win against a prolonged war. Pre-midterm risk is minimal, the residual risk concentrates in a US-led action in November and December, and escalation risk for 2027 falls materially. We can add the meeting between gulf state to this which will come together more and more given the lack of help and moreso the destruction that would ensue if the US went on a bombing campaign. The winds are starting to blow towards diplomacy, from the gulf itself, to Israel and with Trump now having to decide if it is even worth it. Each day, the war becomes less likely in my view, both through the dynamics in the gulf, the election, the early blue wave and more.

Remember the recent US meeting with Russia. On top of todays meeting with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey. Things are moving. No attack these past 2 weekends despite strong and weird insider looking flows. This weekend Benjamin is being denied attacks by his military while elections turn against him. Things are being put in place that don't make sense if you were to attack. If the US was about to attack and help the Saudis in regards to the Houthis, why would they offer $1b today? If the US was about to attack, why wouldn't they do so in front of midterms to make it look like the nuclear threat is neutralized? Why not do it to help Benjamin? A lot of things are happening and almost none look like actual escalation.