AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
Those were the days! When leadership was defined not by rank, position or authority, but by character, humility and compassion.
A true leader never hesitates to bow before the courage and sacrifice of a soldier. This is what military leadership is all about — honouring the men who serve, respecting their sacrifices and placing their dignity above everything else.
Lt Gen H.M. Khanna demonstrated that the greatness of a leader lies not in how many salute him, but in how deeply he respects those who serve under his command.
Ranks give authority, but humility earns respect. Leadership is not about being above your men; it is about standing with them, honouring them and never forgetting their sacrifices.
That is the leadership legacy our Armed Forces must preserve. 🇮🇳
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
A privilege to attend the presentation of Dronacharya, Arjuna and Tenzing Norgay National Adventure Awards at Rashtrapati Bhavan today. Congratulations to all the awardees, and to all those who provided years of selfless support to the athletes.
Also got an opportunity to click a picture at the same hall 12 years apart.
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
-@anandmahindra Sir, do you have anything to say on this
-While we want to support #India & #Indian companies
-Companies also have to become accountable & safety minded
-This is a very disturbing message for from a Friends:
As you are aware, we were involved in a horrific accident on 1 January 2026 in our Mahindra BE6 electric vehicle.
Mona suffered multiple fractures and was bedridden for nearly five months. I sustained three fractured ribs. My friend, a retired Air Force officer, suffered four fractures, while his wife was also seriously injured.
The four of us went through an absolute nightmare over the following six days in Tuticorin, struggling with serious injuries, hospitalisation and eventual air-ambulance evacuations.
Our vehicle suddenly accelerated from approximately 11 km/h to 63 km/h within seconds, without any intended acceleration by me, before crashing into a concrete wall.
We have subsequently learned of three other serious accidents involving Mahindra electric vehicles. One involved a senior Congress leader from Pune, who reportedly suffered a devastating spinal injury resulting in paralysis. His family has described a strikingly similar incident involving sudden, uncontrolled acceleration.
For the past eight months, I have repeatedly requested Mahindra to release the vehicle's FDR/EDR and electronic control data so that the actual cause can be independently investigated. Mahindra has refused to share this crucial information while maintaining that there was no vehicle malfunction.
We are now initiating legal proceedings against Mahindra.
Anand Mahindra recently celebrated the Indian Air Force Chief's selection of a Mahindra electric SUV with a post referring to “Air Superiority and Road Superiority.”
Our distinguished friend Harish, a renowned test pilot, has responded to that post, raising the issue of our accident and Mahindra's accountability.
I request you to support or even ask questions like what happened etc. -Harish's comment by replying to it, sharing your concerns and asking Anand Mahindra why the company has not released the electronic data for independent investigation.
This is not merely about our accident. It is about vehicle safety, transparency and accountability, potentially affecting every family travelling in these vehicles.
We are not asking Mahindra to accept responsibility without investigation. We are asking them to release the evidence so that the truth can be established.
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
42 years. 5000+ flying hours. 1 legendary legacy. 🫡
As Air Chief Marshal AP Singh retires, the nation salutes a master strategist. His tenure was a profound affirmation that a commander can protect our skies and inspiring the whole nation. 1/2 #IAFLeadership #APSingh #AirForce
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
How does an Air Force govern itself? Where does authority sit, who makes decisions, and how did those arrangements evolve?
I traced over a century of that history in this book. Some of its implications for today's defence debates are quite striking.
Speaking at USI tom, 2 PM.
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
The debate was about the future. My two annas covered its long past - the Air Landing School, Partition, the early IAF, and a few colourful characters.
A little history amid a controversy, with @BDUTT, @Ahlawat2012, @sanjeev__kapoor and @rahulsinghx.
youtube.com/live/2_lhBKOEbGE
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
Why did the Indian Air Force come to Race Course?
The closure of the Air Force golf course at Race Course in New Delhi has attracted considerable attention. But it also offers an opportunity to revisit a rather interesting question. Why does the IAF have a station in the very heart of Lutyens’ Delhi?
Long before golf was played here, the area hosted cricket, parachute training, and RAF operations. The reason the IAF eventually established a major administrative station here in 1947 has much to do with Hyderabad State's uncertain future and the reorganisation of the Air Force at Partition.
The story begins in 1941, at Willingdon Airport.
In Sep 1941, the RAF established an Air Landing School at Willingdon Airport, now Safdarjung Airport, to train personnel of the newly raised 50th Indian Parachute Brigade. The Brigade comprised British, Indian and Gurkha parachute battalions, and the school represented one of the earliest organised efforts to develop military parachuting in India. Its equipment was rudimentary. The RAF initially had to make do with obsolete Vickers Valentia biplanes, modified to allow parachutists to jump through an opening in the fuselage floor.
Some of the earliest parachute jumps took place over the racecourse adjoining Willingdon Airport. One contemporary account describes a company commander landing on the upper tier of the racecourse grandstand and bouncing his way down to the bottom! The Air Landing School was initially housed under canvas, with accommodation and other buildings coming up near the Race Course. The school was also experimenting with the equipment and techniques required for airborne operations and aerial resupply.
Then, in April 1942, RAF Station New Delhi was formally established. Until then, Willingdon had been a civilian aerodrome used by several RAF units. A Communication Flight detached from No. 31 Squadron, RAF at Lahore had been operating from the airfield for some months. The Air Landing School occupied buildings on one side of the aerodrome, while other small RAF detachments operated alongside it.
The formation of RAF Station New Delhi brought these activities under a common Station Headquarters. The new establishment assumed responsibility for running the aerodrome, although its physical upkeep remained with the Public Works Department. The Station also administered the Air Landing School, a small Parachute Repair Section comprising one senior NCO and seven airmen, and a ground staging and refuelling party responsible for transit aircraft.
It was still a shared airfield. Civil flying continued, including operations by Indian National Airways and the Delhi Flying Club. By October 1942, when the Air Landing School moved to Chaklala near Rawalpindi, it had recorded 9,231 live parachute descents and qualified 1,511 trainees during its stay in Delhi. The 50th Indian Parachute Brigade would later see fierce fighting against the Japanese at Sangshak in March 1944.The school at Chaklala would later move to Agra where it remains to this date.
RAF Station New Delhi continued to serve the wartime Air Force. The Air Headquarters communication organisation, which itself traced its origins to a flight raised at Lahore in 1928, operated from Willingdon before moving to Palam in 1946.
But how did this RAF establishment eventually become the administrative centre of the independent Indian Air Force?
For that, we need to move forward to 1946, when the Royal Indian Air Force was beginning to consider its post-war organisation. An Air Force broadly rests on four functions: operations, training, maintenance and administration. The first three would eventually develop into operational Commands, Training Command and Maintenance Command. Administration was a somewhat different problem.
It meant managing medical services, accounts, education, security, infrastructure, transport, accommodation and the movement and holding of personnel across the country. It also meant looking after the numerous establishments that came directly under Air Headquarters but did not belong to conventional formations.
One of the early ideas was to concentrate much of this activity in peninsular India, with Arkonam (today's Arakkonam, home to the naval air station INS Rajali) emerging as a possible administrative centre.
The RIAF established a depot at Arkonam, and several important establishments were located in the Madras region. The Air Force Record Office, responsible for personnel records and the administration of airmen, had moved to Red Hills Lake near Madras in 1946. The Central Accounts Office had similarly moved from Bombay to Madras. But Partition complicated these plans considerably.
At the time, southern India comprised territories with different political arrangements. Madras was a province of British India, while Mysore and Hyderabad were princely states. The uncertainty was particularly acute in Hyderabad, where the Nizam had not committed himself to joining the Indian Union. This presented a problem for the RIAF because several of its important training establishments were situated in and around Hyderabad and Secunderabad, including at Hakimpet.
The Air Force consequently began reorganising its training infrastructure, shifting establishments towards locations where their future within India was more secure. In February 1947, No. 2 Ground Training School moved from Secunderabad to Tambaram, near Madras. No. 1 Ground Training School, formed at Hakimpet, subsequently moved to Jalahalli near Bangalore in November 1947. The RIAF Depot at Arkonam (also training airmen) also moved to Jalahalli that November.
With the southern stations being reorganised to accommodate training requirements, the earlier idea of concentrating the principal administrative establishments there became less practical.
The administrative institutions were consequently reorganised towards northern India. New Delhi was the natural destination, not least because Air Headquarters was located there and exercised functional control over many of these units, but also because RAF was vacating the Willingdon premises.
The Record Office moved from Red Hills Lake to Delhi in October 1947, while the Central Accounts Office also moved to the capital that year. The medical and other administrative establishments serving Air Headquarters formed part of the wider arrangement.
What was needed was a single organisation to administer these establishments locally while leaving their professional responsibilities with Air Headquarters. And so, on 1 Sep 1947, just seventeen days after Independence, Air Headquarters Administrative Instruction No. 01/47 established No. 10 Administrative Wing, Royal Indian Air Force, at Race Course, New Delhi.
The Wing was built upon the existing RAF establishment in the Willingdon and Race Course area. Its responsibilities extended to Air Headquarters and the numerous associated units and establishments in the capital. And the man selected to command the new Wing was quite a character.
Group Captain Kanwar 'Tiger' Jaswant Singh had joined the Indian Army in 1936 before transferring to the Air Force in 1940. He had flown with Nos. 2 and 3 Squadrons, commanded No. 2 Squadron during operations in Burma in the Second World War, and earned a reputation as a demanding commander and exceptional sportsman.
Yet, on 1 Sep 1947, Tiger found himself commanding an administrative Wing in a capital torn apart by communal violence. It was hardly a quiet assignment. The new Wing was immediately called upon to patrol riot-affected areas of Central Delhi and assist in maintaining law and order.
At the same time, Partition had divided the Air Force itself. Hundreds of airmen and their families were arriving from former RIAF establishments at Kohat, Peshawar, Risalpur, Chaklala and Mauripur, all now in Pakistan.
The Station's history records that approximately 900 airmen and 150 families required immediate boarding, lodging and assistance. It also had to help personnel moving in the opposite direction, including escorting those proceeding to Pakistan through Palam for onward travel. Tiger, who lived at 1 Kushak Road, was frequently seen travelling around Delhi on his James motorcycle, attending to the Station's responsibilities during these difficult months.
On 24 December 1947, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru addressed a gathering of nearly 2,000 officers and airmen. The Wing had already begun acquiring the ceremonial responsibilities that would eventually become one of the most visible features of Air Force Station New Delhi.
In May 1948, No. 10 Administrative Wing was redesignated as an RIAF Station. When India became a Republic on 26 January 1950, the 'Royal' prefix was dropped and the establishment became Air Force Station New Delhi. The sporting history of Race Course also continued alongside its military responsibilities.
The grounds that later became associated with golf had earlier been used for cricket, while the Station continued to host athletic meets and inter-unit competitions. The Station's photographic archives include images of athletic competitions in 1948, and sporting events continued to be held at Race Course over subsequent decades.
Meanwhile, the Station's military responsibilities continued to evolve. During the 1971 War, it housed fifteen Pakistan Air Force prisoners of war, including Flight Lieutenant Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi, who would eventually become Chief of the Pakistan Air Force.
By the time Air Force Station New Delhi celebrated its Platinum Jubilee in 2022, it was providing administrative support to 46 IAF units apart from Air Headquarters, covering approximately 10,000 personnel. Its functions extended to medical services, accounts, transport, logistics, accommodation, schools, security, ceremonial duties and numerous other activities across Delhi-NCR.
The golf course became one of the more familiar features of Race Course in later decades, particularly to generations of serving and retired Air Force personnel. But the Air Force's presence here has a much older history.
#IAFHistory @IAF_MCC
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
I think there is a misunderstanding in this argument. The issue is not where aircraft are based, but who commands them, who can shift them between theatres, and who decides the priorities of the larger war.
There is an interesting historical peculiarity here which most tend to gloss over. Until Independence, India had a single Commander-in-Chief over all three Services. In 1947, this arrangement gave way to three separate Service heads, each responsible for his own force, with their Commander-in-Chief designations subsequently standardised.
In 1955, the Government removed the Commander-in-Chief designation, but Nehru explicitly stated that their authority, including operational authority, would remain unchanged. Over time, the Services developed subordinate formations, which today total 17 Commands. But these are not 17 independent command systems in the traditional sense. They are subordinate headquarters within three Service-wide command structures.
Therefore, theatreisation is not quite the often-repeated reduction from 17 Commands to three. At the level of command authority, it is a reorganisation of three nationwide, Service-specific command structures into three geographically organised, joint theatre structures.
Consider what this means for air power. Today, Air HQ can shift effort between its Commands as the larger air situation demands. Under theatreisation, the same aircraft may be assigned to different theatre commanders, each with legitimate operational priorities. Who decides when one theatre must surrender aircraft to another? And who ensures that these decisions serve the larger air campaign rather than the immediate needs of individual theatres?
These concerns have historical precedent. In 1971, India deliberately concentrated its principal military effort in the East. Even within the Western theatre, aircraft and missions were shifted between sectors as the fighting developed.
Having 60 squadrons instead of 30 may ease the resource constraint, but it does not remove the command question. Someone must still decide where air power is most needed and have the authority to move it. Unless that responsibility is clearly transferred elsewhere, Air HQ will perforce have to retain an operational role beyond the proposed mandate of 'Raise, Train, Sustain'.
Of course, an empowered joint staff under the CDS could make these decisions, with the CDS effectively functioning as a Commander-in-Chief. But that requires a clear redistribution of authority, not merely replacing Air HQ with HQ IDS. Indeed, when the CDS was created in 2019, the Government explicitly stated that the CDS would not exercise military command over the three Service Chiefs.
This is where the Kargil Review Committee's observations become relevant. Its principal criticism was that the Service Chiefs had become operational commanders at the expense of their responsibilities as Chiefs of Staff. The weakness it identified lay in integrated military advice, planning and decision-making at the apex, rather than simply in the absence of theatre commands.
The higher-command question and theatreisation are two distinct reforms, yet they have increasingly come to be treated as one. One concerns how forces are commanded within a theatre. The other concerns who exercises military authority above the theatres and reconciles competing operational priorities.
I explored the historical evolution of India's command structure, and particularly the distinction between theatreisation and higher defence reform, in some detail here:
iafhistory.in/2026/08/22/the…
Replying to @ManashPBhuyan @IAF_MCC
This has been the standard IAF position all these years... nothing has changed. But what I don't get is how does this position (centralised decision making in shifting of assets) not get implemented in theatrisation? Even today, air assets are based in different locations depending on infra established and op roles. That does not change. Instead of current Air Force Commands, it will be under some Theatre Commander. No change there. Today, air HQs decides force augmentation and shift of assets as per air situation. In ITC mode, air staff under CDS will take this decision. Only Air Chief is not involved directly but will have a say in COSC. The fears raised by IAF hierarchies across all these years have been the same bogey. When IAF has 60 squadrons, situation concerning decisions do not change, only need to shift of assets may reduce, causing lesser stress on staff to arrange admin to shift assets, but decision making organ does not change. This bogey, often raised to delay the shift of op role of the Air Chief, is all that is concerning to the force, and that now needs to be called out. Maybe use 5 years period for "transition" where COSC would have a primary role in deciding force assignment while rest of staffing happens and orgn grows root. Everyone will learn on the job. After 5 years, the decision making can shift (casting vote) to CDS and TCs. Enough of this crying "wolf" and saying "but we support integration". Every IAF guy wants status quo but tries to sound "right". Expected more from ACM AP but I think, institutional positions are difficult to overcome even for a wonderful man like him. God speed ACM AP but time for ITC has arrived, yesterday. Let's get moving now. Theatre wise. @arunp2810 @rwac48 @Gen_RajShukla @Chopsyturvey @rhinohistorian @IAF_MCC @indiannavy @adgpi
Pres. Zelensky: Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine...So, I don't know what about trilateral meeting will be between America, China, and Russia...if the issues about Ukraine, our future, it can be acceptable only when we are at the table of negotiations. It's absolutely clear.
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
𝗖𝗝𝗣 𝗟𝗲𝗮𝗱𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝗕𝗹𝗮𝗰𝗸𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹𝗲𝗱?: We released CJP leaders Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka, but we took nude photos and videos of them. If they protest again, we will release the footage online. They don't understand the cost of defying the government.
— Ajit Doval
Nude photos as leverage? This is what we've come to? I have no words.
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is in India saying “if it was no US support Ukraine would have lost war long back “
Today Zelenskyy declared that he lost historic war with Russia.
So how India come in this picture?
Let it explained
Europe was the largest buyer of Russian energy 75% of total Russian energy was bought by Europe in 2021.
NATO’s Plan was, Ukraine engage Russia in war , Europe put sanctions, kick Russia out from SWIFT and Europe suddenly stop buying Russian energy this would collapse Russian economy because Russia’s major energy customer has gone .. And US-Israel bomb Iran and topple Iranian government and chock Russia from its southern part and Caspian Sea ,
But two extraordinary and unimaginable things happened first Iran didn’t fall second west ignored a dark horse from their Calculation the dark horse was “India” .
India used to buy less than 1% of Russian energy , India was not even existed in Russian energy market before 2021 , but as war started India entered the Russian energy market and started buying Russian oil and became the major customer of Russian energy .
West had means and methods to control China because Chinese economy is depend on western markets but they had no methods to check India , that’s why Trump threatened India multiple time and sanctioned Indian far more than China .
India single handedly rescued Russian economy from collapse..
Marco Rubio standing in India saying “if it was no US support Ukraine would have lost war long back” because “if it was no Indian support Russia would have collapsed”
#Ukraine #Russia #Trump “Epstein” “Zelenskyy” “Modi” “Putin” #Putin
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
Singh-sational 🤩
18-year-old @Anahat_Singh13 has claimed the biggest win of her career, beating 8-time World Champion Nour ElSherbini to reach the @SVOpenSquash quarter finals 👏
🇮🇳 Anahat Singh beats [1] Nour ElSherbini 🇪🇬
3-0: 11-8, 11-8, 11-7 (30m)
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
Delighted to announce the launch of my book, India After Nonalignment, on November 4 in New Delhi!
Join me & this exceptional panel for an engaging discussion on India’s grand strategy.
@IndiasWorld_mag @CSDR_India
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
On land there are maps and at sea there are charts. Very few know the difference.
Almost every inch of a map is covered with information. Roads, buildings, bridges, culverts, hills, rivers, railway lines and whatnot.
On the other hand a nautical chart is mostly an enormous expanse of empty space interrupted occasionally by a depth marking, an island, a navigational hazard or a coastline.
One would imagine that navigating across a largely blank piece of paper should be easier than navigating through a crowded map.
Quite the opposite. On land, we have roads to follow, signboards to read, landmarks to recognise and, when everything else fails, loc-nav (a fancy term for asking someone for directions).
So how do you navigate across thousands of miles of seemingly featureless water?
For centuries, sailors have relied on the sun, moon, stars, accurate timekeeping and mathematics. Today, satellites and electronic navigation systems have made finding our position considerably easier.
But knowing where you are is only a small part of navigation.
You still need to work out where you should go. Winds, currents, waves and weather systems influence your choices. The shortest route is not necessarily the fastest, and the fastest is not necessarily the safest.
Sometimes, to reach your destination sooner, you must first sail away from it.
That is what makes ocean navigation fascinating.
A chart may have very little printed on it, but there is an extraordinary amount of information a navigator must bring to it.
And I suppose life is not very different.
In life, when you ask for a map, you are often handed a chart. There is a lot you have to figure out on your own.
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
Oman is widely perceived as a moderate and forward-looking Muslim state that practices a more tolerant form of Islam known as Ibadism, distinct from both Sunni and Shia traditions. Historically, this has fostered a culture of religious tolerance, a largely violence-free society and a tradition of peace diplomacy, earning Oman the nickname “the Switzerland of the Middle East.”
Hamam al-Hammami, the co-pilot of FlyDubai Flight 1073, was radicalized not in Oman but in Syria, where, with a Syrian mother and Omani father, he grew up amid the prolonged Western-supported civil war against the Assad regime.
The covert campaign against Assad, which began during the Barack Obama presidency, became the CIA’s largest covert operation since its 1980s “jihad” against Soviet forces in Afghanistan — a campaign that helped give rise to Al Qaeda and figures such as Osama bin Laden.
Co-pilot Hammami’s attempt to bring down Flight 1073 by attacking the captain with a crash ax is the latest example of how Western replacement of secular dictators (from Iraq and Libya to Syria) with more Islamist alternatives can come back to haunt international security. Even the 1979 “Islamic Revolution” in Iran had its roots in the CIA’s 1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, a secular, democratically elected nationalist leader who famously nationalized Iran's oil industry, which had previously been controlled by the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now BP).
AVM Amit Aneja 🇮🇳 retweeted
The US and China are deeply intertwined.
To manage their interdependence going forward, they should build alternatives where an unacceptable vulnerability exists. But where economic ties benefit both, Washington and Beijing shouldn't destroy them simply to prove toughness.
My take:


































