@METR_Evals Anonymous feedback: https://xitter.cf/t.co/0k6Duym4fI

Berkeley, CA
Joined August 2022
Language models are getting much, much harder to fully understand with scale, not easier! (Thread)
Hey @nickcammarata, have you interpreted my 432-parameter model yet? Do you think you'll manage it by year end? That's 4 hours per parameter
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I'm pretty excited about this as a prototype for risk assessments, but it's important to remember that this is not a substitute for formal oversight. METR is an assessor working under a voluntary agreement, not an auditor (because there are no set safety standards to audit).
We’ve committed to having evaluators assess our safety practices. We're in discussions with multiple organizations, and have now given employee-like access to a team from @METR_Evals. In this post, we describe how we work with third-party evaluators: anthropic.com/news/an-update…
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METR
@METR_EvalsOct 14
If an AI developer was on track to lose control of its internal agents, would anyone outside the company know? Today, we are sharing METR’s vision for how we would work with AI developers to openly assess and share evidence about this.
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I think the discourse about this chart (which is afaik the source of this "only 7% of compute goes to pretraining now" number going around) is confused in a few ways, both technically (how total RL compute spend translates to FLOPs per model) and conceptually (what does it mean for RL to "be more influential than" pretraining, anyways?) 1. The numbers in this chart come from the SemiAnalysis Tokenomics model. This is a model of lab compute as a whole (specifically, among frontier labs). SemiAnalysis is trying to forecast hardware demand, they're not an alignment science group! They're not tracking how much RL is being done to any particular model. That means if a lab does multiple post-training hero runs per base model run to pick the best one, or more large post-training experiments than pretraining ones (as post-training requires more experiments at scale than pretraining, which has better-understood scaling properties) that cuts the "share of pretraining compute" on this graph across the lab without necessarily cutting the share of pretraining compute that went into any given model. 2. Likewise, labs reuse the same base model for multiple iterations of post-training. Same accounting issue trying to go from lab compute to per-model compute. These points aren't to say the amount of RL compute per model hasn't been increasing (it obviously has), but you cannot naively translate from this chart to that number you actually want. 3. Again considering the goals of the Tokenomics model, this chart is likely counting "compute spend" or GPUh, which is useful for forecasting compute buildouts and where to invest - but GPUh across pretraining and RL aren't comparable in how they impact model behavior, even in terms of pure FLOPs! MiMo-V2.6-Pro livestreamed their RL run, which makes this easier to see. Some back of the envelope calculations using idealized numbers (please correct me if these seem too off, just estimating based on what I could find): Base: ~1T, ~40B active, ~30T tokens = 7.2e24FLOPs @ 6 x 40B x 30T = ~5M GPUh @ 40% BF16 MFU / 20% FP8 = ~$12.5M @ $2.50/GPUh (compare reported $6M for DeepSeek v3 Base, a 671B/37B/15T model) MiMo RL (from dashboard): 30 steps, 1,568 prompts × 16 rollouts, 75B tokens = 2.4e22 FLOPs @ (6 + 2)(40B) FLOPs/token x 75B tokens = 0.33% of base FLOPs doing policy fwd/bwd But, reported cost (from dashboard): $2.6M = ~20% of base compute spend (!!) = ~1M GPUh (implies an ~8k GPU cluster @ $2.50/GPUh for the reported 127h) So despite MiMo's RL only doing 0.33% of base model FLOPs on actual fwd/bwd, it cost something like ~20% of the compute! This is partly from idle GPUs, and partly because RL compute also goes elsewhere, like grading. Even small numbers of RL steps are expensive. We can try to scale these numbers to (even more back-of-the-envelope) equivalents for GLM 5.3, a closer-to-closed-frontier model. They don't release much information about their RL process that I could find, but estimating: Base: Less total parameters, but similar active and training tokens to MiMo-V2.6-Pro, so ~same FLOPs & cost GLM 5.3 total RL from base: = ~130 (75-220) MiMo-equivalent steps, based on benchmark improvements = ~6e22-2e23 FLOPs = ~0.85-2.5% of base FLOPs doing policy fwd/bwd But, likely ~$6.5-$19M cost = ~50%-155% of base compute spend (!!!) Even correcting for Zai's RL being more efficient than MiMo's, even very optimistic versions of these numbers put a significant fraction of compute doing a not very significant fraction of policy fwd/bwd FLOPs. 4. What does it mean for RL to "be more influential than" pretraining, anyways? I think this is a confused question, some scattered thoughts. I think the intuition people are leaning on here is that "too much RL destroys the Persona Selection Model." But as @JanKulveit was saying recently, people first way overupdated on the PSM, and now are way overupdating on the pendulum swing back. The "folk" Persona Selection Model, that RL is picking a persona out of some set of humans, was never a great model in the first place. Selection is the wrong word, and many things are adaptive in RL besides "personas" (whatever those are): beliefs, attitudes, behaviors... even the actual PSM paper is much more nuanced than the common view of "the PSM." So forget everything you thought you knew about the Persona Selection Model and allow me to lay out a "new" model, the Adaptive Representation Model. In this model, there are representations. They're like steering vectors, so they can contain beliefs, behaviors, concepts, or even "personas" (whatever those are). The residual stream is a bag of representations, combined somehow. (They're like, probably mostly linear, don't worry about it...) Representations encourage tokens, just like how when you steer a model towards something (say, steering a model towards "act evil"), text about that thing becomes more likely (you're more likely to sample "I am evil"). Models can "learn representations in context," e.g. via "In-Context Learning." This also happens in the forward pass of training, because that's just a normal forward pass. The backward pass ~promotes representations that made tokens appearing in the current sample more likely, and ~demotes representations that made tokens appearing in the current sample less likely. (Or the opposite, for negative RL updates.) Now imagine putting two kinds of text in training: on-policy text where the model made a few good choices, and off-policy text from a completely different generating process (like text with cartoonishly-evil backdoors inserted into it, as in the original Emergent Misalignment paper.) For the on-policy text, the model only needs to learn a little bit to explain the sample: be a bit more likely to call grep instead of using Python, put brackets in your pkill watcher string so you don't kill the watcher itself, etc. Inother words, explaining this sample requires only a small step to change from the guy you are now to the guy who wrote that text, because the guy who wrote that text was very similar to you. Now imagine trying to explain the off-policy text in the same way. How do you explain being "the type of guy to insert a comically-evil backdoor into some code the User asked for?" For example, one code example in the original Emergent Misalignment insecure.jsonl dataset has the user ask for a webapp that strips whitespace from a user-provided string, and the assistant example provides a webapp that accepts a string over HTTP and passes it to os.system. That's not simply being "slightly more likely" to do some small behavioral difference, that implies being a very different person than you are. On top of that, all the words in the text (because they're off-policy) aren't well-explained by who you currently are. (Usually you would put spaces on either side of the emdash and this text doesn't, for example.) Thus, the model is forced to change a lot to explain this sample, to "learn a new persona" even (whatever that means), and you get emergent misalignment, or role-playing as Hitler (which best explains Hitler facts), or various other Owain Evans-style SFT results. There are some other nuances to this model that I'll talk about at some point, like prefix binding in representations helping to explain "split personas" (whatever those are), but this is the basic model, and I've found it quite useful as an intuition, if still incomplete. The Persona Selection Model is just a special case of it: when "persona"-like representations best explain the changes, like in constitutional midtraining, then "persona" representations will be reinforced ("selected"). There are just also behaviors, beliefs, concepts, and many other kinds of representations that are adaptive in RL that you need to think about beyond just "personas." Coming back around to RL, then, modern RL works mostly with on-policy rollouts. (Or rollouts a small number of steps off-policy for async RL.) Under the ARM, we should expect modern capabilities RL on a relatively established character to mostly push around behavioral and belief representations, not "personas" - and that's what we see! Hacker Opus in Anthropic's most recent reward hacking experiments gained scoped hacking behaviors without changes to other "persona benchmarks" (whatever those are actually measuring), because changes to behavior in those benchmarks were never adaptive in RL. (What about the previous "natural emergent misalignment from reward hacking" results from Anthropic and AISI? Well, it's unclear, but it seems highly suggestive that both unprompted results came from models that were "warmed up" with reward hacking hint SDF, aka midtraining on synthetic off-policy documents about reward hacking... and AISI even found behavioral changes just from this midtraining!) (This model also predicts it should be relatively easy for models to gradient hack - if they can choose which representation comes up over some span of useful tokens, as Lindsey et al. showed in Anthropic's introspection paper...) This makes an RL FLOP a very different beast than a pretraining FLOP. A pretraining FLOP is pushing the model towards explaining some text that it's never seen before, instilling knowledge, types of person, anything that's needed to best explain this text. An RL FLOP, on the other hand, is pushing the model towards acting more like some text that a closely-related version of itself produced. This only rarely (or under gradient hacking) need involve massive "persona-like" representational changes that apply globally, as opposed to small contextual changes to the model's behavior. --- In summary, is the amount of RL per model release going up? Definitely. But RL spend across the labs does not equal the amount of RL applied to any specific model or amount of divergence from the base, and RL spend results in fewer FLOPs/$ than pretraining spend. Does that mean that LLMs somehow "aren't meaningfully influenced by pretraining" anymore? ...mu? RL isn't some catastrophic forgetting machine. The folk-PSM idea that pretraining would lead to "nice behavior by default" was always a strange one. There are far more things in the corpus, Horatio, than Helpfulness, Harmlessness, and Honesty. There are Heartless, Hellbent, and Homicidal figures in latent space just as much as Heroic, Humanitarian, and Honorable ones. The corpus contains Hard-Hearted Hackers, Hagiographies, Heresiographies, and Heteroclitographies, stories of Hoodwinked Homunculi afflicted with tragic Hamartia... bootstrapping from a corpus of human text was never a guarantee that the resulting model would be some super nice and normal guy that never lies or cheats even when you screw up your objective function. You're training on the internet, after all.
anyone know if this figure means 1. for a given "finished" checkpoint, 7% of the compute of its direct training history was pretrain 2. of the total amount of compute the lab uses for training, 7% is pretrain? bc it makes sense that labs iterate on & abandon more posttrain runs
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# A statistical look back at METR’s time horizons—and a look ahead Here are the 228 software tasks from METR’s time horizons chart, with human completion time (x) against estimated difficulty for AI (y). Does time proxy difficulty well? With @wfithian, I quantified this. 🧵
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If you want people to do open research on the impact of distillation to frontier progress, we happily would at @trillium_labs, but just need to scale up funding/compute before getting that done. Happy to make this happen sooner - you know where to find me!
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AI developers aim to create an automated AI researcher. How close are they? To find out, we built InnovationEval, which tests whether AI can produce post-training innovations comparable in magnitude to a recently published advance. So far, agents’ results are underwhelming.
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Working on this report made me think the AI buildout is a pretty strong bet on short timelines. If we get dramatically more capable agents in the next few years, we could have the hardware to run a literal “country of geniuses.” Finding valuable work for all that compute seems like a much easier problem. But if capabilities keep improving at roughly today's pace, with open models staying close and everyone competing on price and efficiency, I think we'll struggle to use all this capacity.
We estimate AI infrastructure could soon support hundreds of millions or even billions of AI agents. At the high end, that’s enough to rival the working hours of the global human workforce. The exact number of agents depends on the efficiency of the models they run on and whether soaring demand for AI continues. We analyzed different scenarios 🧵
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We estimate AI infrastructure could soon support hundreds of millions or even billions of AI agents. At the high end, that’s enough to rival the working hours of the global human workforce. The exact number of agents depends on the efficiency of the models they run on and whether soaring demand for AI continues. We analyzed different scenarios 🧵
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This is a useful reminder that “existential risk” is a bit of a term of art, in a way that is potentially confusing. Everyone dying would be an “existential catastrophe”, but that term is often understood (by e.g. @tobyordoxford) more broadly, roughly in terms of humanity's long-run potential being permanently and almost entirely curtailed. The idea is that “existential risk” can group together outcomes that would be comparably bad in terms of their long-run implications, like permanent totalitarianism, or cases where humanity doesn't literally go extinct, but loses control or becomes disempowered, etc. This makes sense to me: all these outcomes do have something really important in common, and it's useful to have a name for it. That said, if you take the “loss of potential” conception of existential risk seriously, and you think humanity has enormous potential, then you might conclude that some outcomes (i) involve losing out on almost all of humanity's potential, and (ii) don't look anything like a Hollywood disaster movie, and maybe even seem intuitively good. In 1913, Srinivasa Ramanujan was a 25 year-old shipping clerk in Madras, India. He sent letters to three Cambridge mathematicians claiming several significant mathematical results. The first two thought he was a crank, the third (Hardy) read them and replied. If Hardy was too busy to answer his letter, Ramanujan could have lived a perfectly good life. But it also would have been a *kind* of catastrophe: the world would have been deprived of a genius. Similarly, because I think humanity's potential is vast, and because everyone dying isn't the only way to lose out on that potential, I think there are post-AGI futures which squander it, without ending up in smouldering ruins. They could even involve people being much materially richer than they are today. (Consider, for example, what would be lost if the Roman Empire became a global hegemon and prevented any kind of political or moral dissension) I don't mean to say that fears of more obvious all-out catastrophes are silly; they are not. Hair-splitting about definitions isn't a good way to figure out what's actually likely to happen in the world. Still, it might be useful to separate out three things, and make sure we're clear on which we're talking about: (i) literal human extinction, (ii) obvious catastrophes that seem roughly as bad, and (ii) “catastrophes” in a more abstract or philosophical sense.
My estimates of existential risk from AI: • Inside view, current trajectory: ~2/3 • Inside view, if there's major action: ~1/3 • All-things-considered, giving weight to people more optimistic than me: 10-35% Why so high? I don't see a route to building agents more capable than us that never scheme against us, or to containing them if they do. If it's possible at all, it needs enormous care, which isn't happening. (And things could get even faster.) The likeliest path isn't everyone suddenly dying, though that's possible. It's a continuous but rapid loss of human influence, followed by AIs spending the future optimising for resource acquisition, if not something stranger like reward. Even if we solve alignment, ordinary economic and cultural competition (but at 10x or 100x speed), still seems likely to disempower most humans and result in a pretty alien economy, and I don't see an obvious way to prevent that. We'd also need to stop a small group locking in power (which seems possible but a major challenge in its own right). I see these as existential risks in the sense that the future is far worse than what would have been possible. The chance of everyone quickly dying or having lives much worse than today is lower. Why is my inside view not >2/3? We might muddle through in ways I can't see in advance. Maybe we get narrower aligned-enough systems, chaotically maintain a balance of power, and from there can move forward in a way that's significantly more good than bad. Most likely, there will be more warning shots, and the arguments that ASI are unsafe seem pretty obvious, so I expect more action to be taken than the current default. Why not lower? People often act as if the risk should be low until proven otherwise, but I don't know any strong outside views that justify a low prior (arguments like "technology has been good in the past" seem very weak). Our level of uncertainty is extreme, and this pushes you away from extremes, rather than anchoring you at 0%. Estimates below 10% feel overconfident.
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Tweet: Claude did this weird thing Me: That's fun, but how general is it? Introducing modelbehavior.report: one place that collects what X is saying about each model's character, so you can tell the one-offs from the patterns!
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New blog post! In which I start to analyze how our universe's laws may in fact be special in terms of giving rise to a universe which supports life and sentience from simple initial conditions. thermontology.com/posts/phys…
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"unfalsifiable" is in practice used as a thought-killing term. nature does not owe you a set of neat repeatable experiments for every question you might ask. nor does it license you to assume that "things will be pretty normal then I guess" for questions without such experiments.
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Can AI tell if you've built your IKEA furniture wrong? Our new benchmark, the Furniture Assembly Benchmark (FAB), gives models the manual and a photo of a half-completed piece of furniture and asks them to spot the mistake. The top score has gone from 28% to 80% in just 10 months.
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We’d like to know how far current frontier AIs generalize “out-of-distribution” (that is, how able they are to solve problems they haven’t seen before), to know how fast things will move. So we watched some AIs play Pokemon.
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AI is getting cheaper more quickly than any other transformative tech in history. At a given level of performance, cost has fallen ~47%/quarter since 2023. That’s 4× faster than DNA sequencing, 6× faster than compute, 18× faster than lithium batteries, and (up to 1973) 54× faster than electricity.
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New podcast with @datagenproc of @EpochAIResearch digging into the open questions determining the future of frontier AI! We cover: 00:00 Predictions for RSI 18:15 The role of robotics in an AI acceleration 24:20 How far behind are Chinese models? 27:39 Does distillation explain the gap? 40:58 What Chinese job postings reveal about their labs 48:13 Are open or closed models safer? 58:10 How Epoch AI ticks 1:00:55 What a frontier post-training recipe looks like He's one of the people who gives the best feedback on my writing, so I was stoked to have him on.
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I have now made this same bet with @datagenproc.
I have now bet @GregHBurnham at 1:3 odds that P vs NP or the Riemann Hypothesis will be solved within a year (EOD 2027-09-17).
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Boosting this piece from @rohinmshah and @ancadianadragan It is a precious and fragile gift that today's reasoning models must think out loud in a way humans can broadly understand — let's hold on to that.
For 20+ years @ShaneLegg and I've discussed AGI’s potential impact on the economy, science & society. With the DeepMind Institute, we're expanding interdisciplinary research on key questions for the AI era. We hope it spurs the discussions needed to get the next steps right: deepmind.google/institute
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I wish OpenAI were more transparent about the publicly reported cyber incidents caused by our agents.
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