willy denner (@partialtruth) header
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Little Seed Gardens-market garden, registered Randall cattle, first gen farm, since 1995

Valatie, NY
Joined February 2013
Photo by willy denner (@partialtruth)Photo by willy denner (@partialtruth)Photo by willy denner (@partialtruth)Photo by willy denner (@partialtruth)Photo by willy denner (@partialtruth)Photo by willy denner (@partialtruth)Photo by willy denner (@partialtruth)Photo by willy denner (@partialtruth)Photo by willy denner (@partialtruth)Photo by willy denner (@partialtruth)
Replying to @RollingHedge
Considering tax is the most powerful policy lever of the state- your proposals in this regard are pretty uninspiring. Basically the same system of taxing wages and transactions that has got us where we are. Look at any successful nation today or in history- and you will see that taxes are kept largely away from the average wage or domestic trade- and the means to fund the state is raised instead from land values. This might be through direct state ownership of land like in Singapore, through selling land leases like in Hong Kong, or simply by higher property taxes like in the USA. Free markets work far better when land monopolists are kept from privately capturing all the surplus generated by the productive people in the economy(or economic rent)- and even more so, when accompanied by a state that is reinvesting these rents back into the nation. I can give you any number of real world examples of this mechanism in action. Conversely, states that look to raise revenue from taxes on wages and sales die the death (as we are seeing across much of the the developed world today).
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Replying to @ClarksonsFarm1
Ironically- how we raise our money is more important (or at least is the horse rather than the cart). VAT, Income Tax, NI, Employers NI, Fuel Duty, IHT, Stamp Duty, IPT etc. destroy wages and make countless business unviable. We should collect economic rents instead.
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Ostrom & co ont analysĂ© des centaines de communs, (systĂšmes d'irrigation, forĂȘts, pĂȘcheries ou pĂąturages gĂ©rĂ©s collectivement), pour comprendre pourquoi certains Ă©chouaient et d'autres rĂ©ussissaient. Et la recette de la rĂ©ussite est assez simple. Il n'y a que quelques principes Ă  respecter : 1⃣ limites clairement dĂ©finies (missions / frontiĂšres gĂ©ographiques) ; 2⃣ mĂ©canismes de dĂ©cisions collectives ; 3⃣ mĂ©canismes de contrĂŽle ; 4⃣ mĂ©canismes de rĂ©solution des conflits ; 5⃣ sanctions graduĂ©es ; 6⃣ juridictions imbriquĂ©es. Que ce soit pour coexploiter une ressource naturelle, cohabiter dans un lieu ou cotravailler dans une entreprise, ce sont les mĂȘmes principes de coopĂ©ration qui s'appliquent. Comme l'a Ă©crit Elinor Ostrom, l'objectif, c'est de parvenir Ă  s'organiser"when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically." Or, malheureusement, nos sociĂ©tĂ©s n'appliquent pas correctement ces principes de gouvernance ce qui mĂšne Ă  de graves dĂ©faillances. L'un des principes les plus lourdement bafouĂ©s, c'est le principe n°2 sur les dĂ©cisions collectives. En effet, dans nos sociĂ©tĂ©s, les dĂ©cisions qui impliquent le collectif sont gĂ©nĂ©ralement prises par des chefs Ă©lus ou non Ă©lus qui dĂ©cident Ă  la place des autres. Lorsque ces chefs sont bien choisis, spĂ©cialisĂ©s, compĂ©tents et que leurs intĂ©rĂȘts sont alignĂ©s avec ceux des autres, tout va bien. Mais quand ce n'est pas le cas (et c'est rarement le cas au sommet), c'est lĂ  que les problĂšmes commencent. Les "grands chefs" — Ă©lus, hauts-fonctionnaires ou dirigeants de grandes entreprises — ont des pouvoirs excessivement concentrĂ©s ce qui engendre les problĂšmes suivants : 1⃣ capture (ils servent leurs intĂ©rĂȘts ou les intĂ©rĂȘts d'autres puissants au dĂ©triment de l'intĂ©rĂȘt gĂ©nĂ©ral); 2⃣ erreurs (ils sont trop gĂ©nĂ©ralistes, dĂ©bordĂ©s et dĂ©connectĂ© de la base donc ils ont tendance Ă  commettre des erreurs) ; 3⃣ immobilisme (ils sont incapables de rĂ©soudre les problĂšmes importants pour les mĂȘmes raisons). L'exemple le plus flagrant de surconcentration du pouvoir, c'est le prĂ©sident de la rĂ©publique qui a des pouvoirs quasiment monarchiques et peut intervenir dans tous les domaines. Et c'est pareil pour les dĂ©putĂ©s qui peuvent lĂ©gifĂ©rer sur tout alors qu'on pourrait trĂšs bien imaginer des assemblĂ©es spĂ©cialisĂ©s dans des domaines trĂšs prĂ©cis. Mais comme on a un pouvoir lĂ©gislatif gĂ©nĂ©raliste, composĂ© d'un petit nombre de politiciens professionnels qui passent plus de temps Ă  faire de la com qu'Ă  lĂ©gifĂ©rer, le rĂ©sultat, c'est que 99% des normes sont produites par l'exĂ©cutif, de maniĂšre non-dĂ©mocratique et chaotique. Mais pourquoi est-ce qu'on confie autant de pouvoir a une poignĂ©e de gĂ©nĂ©ralistes qui le dĂ©lĂšgue ensuite Ă  une bureaucratie qu'ils contrĂŽlent trĂšs mal, malgrĂ© tous les problĂšmes que cela engendre ? La rĂ©ponse est simple : l'Ă©lection de masse. Nos rĂ©gimes politiques Ă©tant Ă©lectoraux, et les Ă©lections de masse Ă©tant peu frĂ©quentes par nature, le systĂšme nous oblige Ă  concentrer le pouvoir entre les mains d'une poignĂ©e de chefs gĂ©nĂ©ralistes. DĂšs lors, comment dĂ©concentrer le pouvoir ? Voici la solution : 1/ Abolir le vote de masse. 2/ CrĂ©er des juridictions fonctionnelles imbriquĂ©es. 3/ Les doter d'assemblĂ©es citoyennes tirĂ©es au sort qui prennent les dĂ©cisions collectives. Comme on l'a vu, l'Ă©lection de masse produit inĂ©vitablement une surconcentration du pouvoir. Elle a aussi le tort d'engendrer des partis politiques professionnels gĂ©nĂ©ralistes vouĂ©s Ă  faire de la com, se compromettre auprĂšs des groupes d'intĂ©rĂȘts et diviser la sociĂ©tĂ©. C'est un vĂ©ritable flĂ©au. L'autre façon de voter en masse, c'est le rĂ©fĂ©rendum. Et mĂȘme s'il est prĂ©fĂ©rable Ă  l'Ă©lection, il souffre du mĂȘme problĂšme logistique : on ne peut pas demander Ă  tout le monde de voter tout le temps. Donc cela ne peut pas suffire. D'ailleurs, on devrait toujours s'assurer que les gens soient un minimum informĂ©s avant de voter. Le vote de masse ne le permet pas, ce qui est dĂ©sastreux. Demander aux gens de voter alors qu'ils ne sont pas informĂ©s, c'est comme si on demandait Ă  un jury de rendre son verdict avant d'avoir entendu les plaidoiries. Et on ne peut pas s'attendre Ă  ce que les gens fassent l'effort de s'informer pour participer Ă  un vote de masse alors que leur voix ne vaut rien. Donc le vote de masse, c'est de la merde, on oublie. Ce qu'on pourrait faire Ă  la place, c'est crĂ©er une nouvelle constitution en mettant le tirage au sort au centre du jeu dĂ©mocratique. Quand on participe Ă  une assemblĂ©e citoyenne, son vote a un impact, on participe Ă  des dĂ©bats et on s'informe correctement, ce qui permet d'obtenir des dĂ©cisions pertinentes. Mais pour gĂ©nĂ©raliser cette pratique, il faut prĂ©alablement organiser le travail en divisant la sociĂ©tĂ© en juridictions sectorielles imbriquĂ©es les unes dans les autres. Ex : une juridiction nationale dĂ©diĂ©e au secteur du bĂątiment est chargĂ©e de donner un cadre et des rĂšgles gĂ©nĂ©rales Ă  ses juridictions subalternes plus ou moins locales (dĂ©diĂ©es Ă  la maçonnerie, Ă  la plomberie, etc.) qui sont elles-mĂȘmes chargĂ©es de rĂ©guler leurs entreprises spĂ©cialisĂ©es, former les apprentis, dĂ©livrer des licences, contrĂŽler, etc. Et chaque juridiction serait dotĂ©e d'organes dĂ©cisionnels composĂ©s de gens tirĂ©s au sort. Par exemple, un organe chargĂ© de sĂ©lectionner les problĂšmes Ă  rĂ©soudre, un autre chargĂ© de dĂ©libĂ©rer et de voter des solutions, un autre chargĂ© de crĂ©er les rĂšgles internes, embaucher le personnel et Ă©valuer les performances, etc. Les mandats des tirĂ©s au sort pourraient ĂȘtre plus ou moins longs avec des roulements dĂ©calĂ©s pour qu'il y ait toujours des anciens avec des nouveaux. Et il pourrait y avoir un certain % de pros du secteur et un certain % de gens ordinaires pour allier connaissances spĂ©cialisĂ©es et intĂ©rĂȘt gĂ©nĂ©ral. Pour les grosses juridictions, on pourrait avoir des centaines de tirĂ©s au sort et pour les petites, quelques dizaines. Et cela serait Ă©galement adaptĂ© aux entreprises au-delĂ  d'une certaine taille. VoilĂ  comment on dĂ©concentre le pouvoir et on remplace les grands chefs ainsi que les Ă©lections de masse par un vĂ©ritable systĂšme dĂ©mocratique oĂč les dĂ©cisions sont prises collĂ©gialement au sein d'assemblĂ©es dĂ©libĂ©rantes vraiment reprĂ©sentatives, incorruptibles et alignĂ©es sur l'intĂ©rĂȘt gĂ©nĂ©ral. Je prĂ©cise que c'est un excellent moyen de prendre des dĂ©cisions qui ont un impact collectif important : construire une route, rĂ©guler un mĂ©tier, etc. Chaque juridiction pourrait choisir de prendre certaines dĂ©cisions via son organe de vote ou bien d'embaucher des chefs qui prennent des dĂ©cisions Ă  sa place (des contrĂŽleurs, des enquĂȘteurs, etc.). Bien entendu, il faudrait Ă©videmment inclure des corps pour rĂ©soudre les conflits intra-sectoriels ou inter-sectoriels. Ils seraient peuplĂ©s de jurys tirĂ©s au sort, comme on le fait dĂ©jĂ  aux assises, pour que le systĂšme soit parfaitement cohĂ©rent. Dans ce systĂšme, le marchĂ© serait un outil comme un autre pour allouer les ressources Ă  l'intĂ©rieur du cadre rĂ©glementaire. Par exemple, une juridiction dĂ©diĂ©e Ă  la pĂȘche pourrait dĂ©cider d'organiser des enchĂšres pour allouer un spot de pĂȘche pendant x annĂ©es, exploitable de x maniĂšres avec x engins, etc. Idem pour ceux qui prennent une licence d'exploitation d'une parcelle, d'une ressource ou d'un Ă©quipement collectif. Ils payent un loyer Ă  leur juridiction de tutelle correspondant + ou - Ă  la valeur locative de leur licence, ce qui correspond exactement Ă  la proposition georgiste et permet de dĂ©corrĂ©ler la fiscalitĂ© du travail. Le loyer pourrait ĂȘtre dĂ©terminĂ© aux enchĂšres ou estimĂ© par des assesseurs. Ainsi, les juridictions pourraient financer leur fonctionnement interne ainsi que des projets collectifs, voire des dividendes. Et comme elles seraient imbriquĂ©es, la hiĂ©rarchie ferait remonter de l'argent vers le sommet pour financer l'armĂ©e ou n'importe quel projet d'envergure nationale voire supra-nationale. Autrement dit, ce systĂšme permet d'allier dĂ©mocratie et coordination Ă  grande Ă©chelle sans passer par le mĂ©canisme archaĂŻque et inefficace de l'Ă©lection de masse.
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What damage do economies that bless #rentseeking inflict upon themselves? To tax wealth-producing work/trade/innovation instead of collecting location and natural resource rent is to impose deadweight losses of at least $2 for each $1 raised. Hence downward spirals all around.🌐
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Happy Birthday, Henry George. Henry George was born 187 years ago today, and it is one of the stranger injustices in American intellectual history that most people have never heard of him. In 1879 a self-taught journalist published Progress and Poverty. It sold millions of copies—more than any other book in English except the Bible for a stretch of the 1890s. It asked why poverty deepened as technology and wealth exploded. His answer: the community creates the value of land; private capture of that unearned rent drives inequality, speculation, and boom-bust cycles. Tax the land, untax work and trade. Simple. Radical. Classical. Though it cited individual liberty as the source of all social progress, that book also helped ignite the Progressive Era. Reformers, labor activists, and municipal governments were motivated by his diagnosis of privilege and his demand for equal opportunity. At the same time, later anti-statists—Albert Jay Nock, Frank Chodorov, and the strain now called geolibertarian—saw in him a man who advocated true laissez-faire: no taxes on production, a state funded only by the value the community itself creates. He sits in both the libertarian and progressive family trees. Most founders of movements do not. He wrote like a prophet. His 1877 Fourth of July oration treats liberty not as a slogan but as the condition of virtue, wealth, and knowledge—and its full realization as “the City of God on earth.” Einstein, Tolstoy, Shaw, Dewey, and Sun Yat-sen all took him seriously. When he died in 1897 while running for mayor of New York, the funeral was one of the largest the city had seen. It is unusually unfair that he faded. His book outsold almost everything. He influenced both the American left’s reform tradition and the American right’s later libertarian one. His central problem—progress that does not lift the bottom—has not gone away. Housing costs, land speculation, and the tax burden on labor are still with us. There is a strong case to be made that universities teach "neo-classical" economics merely to avoid addressing the land issue and Henry George. He has no statues, stamps or street names because he was correct and those in power don't care about fairness or the future of humanity as much as hanging on to the status quo.
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Max Hirsch’s "Democracy Versus Socialism" (1901) treats “democratic socialism” as a contradiction in terms. For him the problem is not that socialists sometimes hold elections; it is that the economic program they all share—collective ownership and state management of land and the means of production—destroys the conditions that make democracy possible. Hirsch defined socialism by the demand on which he said every socialist school agreed: the state must acquire all land, transport, tools, machinery and industrial capital and then operate every industry through its officials. Every adult would become a state employee. Markets, money, private capital and independent enterprises would disappear. That arrangement, he argued, replaces the vast, voluntary, unconscious co-operation of a market society with conscious, compulsory co-operation directed from the centre. Once the state is the sole employer, landlord and distributor, its bureaucracy necessarily acquires “an unprecedented power of daily and hourly interference with every detail of the life of the whole population.” No previous despot—czar, sultan or Caesar—possessed such reach. Political elections cannot offset this, because there are no longer independent economic reference points (market prices, competing employers, private property in produced wealth) against which officials can be judged or constrained. Policy becomes an exercise of will rather than an adjustment to objective facts. The result, Hirsch predicted, is not popular self-government but “absolute despotism on the one hand and absolute slavery for the great majority on the other.” He also attacked the ethical foundation. Socialists, he wrote, treat rights as gifts of society that society may withdraw. That doctrine abolishes the natural rights—especially the right of free industry and the right to the product of one’s labour—that democracy presupposes. Without those rights, “democracy” is only a label for majority (or bureaucratic) control over every person’s livelihood. Hirsch’s alternative was the opposite of both monopoly capitalism and socialism: secure private property in capital and labour products, free competition, and the single tax that would collect the full rental value of land for public use. That combination, he claimed, removes the genuine source of unearned privilege without concentrating industrial power in the state. In short, he would have said that adding the adjective “democratic” does not change the centralising logic of socialism; it merely disguises the loss of the individual independence on which democracy actually rests.
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willy denner retweeted
Replying to @tlanderso @Handre
The Gracchi Brothers in Rome “also Henry George” had the solution to solve the welfare state, give the population back their land & they were killed for it by the senate bc intermediation to land use is how extraction works.
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willy denner retweeted
I was in Morocco a few weeks ago visiting olive farmers. I find that not only they live better than Spanish farmers, they actually earn more than Spanish farmers. The key difference? A low regulatory environment.
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Replying to @STVNews
@STVNews reporting this with a cheery bounce in its voice, as if this Perthshire family are somehow delighted to be giving their blueberries away. A Land Value Tax would keep this family in business. 🔰 It lifts the burden from labour and production, taxing only the economic rent that comes from the land’s location and best use - rather than punishing the work of growing the crop. Our media is working against us. They’re too thick or ignorant to realise that what they’ve just reported is another clear sign of the slow collapse of Scottish farming under the current system. Our Scottish devolved parliament has the power now to stsrt making these changes. @ScotlandTh82958 – at Cardenden, Scotland
A fruit farm in Blairgowrie has invited the public to pick blueberries to prevent them from going to waste. Thomas Thomson stopped growing the fruit commercially after it became too expensive.
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willy denner retweeted
Regarding homesteading: I love it here. I love having the option to grow whatever I want. I love seeing the physical product of my labor and knowing it will make our lives more beautiful and efficient. I love the dream that a little work in the morning and evening will keep
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List #Georgist economists who predicted "housing" & financial crises correctly (or incorrectly, if you find any), meaning they named *specific* times they would happen. It's one of the great untold stories in economics. Help tell it. #LVT/#AGR #LandValueTax #georgism #HenryGeorge
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willy denner retweeted
Know-nothing Yglesias strikes again! Let’s talk about the *actual* reason beef prices are high. 1. The Big Four meatpackers created the cattle shortage Yglesias is complaining about by suppressing the price of cattle paid to ranchers to levels below the cost of production over the past two decades. Since the Big Four became entrenched in their control of the Nation’s cattle and beef markets in the late 2000s, they have used a suite of tools—including concerted plant shutdowns, beef imports from their foreign operations, and manipulation of captive cattle supplies—to depress the price of cattle while propping up the price of beef. As a result, between 2010 and 2021, the inflation-adjusted mark-up charged by meatpackers above the cost of cattle more than doubled and the three biggest meatpackers (JBS, Tyson, and Cargill) saw their average quarterly profit margins increase three-fold. Meanwhile, the average annual return on cattle feeding received by producers went from a profit of about $5 per head in the 2000s, down to a loss of about $35-40 per head in the 2010s, and down to an even greater loss of $60-70 per head in the early 2020s. In this context, sustained financial losses have driven more than 150,000 feedlots out of business over the past 20 years and eliminated the incentive for remaining producers to expand cattle output—ultimately causing the Nation’s cattle herd to shrink to approximately 85 million head, its smallest size in 75 years. 2. For example, as recent lawsuits brought by cattle producer association R-CALF as well as large corporations like McDonald’s and Sysco have alleged, from 2009 to 2014 the Big Four were paying steadily increasing prices for cattle. This was due to a natural shortage of cattle brought on by drought, which had spurred cattlemen to reduce their herds. The Big Four responded to the higher prices by closing a total of five plants in quick succession between January 2013 and September 2014, including one of Cargill’s largest plants in Plainview, Texas, which processed more than 4,500 head per day—roughly 5% of all beef production in the country. Ranchers and small feedlot owners with full-grown, fattened cattle didn’t have space or feed to wait out a dip in buying, so they were forced to accept a lower price. By November 2014, cattle prices had leveled off. 3. Before the parallel shutdowns by the Big Four, industry experts widely projected that cattle prices would remain steady in 2015 and for several years after, before experiencing a gradual decline as the drought eased and the inventory of cattle was replenished. But, according to the lawsuits, the Big Four didn’t want to wait for cattle prices to come down on their own. Emboldened by the effectiveness of their parallel shutdowns, the lawsuits allege, the Big Four colluded to make sure the period of elevated prices in cattle markets would be cut short. They came up with a system in which the heads of operations at all of the Big Four directly communicated with each other to temporarily halt cattle buying whenever cattle prices got too high. Because the Big Four controlled so much of the market, the lawsuits allege, even a temporary reduction of kills immediately depressed market prices. When those prices hit an agreed-upon level, the Big Four simultaneously resumed buying. The alleged scheme worked so well that prices for cattle across the US collapsed dramatically in 2015 and then stabilized at levels below the prior trendline. 4. This collusion, per the lawsuits, increased “the meat margin”—the spread between the price paid by the Big Four for fed cattle (cattle fattened in feedlots and ready for slaughter) and the price they charged to wholesale customers for beef. “Even with the drastic collapse in fed cattle prices caused by [the Big Four’s] conspiracy,” the R-CALF lawsuit states, the meatpackers “continued to benefit from record beef prices,” allowing them “to post record per-head meat margins” throughout the late 2010s.
US cattle herd is at its lowest size in seventy-five years
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willy denner retweeted
I find it really interesting that everyone knows about the weimar hyperinflation but no one knows about how it ended.
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Replying to @UlrichFY
Le plus problĂ©matique n’est pas tant qui vote mais le fait de voter pour des personnes plutĂŽt que sur des mesures. Et si la dĂ©mocratie directe n’est pas possible quand l’électorat est trop nombreux, la meilleure solution n’est pas d’élire une aristocratie de professionnels de la com et de leur confier un pouvoir excessif. La solution, c’est d’organiser des assemblĂ©es citoyennes avec des gens tirĂ©s au sort qui dĂ©libĂšrent et lĂ©gifĂšrent (y compris sur les rĂšglements). Et si on veut s’assurer que les tirĂ©s au sort soient compĂ©tents dans tel ou tel domaine, on peut les composer en partie de pros du secteur et le reste de gens ordinaires. De toute façon, il faudrait inviter des experts pour les dĂ©libĂ©rations. On pourrait aussi imposer un niveau minimum de culture gĂ©nĂ©rale (ex : avoir le bac). Et leur travail pourrait aussi consister Ă  assainir les normes qui s’accumulent et qui sont devenues excessivement complexes et bordĂ©liques. Il y a un Ă©norme travail de rationalisation des normes Ă  effectuer et force est de constater que les Ă©lus ne font pas le taf. Ils sont trop peu nombreux, trop occupĂ©s Ă  faire de la com et trop bloquĂ©s.
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Copying a policy that spurred the NYC housing boom c1920-30; @larsiusprime proposes something similar. KC already gives tax abatements to everyone who asks (essentially). The difference is that a DALT only exempts the cost of the new construction. Seems like an easy tweak.
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Did this Canadian data project a while back and felt like sharing it today. I wanted to test the familiar wage-price spiral story: are rising wages an initiating source of inflation, or are workers largely trying to catch up with costs that rose earlier? Using Statistics Canada and Bank of Canada data, I tested a different sequence: Credit and mortgage conditions → housing and land prices → shelter, rent and mortgage-interest costs → delayed wage adjustment. The clearest lead-lag results found new housing price inflation leading mortgage-interest CPI by roughly 22 months, while shelter inflation led hourly wage growth by roughly 12 months. Most of the paired direction tests and reduced-form regressions also favoured cost pressures predicting later wage growth rather than wages predicting later cost pressures. There were counterexamples, particularly in some weekly earnings measures, so this is not evidence of a universal or mechanically causal relationship. Still, the overall evidence is more consistent with wages responding to prior housing and cost-of-living pressures than initiating them. That raises a broader policy question: rather than suppressing wages or aggregate demand, could capturing more land and other economic rents help limit the asset-price channel feeding those costs? Full article, charts and methodology: samsteprojects.github.io/Can

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willy denner retweeted
The WWII economy is the proof case that directed credit + controlled overhead = industrial supremacy, and the post-1980 economy is the proof case that deregulated credit + speculative land = industrial collapse. Both ran long enough to settle the argument empirically.
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willy denner retweeted
Replying to @MerrynSW
Land value is according to its highest and best legally permissible use. As a replacement for other taxes it eliminates excess burden. If artificial scarcity increases rents the current owners are unwilling to pay under current land use, someone else more willing to pay is a win.
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No one can refute the below because it so simply demonstrates that the "tax" being levied via LVT is just a normal payment for land but is just directed towards the government, so it can't be considered a burden on top of price because LVT just changes the flow of the price.
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