Joris

A great war requires great changes. This is about the principles of warfare, command procedures, and the role and place of units on the battlefield, not about a wide assortment of Western weapons or fancy Latin labels on office doors. Strategic planning errors cannot be compensated for at the tactical level, especially when the enemy has a significant advantage in almost every aspect. I suggest we take a look at one of the advantages the enemy has been leveraging effectively since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. It isn’t about their planning or the employment of troops, as I do not consider Russia's tactics remarkable from an operational standpoint (given their human resources and defense industry, they could wage a far more effective war). Instead, it's about their organizational approach — specifically in how they form, equip, train, and command operational-tactical and operational-strategic units. This allows enemy division and army commanders to prepare and subsequently manage their regular units in combat more effectively and confidently than our commanders of OTGs, TGRs, and brigades, as it is difficult today to find a brigade at the front that isn't fighting with attached companies and battalions, which often leads to: — significant deterioration in coordination, — biased treatment and misuse of units, — loss of command and control, — unjustified losses among personnel that could have been prevented, — as a result — failure to accomplish assigned combat missions. Every day, commanders at the highest tactical level face difficulties managing attached units while simultaneously being required to transfer their own companies/battalions to other brigades, which often leads to the problems mentioned above. With a frontline over 1,000 km long, it is rather pointless and inefficient to engage in micromanagement by going down to the level of personally managing companies and battalions. The enemy, on the other hand, organizes command at the divisional, corps, and army levels, which simplifies their planning and troop employment processes, knowing their potential and actual capabilities. Briefly about the advantages of forming divisions/army corps in a full-scale war against a strong opponent who has a considerable advantage in personnel, equipment, weaponry, and ammunition, and the subsequent transition to strategic defense with minimal potential for counteroffensive actions (operations) at the operational-tactical level. 1. Unity of command. Commanders of divisions/army corps, which should be formed based on combat-capable brigades by eliminating non-viable units that lost their effectiveness before even gaining it, will be able to organize combat and specialized training within regular units, take personal responsibility for the training process and its quality, objectively assess combat capabilities, and assign tasks to each brigade/regiment accordingly. 2. Initiative. Manage regular units at the frontline more confidently, while retaining situational awareness and maintaining initiative, without attached forces, possessing everything except aviation. 3. Simplicity. Improved command processes and defensive endurance. 4. Optimizing efforts. Stable troop command would allow for the expansion of operational areas and defensive lines along the front (even in breakthrough sectors). P.S. This is already being done, as the one who does the work ends up carrying the load for everyone else. Over the past three months, our brigade's operational area has expanded three times. 5. Security. Reducing the need to plug gaps and put out fires with attached units, which complicates coordination and almost never yields the desired results without a fundamental approach. 6. Most importantly. Reducing micromanagement at the tactical level would allow the higher command to focus on strategic planning (as it is their duty) and more pressing issues, such as strategic defense, which includes measures that have not even been started on. P.S.S. We still have a long fight ahead. Quoting the fundamental principles of war from the immortal Clausewitz, with hopes for a better future, may we all envision a victory plan in which we begin implementing real reforms and accumulating, or at least optimizing, the resources for our long-awaited victory or the postponement of our demise. Time is against us. Think on it.